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ABSTRACT
“Russians in Warsaw: Imperialism and National Identity, 1863-1915” examines 
the links between the Russian imperial projeet in Poland and Russian national identities. 
By studying the development of Russian national identity in the context of the Russo- 
Polish conflict, I am able to define its contours in an important Russian borderland. 
Through the use of archival documents, memoirs, the local Russian press, and the annual 
reports of Varsovian Russian organizations, which I collected in Warsaw’s repositories as 
a Fulbright researcher, I have found that the local Russian leadership was anxious about 
the preservation of Russianness within their community.
The leadership of the Russian colony worried that the lower strata of their 
membership might become Polonized if Russians did not take steps to champion an 
alternative Russian identity. The danger of intermarriage with Polish Catholic women 
(who would then become mothers of “Russian” children), the growth in poverty and 
orphans among poorer Russians, the absence of a vibrant Russian culture in Warsaw, and 
the weak position of the Orthodox Church in Warsaw’s public spaces all became matters 
of great concern to those Russians who feared the possibility of nativization. Also 
contributing to these fears was an ambivalence over Russia’s place within Western 
civilization, particularly when Poles confidently placed themselves within that European 
tradition.
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The Russian responses to this imagined Polish threat manifested themselves in 
numerous architectural projects that solidified a Russian historical and Orthodox 
presence, the creation of charitable organizations that focused on Russian needs, and 
imperial tours that lauded Russian history, culture, and other achievements. As was true 
elsewhere in the empire, local Russians increasingly identified Russianness with the 
Russian Orthodox faith and language. Dynastic loyalty also continued to mold their 
identity. Varsovian Russians insisted on propagating what they believed was truly 
Russian on the imperial periphery as a means of ensuring their own national identities and 
as proof of the permanence of their presence there. The importance of this work lies in 
uncovering the influence of local initiative upon the imperial project that Warsaw’s 
Russians took in order to address their particular concerns and the responses of Poles to 
that project.
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INTRODUCTION
RUSSIA, POLAND, AND NATIONAL IDENTITIES
When members of the Russian colony in Warsaw evacuated ahead of the 
advancing German forces in 1915, Russians had dominated the city for just over a 
century. In 1814 Warsaw became the capital of a revived Polish Kingdom that was also a 
part of the Romanov empire in accord with decisions coming out of the Congress of 
Vienna. This constitutional kingdom, however, proved to have a troubled existence, as 
the Polish gentry chafed under increasing autocratic Russian pressure and thus sought to 
preserve their autonomy. The Kongresowka’s constitutional arrangement finally 
collapsed in 1830 with the deposition of Nicholas I and the Polish declaration of national 
independence. The almost immediate reimposition of Russian control was accompanied 
by the termination of the liberal constitution granted by Alexander I. Polish revolts 
against Russian domination -  beginning with the November Uprising of 1830-31, 
followed by the January Uprising of 1863, and culminating in the Revolution of 1905 -  
poisoned relations between Russian and Polish elites for many decades. Russia’s military 
defeats during the First World War marked the end of the contested Imperial Russian 
presence in the Polish capital as victorious German armies marched into Warsaw in 1915 
before advancing further into the empire’s Baltic and Ukrainian provinces.
The Russian inability to secure upper-class Polish loyalty in this western periphery
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was a frequent source of consternation to the Russians. The two nineteenth-century 
Polish uprisings indicated the potential for repeated trouble along a sensitive border, 
across which lived many Poles sympathetic to anti-Russian messages.1 The strategic 
importance of the region only further contributed to Russian concerns vis-a-vis Polish 
loyalty, especially as relations with the Habsburg and the German empires cooled. An 
important part of imperial officials’ discomfort in this western borderland stemmed from 
the growth of Polish nationalism, which was understandably hostile to Russian 
domination. Irina Livezeanu has observed that “although in control in the center, ethnic 
Russians were a weak minority in both the eastern and western borderlands.”2 Indeed, 
Russians remained the outsiders in Warsaw and elsewhere in Russian Poland despite their 
firm military and administrative control of the region/ Warsaw’s Russian population 
remained small and largely official in character, and Russian land ownership in the 
Kingdom was negligible, even though the state provided advantageous terms to 
prospective Russian landowners after 1863. The nearly total evacuation of the Russian 
colony in 1915 only exposed the thinness of the Russian veneer that the Russians had
‘The Polish upper classes were not monolithic supporters of the nationalist 
movement. The titled aristocracy, particularly the great land holders, tended to be loyal to 
the crown while also attempting to avoid the wrath of the Polish patriotic movement. The 
gentry (the nobles with smaller or no land holdings) formed the base of support for 
independence. Yet the latter group also made up a considerable part of the Russian civil 
service in Poland, even after the 1863 Uprising.
frrina Livezeanu, “Defining Russia at the Margins,” The Russian Review 54, no. 4 
(October 1995), 496.
JA. A. Sidorov, Russkie i russkaia zhizn ’ v Varshave (1815-1895). Istoricheskii 
ocherk (Warsaw: Tip. Gubemskago pravleniia, 1901), 184.
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placed over Warsaw in the course of the second half of the nineteenth century.
An additional problem Russian officials confronted in the empire’s western 
regions during the second half of the nineteenth century was the accelerating construction 
of national consciousness among the various peoples there. National consciousness had 
begun to replace earlier identities which were based upon local, regional, religious, or 
caste affiliations in a highly mixed region. Not only the Poles developed modem 
conceptions of their nation, but evidence of growing national consciousness also appeared 
among such peasant populations as Estonians, Latvians, and, to the horror of officials and 
Russian nationalists, Ukrainians. The western borderlands furthermore contained the 
bulk of the empire’s Jewish population, who had also begun to develop modem national 
identities. During the late nineteenth century, the word russkii in Russian discourse was 
fairly complex and could mean more than the Great Russian population. Russian officials 
included people we now call Ukrainians and Belarusians when using it, and the word 
could also designate those who were “simply ‘loyal subjects’ or ‘non-Poles.’”4 The 
term’s variability under conditions of growing national consciousness only exacerbated 
the problem for Russian officials. In these provinces, the challenge Russian nationalists 
faced was to construct a clearer idea of Russianness while also denying national 
distinctiveness to the Belarusian and Ukrainian peasantries. The concurrent task officials
4Theodore R. Weeks, “Defending Our Own: Government and the Russian 
Minority in the Kingdom of Poland, 1905-1914,” The Russian Review 54, no. 4 (October 
1995): 539. For the intersection of religion and language in defining Russianness, and the 
possibility of “Russian Catholics” see idem., “Religion and Russification: Russian 
Language in the Catholic Churches of the ‘Northwest Provinces’ after 1863,” Kritika: 
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 2, no. 1 (Winter, 2001): 87-110.
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had was to balance developing notions of Russian identity with dynastic loyalty, and at 
the same time disarm other nationalist groups.
In this study, I am primarily concerned with the development of Russian identities 
in an imperial setting. Examining Russian nationality in the Polish Kingdom provides 
insights not only into nationalism and Russification, but also the importance of the 
imperial project in defining Russianness. The changing nature of Russo-Polish relations 
after the 1863 Uprising informed Russian national identities by constructing images of 
the Pole as the “Other.” Thus Russians presented a mirror image against which they 
could compare themselves. The study of Russian identities in Russian Poland also 
furnishes an opportunity to investigate the ambivalence among Russians of their place in 
Europe. The question of how “European” or “Western” Russia was came into sharper 
focus in Warsaw than elsewhere in the empire because Russians found themselves in the 
midst of a Western culture they recognized as legitimate and equal to their own. 
Additionally, the influence of Russian educated society, represented by the clergy, 
academics, and journalists, in imperial borderlands can be investigated by scrutinizing the 
policies and initiatives they advocated. I examine these issues by analyzing various 
social-cultural arenas that concerned local Russians. Varsovian Russian leaders came to 
perceive a problem in mixed Russo-Polish families as a possible threat to Russian 
identity. The charitable social institutions these Russians founded provide an opportunity 
to examine the intersection of nationality and philanthropy. The Russian adaptation of 
public space and imperial visitations will also permit an examination of the notions and 
presentation of Russianness. During the late imperial period, these spheres of Russian
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
life became significant factors in the construction of Russian identities at the empire’s 
western margins.
During the course of the nineteenth century, nationalism and matters of national 
identity became increasingly important across Europe. Ernest Gellner identified 
modernization as the process that produces nationalism. Nationalism’s origins lay in “a 
certain kind of division of labor, one which is complex and persistently, cumulatively 
changing.” The modem industrial society requires a highly educated and socially mobile 
population to meet its ever-changing needs. Thus traditional society, with its panoply of 
more or less rigid social orders, popular cultures, and small educated elites, must develop 
a high culture shared by all social classes to meet the demands of industrial capitalism.3 
Another theorist of nationalism, Benedict Anderson, has noted the development of “print- 
as-commmodity” as an important factor in the creation and propagation of “imagined 
communities.” The evolution of a capitalist, desacralized print culture and industry, 
using vernacular languages, made possible the extension of the community from the local 
to the national levels by including many more people of differing social positions and 
enveloping a wider terrain than was possible before. That print culture not only fixed and 
standardized the vernacular written language, but also communicated the idea of a shared 
nationhood.0 More recently, Rogers Brubaker has argued that a more productive question 
in the study of nationalism has to do with the ways in which “nationhood as a political
3Emest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1983), 24, 55 (italics in original).
°Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread o f Nationalism, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991), 18-19,37-38.
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6and cultural form” has been “institutionalized within and among states” rather than asking 
“what is a nation?” He describes the nation as a “contingent event” and challenges 
conceptions of nations as “real, substantial entities.” Brubaker criticizes approaches that 
adopt “categories of practice as categories of analysis.” His study of nationalism 
emphasizes the performative aspects of national identity and explores the process through 
which the nation is realized in practice, an approach that will be applied in this work.7
Modem nationalists perceived the state’s highest goals to correspond with those 
of the nation, which included ethnic, linguistic, religious, or other criteria for 
membership. As the pressures of international political and economic competition 
increased, nationalism became an attractive tool for nationalists to gamer mass support. 
That popular support was the result of a process of acculturation which created a larger 
national identity out of smaller local cultures. Over time, the concept of nationalism also 
changed as industrialization, acculturation, and education transformed communities. 
“Roads, railroads, schools, markets, military service, and the circulation of money, goods, 
and printed matter provided [shared] experiences,. . .  instilled a national view of things in 
regional minds, and confirmed the power of that view by offering advancement to those
'Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question 
in the New Europe (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 13-16. See 
also idem., Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1992); Jeremy King, “The Nationalization of East Central 
Europe: Ethnicism, Ethnicity, and Beyond,” in Maria Bucur and Nancy M. Wingfield, 
eds., Staging the Past: The Politics o f  Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 
1848 to the Present (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 2001), 112-52; Ernest 
Gellner, Nationalism (New York: New York University Press, 1997); Craig Calhoun, 
Nationalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997);and Etienne Balebar, 
“The Nation Form: History and Ideology,” in Geoff Eley and Ronald Suny, eds., 
Becoming National: A Reader (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 132-49.
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who adopted it.”8 But enlisting the people in a nationalistic program was also dangerous 
for multi-national absolutist states. States that asked for dedication from the whole 
population risked demands from that population for greater involvement in determining 
state interests, particularly as education and literacy became common. By the late 
nineteenth century, nationalist programs became problems rather than rallying cries for 
the leaders of traditional dynastic states such as the Russian and other multiethnic 
empires.
Over the course of the nineteenth century, Russian imperial officials had difficulty 
reconciling the goals of an ancien regime dynastic state with modem nationalism. In 
determining matters of state interests, the autocratic regime continued to think primarily 
in traditional dynastic terms. Geoffrey Hosking has described imperial policy as “state- 
building [that] obstructed nation-building.”* The term “Russian Empire” was more a 
geographic designation than a national one; the “Romanov Empire” would have been just 
as legitimate an appellation. The government was averse to the notion of consulting with 
public opinion on important matters of state. It viewed any mass movements, particularly 
national ones from the 1880s onward, with a deep suspicion. The state’s servitors also 
found nascent Russian nationalism at times uncomfortable and even undesirable because 
nationalist interests did not always align with those of the dynasty or its bureaucracy. It 
found itself hesitant and often unwilling to enlist popular participation for fear of losing
sEugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization o f Rural France, 
1870-1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 486.
sGeoffrey Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917 (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1997), xxiv.
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its autocratic prerogatives to an expanding public sphere.10 Until 1906, there was no 
state-wide elected legislative body, and even then, the regime succeeded in severely 
restricting the newly-established Duma’s legal competence to a point that the last decade 
of Imperial Russia could be characterized as being semi-constitutional at best.
Russian officials also persisted in organizing society according to the estates 
(soslovie) of an ancien regime in spite of the changes that urbanization and 
industrialization wrought in the post-emancipation era. An individual’s social rank, 
usually established by birth, remained an important signifier of privileges -  but not of 
rights -  formally granted by the state. The continued perception of the empire’s people as 
being organized according to an outdated social order was also anti-national in its 
orientation. Russia had a long tradition of coopting local elites who continued to 
dominate the peripheral regions. An early nineteenth-century Russian mock prayer to 
Alexander I exemplified the non-national orientation of state privileges: “O Tsar bestow 
upon your own people what you have already granted the Poles and Finns.” The emperor 
granted elites along borderlands benefits which did he did not extend to Russian 
peasants.11 The Baltic Germans were only the most notable example of such a group.
The central bureaucracy also drew from local noble elites to administer the state from St.
luHans Rogger, “Nationalism and the State: A Russian Dilemma,” Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 4, no. 3 (April, 1962): 253-64; Theodore R. Weeks, Nation 
and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western 
Frontier, 1863-1914 (DeKalb, 111.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996), 1-17.
"Raymond Pearson, “Privileges, Rights, and Russification,” in Olga Crisp and 
Linda Edmondson, eds., Civil Rights in Imperial Russia (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989), 102.
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Petersburg. Thus regardless of national origin, Tatars, Swedes, Germans, Poles, and 
others joined Russians in managing the bureaucratic machinery and ruling over the 
empire’s peoples. Bureaucrats of aristocratic Baltic German origin, for example, had 
authority over Russian peasants; no automatic privilege came to a subject for being 
Russian. Officials at the turn of the twentieth century continued to think in primarily 
non-national terms even when they expected the next war to be with Germany and 
Austria-Hungary. Baltic Germans continued to hold many key military and civil posts 
along the strategically sensitive western border, particularly in Russian Poland.
According to an old-regime frame of reference, national origin did not matter as much as 
loyalty to the dynasty and social origin; thus there was no problem with Baltic German or 
other non-Russian officers being stationed along that border.
The difficulties the state faced in reconciling its dynastic interests with 
nationalism and modernization only worsened with the transformations introduced by the 
Great Reforms of the 1860s and 1870s. However much these reforms had dismantled the 
political and especially the social structure of the ancien regime, they left much the same. 
As well as serf emancipation, the Great Reforms of Alexander II included judicial, 
military, censorship, zemstvo or local government, and urban duma reforms that aided in 
the modernization of Russia. Some space was opened for public participation. The 
possibility of greater legality, zakonnost’, became possible with an independent judiciary. 
Most importantly, the peasantry had finally been freed from bondage to noble 
landowners. The problem, however, was that these reforms were incomplete. Zemstvo 
and urban duma competence was severely constrained, peasants were still tied to their
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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village communes and treated separately by the law, and the courts could be 
circumvented by administrative means. At heart, the reforms left the autocracy with its 
bureaucracy intact. Under Alexander III, these reforms were trimmed to reduce their 
ability to infringe upon autocratic prerogatives.12
Although the autocracy preserved its political power and the reforms were only 
partial, the process of modernization had begun to transform Russia and influence the 
state’s nationalities policies in the last decades of the imperial era. Modernization entails 
the social and economic transformation of society from one characterized by social 
estates determined by birth to one of economic classes with expectations of political 
participation among a wider public. The modernizing pressures of urbanization, 
industrialization, increasing literacy, and greater social mobility described by Ernest 
Gellner did exert nationalist pressure upon the regime. The Polish Uprising in 1863 
spurred vehement responses in the Russian press, even among the more liberal Russian 
publicists.13 During the 1870s, the rise of Balkan Slav nationalisms excited many 
Russians who called upon the Russian state to engage the weakening Ottoman Empire in 
a more openly nationalist manner.14 The growing power of nationalism in domestic and
12On the Great Reforms, see W. Bruce Lincoln, The Great Reforms: Autocracy, 
Bureaucracy, and the Politics o f Change in Imperial Russia (DeKalb, 111.: Northern 
Illinois University Press, 1990); and Ben Eklof, John Bushnell, and Larissa Zakharova, 
eds., Russia’s Great Reforms, 1855-1881 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).
13For examples see Henryk Gl^bocki, Fatalna sprawa: Kwestia polska w 
Rosyjskiej mysli politycznej, 1856-1866 (Krakow: Arcana, 2000); and Mikhail N. Katkov, 
1863 god (Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1887).
14Rogger, “Nationalism and the State,” 260.
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foreign affairs among other European states such as the United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, and Italy also played a role in making nationalism a more common part of 
political calculations. Under Alexander III, and even more so under Nicholas n, the 
script adopted for their “scenarios of power” shifted away from that of a European 
emperor who ruled above all his ethnically diverse subjects towards that of a Russian 
(russkii) tsar.15 By the early twentieth century, the autocratic government did pursue 
more clearly nationalist policies. One notable example was Petr Stolypin’s project to 
introduce zemstvos to the western provinces (roughly present-day Belarus and Ukraine) 
in 1910-11 in a form that ensured “Russian” (primarily peasant) dominance at the 
expense of the predominantly Polish gentry landowners. The zemstvo was an elected 
institution of limited local self-government which was responsible for building roads and 
bridges, education, public health, and veterinary services.10 Another act of legislated 
nationalism was the separation of the Kholm/Chelm region from the Polish Kingdom in 
1912, which was spearheaded by the Russian Duma delegate from Poland and Kholm 
Russian Orthodox Bishop Evlogii in an attempt to ensure Orthodox hegemony over a 
mixed population .17
15For more on the political mythology and ceremony of the empire see Richard 
Wortman, Scenarios o f Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy, vol. 2 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
16The electoral system guaranteed that the nobility dominated the zemstvos. 
Authorities did not introduce them in provinces which had no strong Russian noble 
presence. Thus the institutions were not introduced in Russian Poland, Siberia, the far 
north, or the western provinces.
17(Mitropolit) Evlogii, Put ’ moei zhizni. Vospominaniia Mitropolita Evlogiia, 
izlozhennye po ego rasskazam T. Manukinoi (Paris: YMCA Press, 1947), 162-229;
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Yet, although the regime pursued a more openly nationalist agenda, it still did not 
embrace Russian nationalism easily. The state’s conservative servitors were hesitant 
about altering large parts of the old regime.18 Mikhail Dolbilov found that “the imperial 
political elite was so slow in absorbing the priorities of contemporary nationalism that 
even those who were most brutal in suppressing the [Polish] Uprising of 1863-64 and 
Russifying the Western Region wanted to ‘dilute’ the concentrated ethnic content of the 
concept of the Pole with categories that were more compatible with the foundations of the 
empire, with the paradigm of imperial statehood.”19 Not only did the state apparatus 
resist surrendering its autocratic and dynastic prerogatives, but Russian national appeals 
threatened the long-term stability of the state. According to Theodore Weeks, the 
“government, far from pursuing a consistently nationalist course, reacted rather than acted 
and was plagued by the fundamentally non-national (or even anti-national) nature of the
Weeks, Nation and State, 132-51,172-92; Abraham Ascher, P. A. Stolypin: The Search 
for Stability in Late Imperial Russia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 329-33; 
Edward Chmielewski, The Polish Question in the Russian State Duma (Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee Press, 1970); and Andrzej Wrzyszcz, Gubernia Cheimska: Zarys 
ustrojowy (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curii-Sklodowskiej, 1997), 19-36.
l8For a survey of the empire’s bureaucratic leadership at the end of the Imperial 
era see Dominic Lieven, Russia’s Rulers under the Old Regime (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1989); and Richard G. Robbins, Jr., The Tsar’s Viceroys: Russian 
Provincial Governors in the Last Years o f the Empire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1987).
19Mikhail Dolbilov, “The Stereotype of the Pole in Imperial Policy: The 
‘Depolonization’ of the Northwestern Region in the 1860s,” Russian Studies in History 
44, no. 2 (Fall 2005), 82. See also idem., “Russification and the Bureaucratic Mind in the 
Russian Empire’s Northwestern Region in the 1860s,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian 
and Eurasian History 5, no. 2 (Spring 2004), 245-71.
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empire.”20 The great problem the empire created for officials or advocates of Russian 
nationalism was that it could not be a nation-state.
Nationalist movements posed serious problems for non-democratizing multi­
national states such as the Russian Empire once modernization set in.21 Hans Rogger 
described the empire’s response to these movements and social changes in terms of a 
“demographic fear” that preoccupied Russian officialdom in the late nineteenth century.22 
The 1897 census counted over 130 different language groups. The East Slavic (Great 
Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian) population made up approximately two-thirds of the total 
population (66.8% of 125 million people), but if the Belarusian and Ukrainian peoples
20Weeks, Nation and State, 5.
21The nationalities issue was also paramount in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
which, like the Russian Empire, had a Polish minority population. Austrian Galicia 
witnessed a rise in Polish nationalism which challenged the Austrian dynastic order.
Keely Stauter-Halsted has described the development of a Polish national consciousness 
among peasants in Austrian Poland as they became political participants and challenged 
gentry representations of the Polish nation. Other studies of Austrian Galicia have 
examined the importance of public celebrations, such as commemorations of monuments 
to the poet Adam Mickiewicz, and imperial tours of inspection in Austrian Poland as a 
means of defining the Polish nation and identifying the seminal moments of the Polish 
past. See Keely Stauter-Halsted, The Nation in the Village: The Genesis o f  Peasant 
National Identity in Austrian Poland, 1848-1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); 
Patrice Dambrowski, Commemorations and the Shaping o f Modem Poland 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Daniel L. Unowsky, ‘“Our Gratitude Has 
No Limit”: Polish Nationalism, Dynastic Patriotism, and the 1880 Imperial Inspection 
Tour of Galicia,” Austrian History Yearbook 34 (2003): 145-71; idem., The Pomp and 
Politics o f Patriotism: Imperial Celebrations in Habsburg Austria, 1848-1916 (West 
Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 2005); and Kai Struve, “Politische 
mobilizeirung und nationale identifikation. Die Wahlbeteiligung der Landbevolkerung in 
galizien 1861-1911,” Zeitschriftfur Ostmitteleuropa -  Forschung 54, no. 3 (2005): 377- 
98.
2/Hans Rogger, Russia in the Age o f Modernization and Revolution (London: 
Longman, 1983), 182,183.
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were separated from the Great Russian, the titular nationality constituted only a plurality 
(44%). The Russian state also included significant Muslim (11%) and Jewish (4.3%) 
populations.23 It did not help that the non-Russian subjects lived primarily along the long 
borders of the empire, thus heightening the danger nationalism posed. Russian 
nationalism could and did alienate peoples along these sensitive borders, and subject 
peoples’ nationalists threatened the empire’s unity.
Closely tied to the issue of nationalism, and one that did much to alienate subject 
peoples, was the problem of Russification. Many Western and Polish scholars use the 
term “Russification” for a variety of policies and outcomes. It has included administrative 
centralization and standardization, conversion to Orthodoxy, and voluntary adoption of 
Russian culture, as well as policies of forced cultural assimilation/4 However, the 
nationalities policies adopted by the Russian state cannot be described as planned or 
systematic. Rather than operating from a single, centrally designed policy, officials 
adopted a situational approach from region to region. In many cases policies were 
reactions to local conditions and diverged widely from policies enacted upon minorities 
in other territories. Even in the arena of law, the empire never created a truly uniform 
legal system to replace the myriad local legal codes. What could be observed across the
^Andreas Kappeler, The Russian Empire: A Multi-Ethnic History, trans. Alfred 
Clayton (London: Longman, 2001), 284-86.
24Edward C. Thaden, “ Introduction,” in Edward C. Thaden, ed., Russification in 
the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1981), 7-9; Robert P. Geraci, Window on the East: National and Imperial Identities in 
Late Tsarist Russia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 9; and Anders Henriksson, 
“Nationalism, Assimilation, and Identity in Late Imperial Russia: The St. Petersburg 
Germans, 1906-1914,” The Russian Review 52, no. 3 (July 1993): 341-53.
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empire were policies characterized by inconsistency and fragmentation.25 Russian 
officialdom refused even to consider that Ukrainians were a separate nation from Great 
Russians and their policies banned Ukrainian publications and national organizations., 
including those that were apolitical. In some regions, such as Kazan (in the Middle 
Volga), Russian authorities considered cultural Russification and conversion to Russian 
Orthodoxy to be desirable goals for a good part of the nineteenth century. Other regions, 
such as the Duchy of Finland, preserved administrative autonomy and an autonomous 
cultural development until the end of the nineteenth century.26
In the case of Poland, harsh policies of administrative, but not cultural, 
Russification followed rebellion against Russian rule. Russian officials generally rejected 
the possibility of culturally russifying Poles because of widely held notions of civilization 
during the nineteenth century which placed the West at the pinnacle of civilization.
Poland had a long history and considerable cultural heritage to establish its “European” 
credentials, while the place of Russia within European civilization was less secure. The 
writer Vladimir Mikhnevich provided one example of such uncertainty on the part of 
contemporary Russians. He wrote that Russification (obrusenie) was not possible in 
Poland because Russia was a “great power in terms of state forces, but very weak in
25Geraci, Window on the East, 7; Aleksei Miller, “Russifikatsii: klassifitsirovat’ i 
poniat’,” J 6  Imperio, no. 2,2002: 133-48.
26See Geraci, Window on the East; C. Leonard Lundin, “Constitutional and 
Historical Background of the Russification Dispute in Finland,” in Edward C. Thaden, 
ed., Russification, 357-72; and Kappeler, The Russian Empire, 276-77; and Orest 
Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, 2nd ed., (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1994), 282, 
283.
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social and cultural ones.”27 Such assumptions even contributed to a sense of inferiority in 
Russian culture. Cultural Russification would have been unacceptable under these 
conditions. Rather than culturally making Poles into Russians, the administration and all 
areas of official life became Russian in language, if  not always in personnel. Thus 
official business had to be conducted in the Russian language, even in the provincial 
peasant courts. This form of Russification attempted to control a rebellious and unreliable 
population that threatened the indivisibility and stability of the Russian Empire.
The Polish historiography of the period, however, has generally argued that state 
policy amounted to cultural Russification. Polish scholars have tended to conflate 
administrative with cultural Russification without examining the state’s intentions too 
closely. Polish historians thus view all punitive policies and centralization as having the 
intention of assimilating, culturally destroying, or denationalizing the Poles.28 One 
recurrent citation of such intentions is Antoni Zaleski’s apocryphal quotation attributed to 
Warsaw’s School District curator Aleksandr L. Apukhtin (1879-1897) that “in ten years 
no mother in this country will speak to her children [in any other language] than 
Russian.”29 A further example of how Polish historians conflated administrative
27Vladimir Mikhnevich, Varshava i varshaviane. Nabliudeniia i zametki (St. 
Petersburg: Tip. F. Syshchynskago, 1881), 5.
28Stefan Kieniewicz, Warszawa w latach 1795-1914 (Warsaw: Panstwowe 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1976), 261-68; and Bogdan Suchodolski, “Nauka,” in Stefan 
Kieniewicz, ed., Polska XIX wieku: paristwo, spoleczemtwo, kultura (Warsaw: Wiedza 
Powszechna, 1977), 439.
29Antoni Zaleski, Towarzystwo warszawskie. Listy do przyjacioBci przez 
BaronowqXYZ (Warsaw: Panstwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1971), 191-92. It should be 
noted that Zaleski, as a journalist, was at times hyperbolic in his writings, which were
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Russificatory policies with cultural Russification is the assertion that Russification failed 
because Polish culture survived in “the home and the family.”30 Although there is no 
doubt that the educational system and official life were thoroughly Russified, such an 
extreme intent as attributed to Apukhtin has not been supported. The government never 
really attempted to impose Russian culture upon the entire population and destroy Polish 
culture.
Even Polish studies that focus upon Russification and state policies vis-a-vis 
Poland generally accept that the state’s goals included the obliteration of Polish culture 
Mid assimilation.31 Among the most exaggerated in this respect has been Agata 
Tuszyriska’s Rosjanie w Warszawie, which encourages readers to perceive a somewhat 
unidimensional portrait of the Russians in Warsaw during the late nineteenth century.
intended for a Polish readership outside Russian Poland. An indicator of the quotation’s 
status as conventional wisdom is the ease with which it appeared, even in discussions I 
have had at the Instytut Historii (PAN) with some academics. For a recent example of the 
quotation’s use in Polish scholarship, see Piotr Paszkiewicz, Pod berkm Romanowow: 
sztnka rosyjskaw Warszawie, 1815-1915 (Warsaw: Instytut Sztuki Polskiej Akademii 
Nauk, 1991), 94; and Agata Tuszyriska, Rosjanie w Warsawie (Paris: Instytut Literacki, 
1990), 36.
30Hanna Dylqgowa, Historia Polski, 1795-1990 (Lublin: Instytut Europy 
Srodkowo-Wschodniej, 2000), 90. See also Stefan Kieniewicz, Historia Polski, 1795- 
1918, 8th ed. (Warsaw: Paristwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1996), 292-95.
31 Witold Rodkiewicz, Russian Nationality Policy in the Western Provinces o f the 
Empire, 1863-1905 (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersyteta Marii Curii-Sklodowskiej, 
1998), 10-11; Pawel Piotr Wieczorkiewicz, “Polityka rosyjska wobec Krolestwa 
Polskiego w latach 1909-1914” (Ph.D. diss., University of Warsaw, 1976); and Piotr 
Paszkiewicz, “W cieniu tronu i oltarza. Polityka imperialna Rosji i jej aspeky 
rusyfikacjne (fazy i przejawy),” in Dariusz Konstantynow and Piotr Paszkiewicz, eds. 
Kultura i polityka: wptyw polityki rusyfikacyjnej na kulturp zachodnich rubiezy Imperium 
Rosyjskiego (1772-1915) (Warsaw: Instytut Sztuki Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1994), 15.
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This impressionistic overview of the Russian community presents them as polonophobic, 
arrogant, and lording over a prostrate Polish population.32 Other scholars made similar 
assumptions concerning the Russian administration that result in a tendency either to 
oversimplify Russian intentions or to define them in terms of Polish suffering which 
inhibit a more careful analysis. Not all have assumed cultural Russification as official 
policy, however. Leszek Jaskiewicz, for example, has described imperial policy as being 
“less interested in denationalizing Poles than in instilling respect for imperial unity and 
loyalty.”33
The idea that the Russian state desired to make its non-Russians into Russians is 
problematic. Although Russian nationalist writers and some authorities may have desired 
such policies, the civil servants who would have been responsible to enact them simply 
did not have the resources or the frame of mind to attempt them. At the end of the 
nineteenth century, Governor-General Gurko’s son Vladimir (himself a civil servant in St. 
Petersburg) described attempts at Russifying (obrusenie) the next generation of the Polish 
intelligentsia as “futile attempts.”34 Andreas Kappeler has noted that “the concept of 
russification is negated by the fact that the policies pursued towards numerous ethnic 
groups were based not on integration, but on segregation and discrimination-”35 The state
32Agata Tuszynska, Rosjanie w Warsawie (Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1990).
33Leszek Jaskiewicz, Carat i sprawy polskie na przetomie XIX i X X  wieku 
(Pultusk: Wyzsza Szkola Humanistyczna w Pultusku, 2001), 50.
34Vladimir Gurko [V. R., pseud.], Ocherki Privislian ’ia (Moscow: Tip. V. V. 
Chicherina, 1897), 332.
35Kappeler, The Russian Empire, 273.
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deemed some peoples to be a threat to the empire’s integrity and then repressed, rather 
than assimilated, them. The most notorious example was the state’s treatment of Jews. It 
restricted them to the Pale of Settlement (roughly the lands of the former Polish- 
Lithuanian Commonwealth) and placed many other onerous restrictions on them.
Russian officials considered Muslim Tatars and Central Asians unassimilable and 
perceived in their literate Islamic cultures a threat that could Islamicize (or Turkify) the 
neighboring smaller pagan populations. After the conquest of the Caucasus in the mid­
nineteenth century, the Russian government forced many North Caucasian Muslims out 
of the empire. For the most part, Russian officials did not imagine such peoples to ever 
be capable of becoming loyal subjects, let alone becoming assimilated into Russian 
culture.36
In the last years of the imperial era, the category of inorodtsy (aliens) expanded 
considerably and the notion that subject peoples could ever be assimilated declined in 
popularity. Initially, the term applied to the various nomadic peoples of Siberia. During 
the conquest of Central Asia, the term’s definition grew to include the empire’s new 
subjects. By the early twentieth century, its use fell upon all the unassimilable peoples of 
the borderlands: Siberians, Muslims (Kazakhs, Tatars, and others), Jews, and Poles. The 
people who were not “alien” were the Eastern Slavs -  the Ukrainians and Belarusians,
36For more on Russian policies towards these peoples see Hans Rogger, Jewish 
Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1986); Austin Jersild, Orientalism and Empire: North Caucasus Mountain Peoples 
and the Georgian Frontier, 1845-1917 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2002); and idem., “Faith, Custom, and Ritual in the Borderlands: Orthodoxy, Islam, and 
the ‘Small Peoples’ of the Middle Volga and the North Caucasus,” The Russian Review 
59, no. 4 (October 2000): 512-29.
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who instead were denied their separate identities. Slocum also found the term being 
adopted by non-Russian nationalists, “some of whom came to see the term as a badge of 
honor.”37 While officials initially used the word to control outsiders, by the end of the 
imperial period they applied it in a manner that had become oppressive to Ukrainian and 
Belarusian nationalists. By denying the status of “Other,” Russian officials refused to 
consider the Ukrainians or Belarusians to be separate nations from Russians. These 
peoples were forced into the Russian nation, while most of the empire’s other peoples 
were explicitly excluded. The term became a defensive means of guarding ethnic 
boundaries.
In the Western borderlands, Russian officials and publicists recognized the 
centrality of the Russo-Polish conflict. Baltic Germans and Finns had long reputations of 
loyalty to the dynasty that only began to weaken after the adoption of Russificatoiy 
policies in the late nineteenth century.38 While prominent Russians such as Mikhail N. 
Katkov and Nikolai A. Miliutin attacked the privileges of Baltic Germans or Finns, Poles 
remained the center of attention of Russian officials in both the Polish Kingdom and the
37John W. Slocum, “Who, and When, Were the Inorodtsyl The Evolution of the 
Category of ‘Aliens’ in Imperial Russia,” The Russian Review 57, no. 2 (April 1998): 
187.
38For an overview of the western provinces see Thaden, Russification', ibid., 
Russia’s Western Borderlands, 1710-1870 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); 
Anders Henriksson, The Tsar’s Loyal Germans: The Riga German Community: Social 
Change and the Nationality Question, 1855-1905 (Boulder, Colorado: East European 
Monographs, 1983); and Weeks, Nation and State.
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Western region.39 The socio-economic position of the Polish gentry (and its large 
numbers), industrial development in the region, the rise of an industrial Polish middle 
class -  which included Polonized Jews and Germans, and the repeated risk of Polish 
rebellion made those who identified with Polish culture in these territories a clearer threat 
to Russian domination there. Furthermore, Russian and Polish nationalists fought over 
the cultural future of the empire’s western provinces. While the Poles referred to the pre- 
Partition boundaries (1772) of their independent state as justifying Polish domination of 
this mixed ethnic region, Russians harked back to the boundaries of the medieval Kievan 
Rus’ state as a way of laying cultural and national claim to this terrain.40
After 1863, the Polish Kingdom became an important locus for Varsovian 
Russians to examine the elements of Russianness that were valuable to them. National 
identity in this western borderland constituted political and cultural practices by Russian 
officials in response to hostile Poles. These practices served to bind them together as a 
group. “National identity is shaped in large part through images reflected in encounters 
with the people of neighboring countries. Russian writers, artists, and publicists 
habitually viewed themselves in the mirror of Polish life and culture, employing that
39The Western region consisted of the nine western provinces that became a part 
of the Russian Empire as a result of the first two Partitions of the Polish Commonwealth 
in 1772 and 1792. In Russian it was the zapadnyi krai, and the kresy in Polish.
40For an example of how this perception affected Russian policies concerning 
Lithuanian peasants see Theodore R. Weeks, “Russification and the Lithuanians, 1863- 
1905,” Slavic Review 60, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 96-114; and Piotr Lossowski, “Russian 
Authorities’ Policies towards National Minorities. Prohibition of Lithuanian 
Publications, 1864-1904,’Meta Poloniae Historica 88 (2003): 65-85.
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mirror to sharpen their perception of themselves as a people.”41 As Russian officials 
administered this “historical” nation that refused to reconcile itself to Russian suzerainty, 
they increasingly were confronted by matters that brought attention to Russian and Polish 
identities. The issues that local Russian officials concerned themselves with included the 
Polonization of “smaller” peoples and of local Russians, the parameters of Russian 
identity, and the Imperial mission in this western periphery. A common thread that ran 
through these matters was the Russian perception of Polish cultural strength and the 
numerical weakness of the Russians. Their responses to Poles and their policies in the 
Polish Kingdom reflected these issues of identity.
The local Russian administration displayed a considerable amount of initiative in 
matters that touched upon Poland and the Russian presence there. Unlike in the Western 
region, where the Russian battle with the Poles centered upon the supposed Russianness 
of the peasantry, the important issue for Russian officials living in the Polish Kingdom 
revolved around the possibility of their nativization and Polonization. Not only was their 
activity a means of asserting that they knew how to address the problem of the Poles best 
because they were closest to the “battlefield,” but it also exposed their own fears 
concerning fellow Russians in this region. Local action, which at times was not in accord 
with St. Petersburg’s policies, often functioned to define more clearly what was properly 
“Russian” from what was “Polish.” Thus, their initiatives served as a defense against 
perceived threats to the interests not only of the empire, but also to the nationality of
41David L. Ransel and Bozena Shailcross, “Russian Identity in Its Encounters with 
Poland,” in David L. Ransel and Bozena Shailcross, eds., Polish Encounters, Russian 
Identity ( Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 1.
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Russians living on the periphery.
The interactions between Russians and Poles played a significant role in the 
initiatives made by the Russian community. Russian officials and Polish educated society 
approached each other with contradictory concepts of Russo-Polish relations that were 
bound to lead to misunderstandings and conflict. Russians in Poland approached the 
region as an integral part of the Russian Empire, and accepted the indivisibility of the 
state for its survival. Poles, however, continued to look to independence, or at least 
genuine autonomy, as the goal.42 As each group misread the expectations of the other, 
responses led to greater frustration and led to a circular process of increasing mutual 
animosities. Whatever measures Russian officials took were certain to be unacceptable to 
Polish nationalists.
Polish nationalists, aristocrats, or intellectuals harkened to a long history of Polish 
statehood when they approached relations with the Russians governing Poland. 
Contemporary Polish historians such as Joachim Lelewel in Warsaw (in exile in Belgium 
after 1831) and members of the Krakow School at the Jageillonian University popularized 
the history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The revived existence of Polish 
statehood as the Napoleonic Grand Duchy of Warsaw (1807-1815) also became an 
important part of the national mythology to Poles. After the 1831 Uprising, Poles
42The Poles, of course, were not monolithic in their goals or national vision. The 
aristocracy tended to accept a closer relationship with the autocracy, particularly as social 
and economic transformation threatened their primacy. Other Polish factions looked to 
the ideal of a democratic republic that included the peasantry. During the late nineteenth 
century, socialism became a goal for still other Polish activists, and even among them, the 
question of national independence was heatedly debated.
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mythologized the era of the Polish Congress Kingdom (1815-1830) into an idealized legal 
relationship with the Romanov state and dynasty. Poles continued to look to the 
autonomy and constitution of the Kongresowka and hoped that some of that liberty would 
return.
Russians who came to govern Poland could not satisfy such Polish expectations. 
Any move to regain control or ensure Russian state interests inevitably were seen by 
Poles in a dim light. Russian officials also refused to countenance a drive for Polish 
autonomy or rights, since granting such measures would have run counter to the state’s 
centralization and rationalization. Russian moves to secure the region only added to 
Polish complaints, which led Warsaw’s Russian leadership to respond more strongly. 
Local Russian initiatives need to consider the nature of the relationship with the Poles and 
the mutually negative responses they elicited.
Other scholars have studied the initiatives of local officials in ethnically mixed 
regions of the empire that may not have squared well with what St. Petersburg intended. 
Stephen Velychenko has described an imperial bureaucracy that was “plagued by internal 
rivalry” which “reflected and perpetuated the diversity of the empire.” In this setting, 
“ignoring directives was so widespread that, in practice, self-rule was the rule.”43 Paul 
Werth has argued that the illegal and forced conversion of Mari “pagans” in the Volga- 
Kama region to Orthodoxy was “a means for establishing and projecting [the local 
officials’] authority.” These local officials invoked their own local expertise to justify
43Stephen Velychenko, “Identities, Loyalties and Service in Imperial Russia: Who 
Administered the Borderlands?” The Russian Review 54, no. 2 (April 1995): 190.
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policies that contravened established imperial policies.44 Robert Geraci has written about 
another example of local authorities who resisted the capital’s policies to limit Tatar 
Muslim secular education in confessional schools (medresses) because of the animosity 
they would generate.45
While St. Petersburg’s bureaucracy attempted to control the imperial periphery, 
the borderlands also influenced identity in Russia’s center. The interplay between 
Russianness and imperialism has been intricate. With the case of Russian Poland, one 
sees that some Varsovian Russian officials and writers attempted to square the circle of 
nation and dynastic empire by practically declaring that the Russian nation was 
coterminous with its empire. Since their presence in Poland was largely a result of the 
Romanov’s imperial project, they not surprisingly attempted to propagate a dynastic 
nationalism and defined their Russian identities through an administrative lens. Although 
national identities have often included or centered upon the peasantry, Russian dynastic 
identity in Poland did not emphasize this class, because the local peasantry had been 
developing distinctive Polish and Catholic identities.
Varsovian Russian nationalists constructed their national identity through the use 
of various cultural means such as historical and other scholarly writing, religion, and
44Paul W. Werth, “Baptism, Authority, and the Problem of Zakonnost ’ in 
Orenburg Diocese: The Induction of over 800 ‘Pagans’ into the Christian Faith,” Slavic 
Review 56, no. 3 (Fall 1997): 457,473. See also Paul W. Werth, At the Margins o f  
Orthodoxy: Mission, Governance, and Confessional Politics in Russia’s Volga-Kama 
Region, 1827-1905 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002). Ultimately, St. Petersburg’s 
officials accepted the legally questionable conversions in the belief that “apostasy” and 
the challenge to authority would be worse than local officials’ violations of zakonnost’.
45Geraci, Window on the East, 291-93, 308.
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architecture. The writing of A. Sidorov and Warsaw University Professor D. Tsvetaev 
helped to construct a collective Russian memory in Poland that also justified the Russian 
presence there. They presented the Russian state’s strength as evidence of the power of 
the Russian people, particularly when contrasted with the demise of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth in the late eighteenth century. The dynasty and its imperial expansion 
became part of the defining features of the Russian nation, while the Poles became 
characterized by the szlachta’s endless debate and disunion.40 The more successful Slavic 
“brother” had to save the weaker siblings who failed in the task of statehood; naturally, 
that help came in the form of Romanov rule over fellow Slavs. The construction of 
Russian Orthodox churches and monuments also imposed a cultural identity that centered 
upon the dynasty and its imperial mission. The writing of men such as Tsvetaev became 
a part of the evidence used to create public space that functioned as sites for a Russian 
dynastic identity.
Varsovian Russian writers also attributed economic development in late 
nineteenth-century Russian Poland to imperial policy and the Russian dynasty’s wise 
choice in administrators for the region. Warsaw University professor V. V. Esipov linked 
the Vistulaland’s (Privislinksii krai, the term he and other Russians used to describe 
Russian Poland after the 1863 Uprising) robust modem economy exclusively to direct 
Russian rule and Nikolai A. Miliutin’s and Prince Vladimir A. Cherkasskii’s post-1863 
administrative and agricultural reforms, which established a landowning peasantry, while
,6For one example of such uses of the Polish past to reflect upon Russia’s, see A. 
Sidorov, K  stoletnei godovshchine tret’ego razdela Pol’shi (St. Petersburg: E. 
Evdokimova, 1895).
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ignoring the advances made by Polish, Jewish, and German investors.47 The notion of 
Russian imperialism coming to the aid of other Slavs became a part of the narrative that 
obfuscated the nature of imperial rule and promoted a more “paternal” concept of the 
Russian nation and its place in the world and among other Slavs.
The emperor, as the embodiment of the state and the nation, was the paramount 
symbol of that paternal Russian national discourse. He was a particularly important 
marker of Russianness because the great majority of the Russians in Poland were 
themselves in state service. One can see how they fashioned their identity on the basis of 
ethnicity, religion, and career choice. The categories of “Russian,” “Orthodox,” and civil 
servant (or officer) fused into a composite identity. These officials performed in the 
imperial narrative as the tsar’s servants on the Russian borderland. Varsovian Russians 
adopted the imagery of the tsars to construct a justification and collective memory for 
their own community. The imprisonment and death of Tsar Vasilii Shuiskii in 1612 at 
the hands of Poles and the visits of emperors extending as far back as Peter the Great to 
Poland all became a part of the story of Warsaw’s Russian community. These imperial 
bonds, however tenuous, also made that local history a part of larger Russian history. 
Furthermore, the events Russian officials highlighted became the means by which they 
drew distinctions between themselves and the Poles; they were loyal and served the 
sovereign, while Poles were suspect, if not treasonous. The expanding role of local
47V. V. Esipov, Privislinskii krai: statistichesko-ekonomicheskii ocherk (Warsaw: 
Tip. Varshavskago Uchebnago Okruga, 1907), 2. Esipov dismissed the first half of the 
century, although considerable investments in economic development were made by 
Minister of Finance Prince Ksawery Drucki-Lubecki before the November 1830 Uprising.
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Russians in the imperial visitations to Warsaw corresponded to the contraction of the 
Polish nobility’s importance at such events. Imperial visitations to Warsaw made 
manifest the ties between Russians and their tsar, while the Poles were increasingly 
relegated to an alien and conquered status.
As well as providing evidence of Polish perfidy, the January Uprising of 1863 
created a gulf between Russian and Polish elites that few could overcome during the 
remainder of Russian rule. Although there was an attempt at a rapprochement (ugoda) 
among a small circle of mostly aristocratic Poles, the Russians governing the Polish 
Kingdom did not reciprocate. Any notion of reconciliation evaporated not long after the 
greatly celebrated imperial tour of Nicholas II in 1897. To a large part of the Polish 
population, the ugodowcy (proponents of reconciliation) were nearly guilty of national 
apostasy; additionally, their generally aristocratic orientation increasingly belonged to a 
previous age of political activity. Among the Varsovian Russians, few considered better 
relations with Poles to be of any genuine value; after all, they did not need the szlachta’s 
aid in governing Poland. Furthermore, relations with Poles that were too close proved to 
be problematic for Russians in these territories. Surrounding oneself in a Polish 
environment, or exuding sympathy with Poles, could threaten a Russian official’s career. 
So-called Polish orientations could be, and at times were, interpreted as being anti­
imperial or anti-Russian. Officials who had more liberal views concerning the Poles 
tended to have brief tenures in the Polish Kingdom; particularly in the early post-uprising 
years, such opinions led to the loss of a post or a transfer to other parts of the empire. In 
such an environment, searching for common ground was not a productive endeavor.
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The social chasm between Russians and Poles extended well beyond matters of 
official occasions or governmental policy. It also led Russian officials to express concern 
over the Poles’ detrimental influence upon their own community’s identity. Varsovian 
Russian leaders discovered a dangerous specter in the person of the Polish woman who 
married the immigrating Russian official. She became the enemy within because of her 
traditional role as wife and mother. From that hallowed position, she could threaten the 
supposedly natural Russianness of their children. Close relations with Poles not only 
threatened civil service careers, they could also endanger the national identity of the 
officials’ children.
A considerable part of the local Russian efforts to define Russian versus Pole had 
much to do with defending and promoting the Russianness of the children of mixed 
marriages. Not surprisingly, the importance of the Russian Orthodox faith and Russian 
language loomed large among those who worried about these youngsters. Who other than 
the mother taught a child its first words and prayers? Russian leaders in Warsaw 
endeavored to foster environments that would mitigate her (and her family’s) deleterious 
influence in the name of preserving the Russianness of that younger generation. Thus 
they set up charities focused upon these children’s needs and established an exclusively 
Russian gymnasium for them. The hope was to create surroundings that were more 
assuredly Russian in order to anchor a sense of the Russian in a hostile and alien setting.
Another important means of anchoring a sense of Russianness in Polish (and 
Jewish) Warsaw was through the command of public space. Along with the ever-present 
Russian uniforms, signs, and government offices that represented the Russian Empire, the
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city’s skyline increasingly bore the silhouette of Russian cities by acquiring numerous 
Orthodox churches modeled upon a neo-Muscovite style. Not only was the Russian 
attention to public space a reaction to Polish nationalism, but it also reflected currents 
appearing in St. Petersburg and other parts of the empire. As industrialization, 
urbanization, terrorism, and a burgeoning civil society threatened the autocracy, Russian 
officials attempted to shore up the image of a regime resting on secure foundations with 
large building projects that invoked a quintessentially Russian era, i.e., one 
uncontaminated by Peter I’s westernization policies. The second half of the nineteenth 
century witnessed a boom in church construction, and the many Russian Orthodox 
churches garnered the most visible and the most important locations. Among the 
important projects was the renovation of the Staszic Palace in a neo-Muscovite style. It 
had both the benefit of adding a Russian visual marker to Warsaw’s center and it was also 
intended to protect Russian gymnasium students within from Polish cultural 
contamination. The other great project of the late imperial era, the construction of the 
Alexander Nevskii Cathedral, occupied one of the downtown’s most prominent locations 
and dominated the surrounding skyline. This church, like the others, made explicit the 
links between Russian Orthodoxy, the Empire, and the Russian nation in Warsaw.
The protection of Russians and Russian interests on this borderland became a 
recurrent theme of Varsovian leaders, particularly at the close of the imperial era. In 
choosing the rhetoric of “protecting the weak,” local Russian officials frequently blurred 
the distinctions between the condition of poor or disadvantaged Russians in Poland and 
the situation of the Russian imperial mission there. These concerns merged with Great
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Russian imperialism and even reached a sense of crisis after the 1905 Revolution, when 
religious toleration was proclaimed and the newly created Duma had a significant 
representation of national minorities. The editors of the periodical Nedelia okrainy began 
their March 19/April 1 issue by declaring that “The Russian cause in this borderland 
[Poland] is undergoing a crisis.” They lauded the efforts of the chief Russian officials 
who fought to preserve and strengthen Russian interests in the Polish Kingdom and tied 
imperial issues to religious-national matters, such as the protection of “Russians” in the 
Kholm/Chelm region.48
While local Russians employed the rhetoric of protection and generally rejected 
the possibility of transforming Catholic Poles into Orthodox Russians, we cannot forget 
that their policies could and did appear to the Poles to be cultural Russification. The 
markers of Russian control became omnipresent and oppressive to Poles, particularly as 
they saw government employment opportunities favor Russian migrants who came to rule 
over them. The Russification of the educational system particularly enraged Poles; to 
them, it was proof that Russian policy intended to destroy Polish culture. Yet, even here, 
if  the policy was cultural Russification, then it was doomed to failure due to a permanent 
lack of financial resources such a policy would have required. Additionally, attendance in 
these schools was not compulsory for all children. The authorities’ intention was to 
regularize state education, to destroy “Polonism” (Polish nationalist separatism and 
hatred of Russia), to control a population of students who had earned a reputation as
48“Russkiia sily v krae,” Nedelia okrainy, no. 2, 19 March/1 April 1907: 1,5.
The article proceeded to praise Governor-General G. A. Skalon, Warsaw Archbishop 
Nikanor, and Kholm-Lublin Bishop Evlogii, who was a member of the State Duma.
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nationalistic troublemakers for the empire, and to create loyal citizens.49
Similar problems surfaced in the empire’s other regions. In the Second Duma’s 
discussions on an education bill in 1907, a Muslim delegate from Kazan said of the 
Russian language and education system there, where only Russian was permitted: “So far 
the government has not tried to spread Russian but to annihilate native languages.” He 
pointed to the failure of these schools in teaching Russian, or anything, for that matter.50 
Similarly, Polish literacy only declined, with little corresponding increase in Russian 
literacy. Those who did go to schools only left with a greater hatred of Russia. Thus the 
Polish language disappeared from official use in government and education, but it 
flourished in the unofficial, albeit censored, arenas of the press and theater.
The sources used to examine the development of Russian national identities in 
Warsaw include previously published sources and archival materials which have received 
little, if any attention. They consist of the Varsovian Russian press (official, clerical, and 
private), charitable institutions’ annual reports, special pamphlets, the 1897 census for 
Warsaw, travel writing, contemporary academic works, and memoirs. Among the 
unpublished materials are memoirs from Columbia Univeristy’s Bakhmeteff Archive and 
the Polish National Library. The Archive of the City of Warsaw (APW) and the Main
49Weeks, Nation, State, and Nationalism, 12-13, Darius Staliunas, “Did the 
Government Seek to Russify Lithuanians and Poles in the Northwest Region after the 
Uprising of 1863-64?” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 5, no. 2 
(Spring 2004), 278.
50Gosudarstvennaia Duma. Vtoroi sozyv. Stenograficheskiia otchety, sess. 2, 
mtg. 38 (15 May 1907), col. 553; quoted in Wayne Dowler, “The Politics of Language in 
Non-Russian Elementary Schools in the Eastern Empire, 1865-1914,” The Russian 
Review 54 (October 1995), 532.
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Archive of Old Documents (AGAD) have provided information on the city’s architecture, 
imperial tours, and some of the charitable organizations of the Russian community.
One of the difficulties with the archival material in Poland relates to the losses 
incurred over the past century. When the Russians evacuated in 1915, die archives 
followed them, and only the materials specifically related to Poland were returned by the 
Soviet Union in the 1960s. Documents relating to the Russians who were there (such as 
personnel files) remain in Russian archives. Naturally, the diaries and unpublished 
memoirs of evacuating Russians also moved with their authors to the Russian interior. 
Another difficulty lay in the unavailability of some materials. AGAD’s holdings of the 
Varsovian Russian Orthodox Church archives were in conservancy when I attempted to 
examine them. The situation of certain collections of the City archive also made them 
impossible to study. The city archive is not as well organized (possibly due to a lack of 
funding) as AGAD. Some materials had never been fully inventoried, and archivists 
would not present them to me since they had no idea of what exactly or how much there 
was; one particularly frustrating example of an unavailable collection focused on the 
Russian Club and an antecedent of the Russian Charitable Society.
The time frame for this study is fairly straightforward. It begins in 1863, as the 
Polish Uprising of that year marked a watershed in the history of Poland and Russo- 
Polish relations. Its occurrence during the height of the Great Reforms only added to its 
importance and to the perception among Russians of Polish perfidy. Russian officials 
arriving in Poland in the wake of January eliminated the last remnants of Polish 
autonomy, and the uprising’s collapse marked the end of Polish Romantic nationalism.
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The choice of a closing date is even simpler; the Russians disappeared as a political 
presence in Poland in 1915, and did not return until late in the Second World War.
Among the omissions in this study is a lengthy account of the impact Polish 
participation in the Revolution of 1905 had upon the Russians. My primary reason for 
not dealing with this subject is that the image of the Pole against which local Russians 
constructed their ideas of Russianness was primarily linked to their traditional notion of 
the Pole and the szlachta as being equivalent. That construction of Polishness was 
already an anachronism among Warsaw’s Poles whose national identity had been 
enlarged to encompass all classes. This last outburst of revolutionary violence in Poland 
witnessed the beginnings of mass political culture with the rise of the National 
Democratic Party, the Polish Socialist Party, and other parties. The old gentry Poles, with 
their notions of romantic nationalism, were a part of the past. Additionally, the 
revolution only confirmed and hardened the Russian officials’ negative perceptions of the 
Pole.51
The secondary literature that I have examined has focused upon studies of 
imperialism and national identities of other western empires, as well as the Russian 
Empire. The historical studies of the British, French, and Dutch empires have provided 
the starting points of my study and offered helpful insights for the methodological and 
structural organization of this dissertation.5z Scholars of European imperialism such as
51For an excellent study of the 1905 Revolution in Poland see Robert E. Blobaum, 
Rewolucja: Russian Poland, 1904-1907 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).
52 Alice L. Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea o f Empire in 
France and West Africa, 1895-1930 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997); Herman
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Ann Laura Stoler have described the uncertain nature of European identity in the 
colonies. She found that “for the European-born, the Indies was transformative of 
cultural essence, social disposition, and personhood itself. His Lamarkian distinction was 
rarely so explicitly expressed; namely, that ‘Europeanness’ was not a fixed attribute.”53 
In a similar fashion, the Varsovian Russian community found the boundaries of its 
Russianness threatened by a highly developed Polish culture.
The example of the Habsburg Empire, although it was also a multinational 
empire, and had some parallels with Russia, had significant differences that make the case 
of Austrian Galicia unlike that of Russian Poland. Most notably, the Austrian state had a 
far more democratic, albeit dysfunctional, political system, while the Russian tsar claimed 
to be the Autocrat of Russia even after the Revolution of 1905. Additionally, Galicia 
enjoyed considerable autonomy with local Polish elites controlling the administration and 
provincial diet (the Sejm). The national conflicts that dominated Galicia were 
predominantly between Poles and Ruthenians (Ukrainians) because few Germans resided 
there or administered it. The primary national issue in the Polish Kingdom was between 
Russians and Poles because of the hegemonic authority Russian officials had over Poles. 
Finally, the Habsburg dynasty consciously avoided the appearance of ruling as Germans
Lebovics, True France: The Wars over Cultural Identity, 1900-1945 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1992); and Andrew S. Thompson, “The Language of Imperialism and 
the Meanings of Empire: Imperial Discourse in British Politics, 1895-1914,” The Journal 
o f British Studies 36, no. 2 (April 1997): 147-77.
53 Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education o f Desire: Foucault’s History of 
Sexuality and The Colonial Order of Things (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 
1995), 104.
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because the nationality problems of that empire made such a position untenable. During 
the reigns of Alexander III and Nicholas II, the Romanov dynasty clearly moved in the 
direction of being a Russian (ruskii) national dynasty. For these reasons, I have favored 
studies of imperialism and nationalism in the British and French empires over those of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire to provide insights into Russian rule over its Polish 
territories.
The field of cultural anthropology has particularly influenced my study of 
nationalism and the construction of ethnic identities. Among the important authors in this 
area have been Fredrik Barth and Manning Nash, both of whom have highlighted the 
importance of boundaries in defining groups. Barth has written about the importance of 
ethnic boundaries for the maintenance of group integrity. The boundary markers of 
ethnicity, such as language, religion, and dress, among others, however, are not the result 
of a group’s isolation from other groups. Rather, ethnic distinctions persist despite 
regular group interactions and become valuable markers of difference as a result of those 
interactions. “Just as both sexes ridicule the male who is feminine, and all classes punish 
the proletarian who puts on airs, so also can members of all ethnic groups in a poly-ethnic 
society act to maintain dichotomies and differences.” The interactions between groups in 
multiethnic societies can sustain the boundaries between them.54 Manning Nash focuses 
more on ethnic boundary markers that sustain group identity and cohesiveness, which
54Fredrik Barth, “Introduction,” in Fredrik Barth, ed., Ethnic Groups and 
Boundaries (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), 9-38 (quotation, 18). Barth does not assume 
these boundaries to be fixed. Over time and with the continued interaction between 
groups, these boundaries will also undergo alteration.
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include kinship, commensality, and a common cult. Kinship presumed a common 
biological descent and historical past. Commensality is the property of “eating together” 
and indicated a type of equality and continued ties of kinship within the group. The 
common cult assumed a shared value system and sacred symbols. Nash identifies these 
as the basic elements of group differentiation.55 With these works in mind, I approached 
the development of Russian identity in Warsaw as the project of a group which perceived 
its ethnic boundaries threatened and attempted to shore up those distinctions. The 
broader historiography of Russian imperialism and nationalism vis-a-vis the Poles has 
primarily dealt with official policies, but not closely addressed matters of Russian 
identity.
The non-Polish-language literature on the Russians in the Polish Kingdom is 
relatively thin. Most studies tend to focus upon the contested Western Region or upon 
Russo-Polish relations writ large, rather than the Polish Kingdom.56 Among those that do 
examine the Russians in Poland, the tendency has been to examine the political spectrum 
(usually from the perspective of the capital) rather than matters of identity, or to research 
the impact of Russian policies on Polish identities.37 Among the most valuable to study
^Manning Nash, The Cauldron o f Ethnicity in the Modern World (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1989), 10-11.
56Theodore Weeks and Mikhail Dolbilov have written quite extensively on this
region.
57Piotr Wandycz, The Lands o f Partitioned Poland (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1974); Thaden, Russia’s Western Borderlands', and Leonid E. 
Gorizontov, Paradoksy imperskoipolitiki: Poliaki v Rossii iRusskie vP o l’she (Moscow: 
Indrik, 1999).
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the interaction between policies and identities at the local (Polish Kingdom) level has 
been Theodore Weeks’s Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia. My work expands 
upon the literature of identities and imperialism in Russia by analyzing the construction 
of Russian identities in Poland. In this part of the empire, Russians confronted a “more 
European,” and thus a “more civilized,” nation than their own. Uncovering the means by 
which Russian nationalists in Warsaw attempted to work through such a quandary will 
contribute to the broader issue of the perception of Russia’s place in Europe.
Additionally, my research has concentrated on the ways local officials, clergy, and writers 
attempted to create a Russian image of Warsaw. One of the means by which these 
leaders worked out the boundaries of Russianness was through the assertion of Russian 
power over Poles to define the public spaces, ceremonies, and collective memories in the 
city. As Robert Geraci’s work has described Russia at its eastern boundaries, this 
dissertation looks at the western boundaries of Russianness. Along the east, Russian 
officials found themselves confronting a highly developed and unassimilable Islamic 
culture. The situation was similar in Poland. In both cases, the interaction with these 
non-Russian cultures posed questions that sharpened the features of Russian identity.
Like Geraci, I have found that Russians in Warsaw “tried to shore up the somewhat 
dilapidated wall” that marked the boundaries of Russianness.38 However, while his study 
found that the Russian language began to replace Orthodoxy as an ethnic boundary 
marker by the end of the nineteenth century, my findings suggest that Orthodoxy retained 
its importance in Poland.
58Geraci, Window on the East, 292.
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The policies Varsovian Russians enacted were as informed by attempts to define 
Russianness as they were by a need to control a troublesome imperial territory. As recent 
western scholarship has shown, the issue of Russification was far from being a 
straightforward matter. Multiple tracks of thought, some of them even contradictory, 
contributed to produce various policy decisions across the empire. This dissertation will 
add to that body of work by specifically examining the issues of Russian identities and 
empire in the Polish Kingdom itself. While the perception of a Russo-Polish contest also 
characterized policies in the western provinces, Russian officials there constructed 
arguments that employed history and demography to claim contemporary Belarus and 
Ukraine as being truly Russian. Governor-general Murav’ev claimed that he was 
“recovering” a truly Russian region from the hands of the Polish pan or landlord. In the 
Polish Kingdom, they had no such props to claim that the “Vistula region” was “truly 
Russian.” They had to define Russianness and the Russian mission there by utilizing 
other means.
This study emphasizes Warsaw both because that city was the center of 
administration for the Polish Kingdom, and because it was die single largest Russian 
community in Poland.5* Yet, despite considerable Russian in-migration, their numbers 
remained relatively minute. In Warsaw, administrators faced a city that would challenge 
the traditional conceptions of the dynastic state as a result of the considerable social and 
economic transformations produced by urbanization and industrialization. The city also
59The other “Russian” population centers, such as Chelm/Kholm, were different in 
nature because the people there did not necessarily perceive themselves as Russian.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
40
remained the center of Polish nationalists. On that terrain, Russians were the outsiders by 
all measures other than those of sheer power. In Poland, they had to define Russianness 
with the awareness that they were actually far away from home and surrounded by a sea 
of nationally conscious and hostile, albeit weak, Poles.
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CHAPTER 1
PUBLIC RUSSIFICATION, PRIVATE POLONIZATION?
After the failed January 1863 Uprising, Russian officials decided that the whole of 
Polish society was not to be trusted with any form of autonomy. They thus embarked on 
a series of reforms in the Polish Kingdom that were intended to eliminate any sign of 
autonomy. Poles were to be removed from all positions of serious authority in the Polish 
lands. These policies required mass Russian migration from the empire’s interior to 
creation a reliable Russian administration. During the second half of the nineteenth 
century, a Russian community formed in Warsaw from what had been an insignificant 
population before 1863. This migrant colony built a community that defined itself in 
sharp opposition to the traitorous Poles whom they came to pacify.
The fact that Russian officialdom held such a negative opinion of Poles is, in 
some ways, understandable. From their vantage point, Russia had extended to the Poles a 
good measure of autonomy for which they appeared ungrateful. Although Poles had been 
Napoleon’s allies in the 1812 invasion of Russia, at the time of the Congress of Vienna 
Alexander I had created an autonomous Polish Kingdom, which was tied to Russia 
through the Romanov dynasty. He provided it with a liberal constitution (which he did 
not grant to Russia), an army, and other institutions free from St. Petersburg’s direct 
control. Poles ran the administration, with Polish serving as its official language. The
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Russians considered such “benevolence” responded to by an uprising in 1830.1 Despite 
plans for reforms returning some autonomy to the Kingdom during the late 1850s and 
early 1860s, the more radical elements of the Polish patriotic movement embarked upon 
the January Uprising in 1863. The repeated revolts indicated that at least part of the 
Polish szlachta would be content only with full independence, an outcome the Russian 
state rejected. The 1905 Revolution only confirmed the stereotype of the rebellious Pole 
who “can never be satisfied” under Russian rule.2 In the imagination of official Russia, 
the Pole became the greatest, most intractable enemy of Russian interests.3
The anger the 1863 Polish rebellion produced extended beyond official circles 
into educated Russian society. The journalist Mikhail N. Katkov, who became the 
polonophobic tribune of Russian nationalism, was among the most ardent in attacking the 
Poles. During the uprising, he wrote that “the world was present at her [Poland’s]
’The Polish constitution and administration, however, were not free from Russian 
interference, and Alexander I also had begun to tamper with the limitations of being a 
constitutional king. See R. F. Leslie, Polish Politics and the Revolution o f November 
1830 (London: University of London Press, 1956); and Angela T. Pienkos, The Imperfect 
Autocrat: Grand Duke Constantine Pavlovich and the Polish Congress Kingdom 
(Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1987).
2AGAD KGGW 2507. Letter of Kalisz governor Novostiltsev to Governor - 
General Skalon, 29 October (OS) 1905. The Russian calendar used the Julian rather than 
the Gregorian system, which placed its dates approximately two weeks behind the Polish 
calendar. When using Russian sources, OS indicates the Old Style, or Julian calendar.
3Weeks, Nation and State, 54-59. For evidence of the dangerous Pole, Russians 
could simply refer to the number of times Poles caused rebelled against the partitioning 
powers: the 1794 Kosciuszko Rebellion against the Second Partition of Poland, the 1830 
November Uprising in the Congress Kingdom, the 1846 Uprising in Galicia, the 1848 
Revolution in Prussian Poznan, the 1863 January Uprising in the Congress Kingdom, and 
finally the 1905 Revolution.
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funeral” at the conclusion of the Third Partition of 1795. Yet, although the 
Commonwealth died, “its specter, like a vampire, comes to suck the blood of living 
people.”4 He interpreted the Polish uprising as a threat to Russia and called for the 
harshest official response to end the Polish question of independence. Even more 
polonophilic or liberal Russians found Polish rashness frustrating because it threatened to 
destroy the tentative steps toward reform made by a cautious autocracy determined to 
maintain law and order. The liberal historian Konstantin Dmitrievich Kavelin, for 
example, viewed the uprising as “an attack on Russia’s honor.”5
The Poles themselves provided Russian authorities and educated society good 
reasons for distrusting them throughout much of the nineteenth century. Many patriotic 
Poles continued to hope for a “Napoleonic savior.”6 Among the Polish emigre 
community (the Wielka Emigracja) much was done to portray Russia as the oppressor 
and influence public opinion in the West against Russia; the poet Adam Mickiewicz’s
4Katkov, 1863 god, 326-27.
5Curtis Richardson, “Konstantin Dmitrievich Kavelin: An Intellectual and 
Political Biography (Ph. D. dissertation, Northern Illinois University, 1999), 310. For 
more on Russian responses to the January Uprising see Olga Maiorova, “War as Peace: 
The Trope of War in Russian Nationalist Discourse during the Polish Uprising of 1863,” 
Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 6, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 501-34; 
and Gl^bocki, Fatalna sprawa.
6A classic literary example of the belief in a Napoleonic savior is the character 
Ignacy Rzecki in Boleslaw Prus’s The Doll, serialized in 1887 and published as a book in 
1890. Poles continued to admire the Bonapartists because of their repeated, albeit 
generally insincere, support for Polish national independence. For a study of the 
Napoleonic myth during the inter-uprising era among Polish emigres, see Jan Ziolek, 
Studia nad myslq politycznq Wielkiej Emigracji: Napoleon I  i Napoleon III (Lublin: 
Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1995).
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exile in Paris after the 1830 Polish uprising constituted only the most notable case.
During the mid-century, Prince Adam Czartoryski, who was a leader during the 1830 
Uprising, settled in Paris at the Hotel Lambert, from where he regularly attempted to 
sway the policies of other states to aid Poland against Russia.7 Other educated or 
upperclass Poles, such as Jozef Bern, who participated in the Hungarian Revolution 
during 1848, participated in revolutionary movements throughout Europe in the hopes of 
sparking a continental conflagration that would result in national liberty.8 Yet another 
indicator of the Polish desire for a western messianic figure appeared amongst the ranks 
of Polish civil servants (of the Russian state), 25 of whom bore the name “Napoleon.”9 
The Russification of administration and personnel that followed the two uprisings appears 
less sinister in this context.
In response to the 1863 Uprising, Russian officials dismantled the institutions of 
Polish autonomy and instituted harsh reprisals upon the rebels. Many Poles were hanged
7Lloyd S. Kramer, Threshold o f a New World: Intellectuals and the Exile 
Experience in Paris, 1830-1848 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), chap. 4; 
Krzysztof Dunin-Wqsowicz, Francuska opinia publiczna wobec sprawy polskiej i 
Polakow w latach 1895-1914 (Warsaw: Neriton, 1999); and Radoslaw Zurawski vel 
Grajewski, Wielka Brytania w “dyplomacji ” ksipcia Adama Jerzego Czartoryskiego 
wobec kryzysu wschodniego, 1832-1841 (Warsaw: Semper, 1999).
8Eugene J. Kisluk, Brothers from the North: The Polish Democratic Society and 
the European Revolutions o f1848-1849 (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 
2005). During the Revolutions of 1848, Mickiewicz turned his attention to Italian 
revolutionary politics and also edited a radical newspaper in Paris in 1849.
9Ekaterina Nizharadze, “The World of Provincial Bureaucracy; Russian Poland, 
1870-1904” (Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 1998), 144. This name must 
have posed some rather interesting problems for these families. Naming a son Napoleon 
indicated the parents’ desire for Polish independence on the part of the parents, while the 
individual, as an adult, served the most infamous of the partitioning powers.
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or deported to Siberia, while thousands fled into exile. Officials confiscated thousands of 
gentry estates, and placed special taxes upon the rest. The Catholic hierarchy also felt the 
wrath of the administration. By 1870 not one bishop of the Polish Kingdom remained in 
his diocese, and many priests followed their gentry counterparts to prison, Siberia, or 
foreign exile. Russian officials dismissed Marquis Aleksander Wielopolski’s pre-1863 
reform plans for the Polish Kingdom, which failed to satisfy the Polish patriotic 
movement because of their weakness and Wielopolski’s general conservatism.10 His 
program included extensive educational reforms and Jewish emancipation, which Polish 
liberals supported, and modest proposals for autonomy, local self-government, and 
peasant reforms, which frustrated Polish nationalist factions. Of Wielopolski’s reforms, 
only Jewish emancipation survived intact. As a result of the rebellion, Wielopolski’s 
reforms gave way to those of Nikolai Miliutin, which eliminated the remaining shreds of 
autonomous Polish institutions.11 Miliutin closely tied the Congress Kingdom to the rest 
of the Russian Empire and created institutions headed by loyal Russian bureaucrats.
Upon the death of Viceroy Berg in 1874, St. Petersburg replaced the office of viceroy
10Aleksander Wielopolski (1803-1877) was the chief civilian administrator of the 
Polish Kingdom’s government until the 1863 Uprising and was a strong advocate of a 
Polish rapprochement with Russia. He believed that Polish independence was unlikely 
and that the best hopes for Polish aspirations would be under the tsarist regime.
“For Wielopolski’s reforms and the January Uprising, see R. F. Leslie, Reform 
and Insurrection in Russian Poland’ 1856-1865 (London: University of London, Athlone 
Press, 1963). His proposal for peasant reforms would have changed corvee into rents, 
and would not have transformed peasants into freeholders. Nikolai Alekseevich Miliutin 
(1818-1872) was the tsar’s plenipotentiary of Polish affairs from 1863 to 1866. He 
achieved prominence in the bureaucracy as one of the “enlightened bureaucrats” who 
spearheaded the Great Reforms.
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with the position of Governor-General in order to make Russian Poland’s administration 
more similar to that of European Russia’s provinces. In 1869, higher education 
succumbed to Russification when the Polish-language Main School became the Russian- 
language University of Warsaw. That same year, Russian became the mandatory 
language of instruction in secondary schools as well. The reforms’ intention was to wipe 
out all vestiges of a Polish public space by making all official public life — schools, public 
offices, railroads, courts, and even street signs -  Russian. Even the name Tsarstvo 
Pol’shoe (Polish Kingdom) would eventually, albeit irregularly, be replaced by 
Privislinskii Krai (Vistula Region).12
The Russian civil servants who enacted these reforms intended to centralize the 
state’s bureaucracy while reasserting imperial authority. Enlightened Russian bureaucrats 
such as Nikolai Miliutin advocated greater administrative uniformity because special 
considerations for ethnic groups in the empire ran counter to their ideas of a more 
efficiently managed modem state. The other purpose behind the policies was to suppress 
the challenge to imperial authority officials termed “Polonism,” which they defined as the 
szlachta’s revolutionary nationalism and Russophobia.13
12Piotr Wandycz, The Lands o f Partitioned Poland, 193-96; Henryk Wereszycki, 
Historia polityczna Polski, 1864-1918,2nd ed. in Poland (Wroclaw: Ossolineum, 1990), 
57-64;and Jerzy Borejsza, “Rewolucjonista polski: szkic do portretu,” in Stefan 
Kieniewicz, ed., Polska XIXwieku: panstwo, spoleczenstwo, kultura (Warsaw: Wiedza 
powszechna, 1977), 298. Miliutin also supported more generous terms of emancipation 
for Polish peasants in the hope that they would become a new base of support for the 
imperial regime in the region. Polish peasants did not have redemption payments and 
became freeholders with titles to their own land.
13W. Bruce Lincoln, “The Making of a New Polish Policy: N. A. Milyutin and the 
Polish Question, 1861-1863,” Polish Review 15, no. 1 (Winter, 1970): 65; Stanley J.
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Imperial ideology frequently justified its authority through the use of familial 
rhetoric. The tsar was the all-knowing father of the Russian family/empire while the 
people, both Russian and non-Russian alike, were his children. Through this rhetorical 
device, the autocracy placed itself above national or estate (class) interests. The emperor, 
through his bureaucracy, paternally enacted policies that would best serve all the peoples 
of the Romanov state. But Poland (or more specifically the szlachta) had proven itself to 
be the incorrigible child in this family narrative. Russian bureaucrats arrived in Warsaw 
to reintegrate the rebellious daughter, Polska, into the tsar’s fold.
Although administrative Russification appeared to stem the problem of Polish 
“rebelliousness,” the Russian community found itself in a Polish setting whose attractions 
threatened the national identities of the people who came to control Poland. Ann Laura 
Stoler described Dutch imperialists’ identification of “a social problem and a political 
danger” when children resulted from “mixed” unions (through concubinage), the men 
succumbed to nativization, and European children took too much to the local foods and 
became too well versed in local knowledge.14 Although both Poles and Russians were 
Slavs, Russian officials came to identify Polishness as radically distinct from 
Russianness. The Poles became the Russians’ most distant “relatives” among all the
Zyzniewski, “Miljutin and the Polish Question,” Harvard Slavic Studies 4, (1957): 245- 
46. Although Miliutin opposed attempts to Russify the Poles culturally, the overriding 
interest in reestablishing order and eliminating the deleterious nature of Polish noble 
influence upon the rest of Polish society opened the way for policies that became 
increasingly anti-Polish.
14Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the 
Intimate in Colonial Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 2.
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other Slavs because of their strained relations. Under these conditions, the maintenance 
of boundaries became more important to the leadership of the Russian community.
The close proximity Russians had with Poles in the work place, and especially in 
domestic settings, opened the way for the boundaries between the two groups to be 
breached. Despite the considerable flow of Russians into Warsaw, the bureaucracy 
continued to depend upon Poles to fill many posts. Outside of the administration and the 
garrison, the Russian civil servant or soldier found himself in an overwhelmingly Polish 
environment; theaters, social events, and other entertainments remained predominantly 
Polish. The Varsovian Russian leadership’s greatest concern, however, came to rest upon 
the figure of the Polish woman. They came to fear that she might Polonize the arriving 
Russians and their children. While social intercourse with Poles could foster Polish 
sympathies among Russians, what most disconcerted the Russian leadership were mixed 
Russian-Polish marriages. They feared that the Polish wife would have the opportunity of 
Polonizing the children at home while the husband dutifully performed his service to the 
emperor. This domestic state of affairs threatened to turn the family narrative of imperial 
ideology on its head by integrating Russians into a “Polish” family.
Because the Russian community in the Polish Kingdom was ethnically mixed, 
small, and somewhat isolated from the rest of Russia, its Russianness in the midst of a 
Polish setting was threatened. Sealing off the Russian community from Polish society 
was unrealistic. The Russian nobility was too small a group, and elite Polish society 
could and did provide a comfortable environment for those looking for western or 
aristocratic surroundings. Those from the lower social estates were overwhelmingly male
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and had no other alternatives than to search for Polish social settings (see Table 1). The 
noble leadership of the community became concerned that such fraternization on the part 
of the lower social orders would threaten the national identity of these commoners.












Source: Tsentral’nyi statisticheskii komitet Ministerstva vnutrennikh del, Pervaia 
vseobshchaia perepis ’ naseleniia Rossiiskoi Imperii, 1897g, v. 51 [a] g. Varshava (St. 
Petersburg: Tipografia S. Peterburgskoi Tiurmy, 1904): 172-73, table 24. This table 
combines the Great Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian speakers (as the census did when 
it simply used the rubric “Russian”).
Officials responsible for the pacification of the western provinces and the Polish 
Kingdom also feared that upper-class Russians socializing too closely with Poles could 
become Polonized. Russian military educators such as Pavel O. Bobrovskii worried that 
Russian officers who had been sent to these troublesome provinces had inadequate 
education in the military schools to respond properly to the Polish intelligentsia’s
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“slanders” against Russian men, culture, and policies. These men were left “without 
defense mechanisms” to resist the “alien,” non-Russian opinions of the Poles.15 Without 
the training to “defend” Russia off the battlefield, Russians living among the Poles could 
succumb to Polonization when they encountered the culturally confident Polish 
intelligentsia.
Under these circumstances, the presence of many Poles in the administration 
developed problematic connotations. Even before the 1863 Uprising erupted, 
polonophilic sentiments were perceived as a problem for Russian officials. A. A. Sidorov 
wrote that General Nikolai Sukhozanet, who held the Viceroy’s office between 1861 and 
1863, “came from Polonized Belarusians,” loved the Polish language, and surrounded 
himself with Poles when he served under General Paskevich in Poland after the 1830 
Uprising. This pro-Polish orientation became a part of Sidorov’s explanation for the 
viceroy’s inability to control the unrest of the early 1860s.16 During the early post­
uprising years, two camps -  that of Viceroy Berg and that of Nikolai Miliutin -  formed 
within the Kingdom’s Russian administration. G. M. Shcherbatov commented that the 
Russians who supported Berg were “Polonized” as a result of their long residence in 
Warsaw. Because of the polonophilic sentiments among Berg’s clique, Poles who ran
15Pavel O. Bobrovskii, Iunkerskiia uchilishcha, (St. Petersburg: Tip. V. S. 
Balasheva, 1872), 2: 308-9.
16A. A. Sidorov, Pol ’shoe vozstanie 1863 goda. Istoricheskii ocherk (St. 
Petersburg: N. P. Karbasnikova, 1903), 106.
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afoul of Miliutin’s Russifying group approached Berg’s men to redress their grievances.17
D. D. Obolenskii, who served in Poland during the 1860s, noted another example of
Polonization. He wrote that:
Even such an ardent Slavophile as A. I. Koshelev, [who was] invited to the post of 
director of finances [in the Polish Kingdom]. . . ,  while not renouncing his 
Slavophile ideas, experienced for himself the power of Polonization. He 
surrounded himself almost completely with Poles, and believes only them. A. I. 
Koshelev has even reached the point of saying when asked of one man: “An 
excellent official, although [he is] a Russian.”
Obolenskii complained that many officials of Koshelev’s type served in Poland at the
time.18 Even at the end of the century, officials who willingly worked with Poles faced
charges of being Polonized. Warsaw President Sokrates Starynkevich approached local
Poles or made contracts with Polish factories, rather than hiring Russian specialists or
factories for Warsaw’s projects. In response, his relations with fellow Russians were
reported to be rather cool because of his “Polonophilism.” 19
Social Fraternization with Poles and Polonization posed an even greater problem
for the Russian leadership when Russian administrators and soldiers in Poland were
unmarried. The travel writer Vladimir Osipovich Mikhnevich opined that “if there exists
17G. M. Shcherbatov, “Russkii gubemator v Pol’she,” Russkaia starina, v. 42, 
June 1884, 597; D. D. Obolenskii, “Nabroski iz proshlago,” Istoricheskii vestnik, v. 54 
(October - December 1893): 681-82. Berg resisted the reforms Miliutin attempted, at 
least in part because they would have infringed upon his powers as viceroy. For more on 
this conflict, see Kszysztof Groniowski, “Walka Miliutina z Bergiem (Spor o 
reorganizacj? Krolestwa Polskiego po koku 1863,” Kwartalnik historyczny 69, no. 4 
(1962); 891-905.
18Obolenskii, “Nabroski iz proshlago,” 682.
19S. Alekseev, “Varshava,” Novoe vremia, 17/30 August 1902,4; and Zaleski, 
Towarzystwo warszawskie, 153-58.
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a chance of coming together (and it certainly does), then it could only be [through] the 
most personal and most simple connecting links between Russians and Poles . . .  the 
Polish woman.”20 The possibility that regular contacts with Polish noble families might 
lead to Russian men marrying Polish women was dangerous because it would make 
Russians more likely to sympathize with the rebellious Poles and thereby dilute their 
loyalty to the Russian state. Such Russians might even “uncover” some earlier Polish 
roots, discovering a Catholic grandparent (or great-grandparent).21 Given the usual pan- 
European aristocratic marriage patterns and the fact that Poles made up over half of the 
empire’s noble estate in 1850, it was not unusual for Russian noblemen, including 
governor of Radom Prince Dolgorukii, to have familial connections with Polish 
aristocratic families, among others.22
The dangers of Polonization were not limited to those Russian officers in the 
smaller Polish towns where few Russians lived. Even the much larger Varsovian Russian 
colony was at risk. A small Russian community in Warsaw had existed before the 1863 
Uprising. Because of their long-term contacts with Polish society, S. von DerfePden, an 
officer dispatched to Russian Poland after 1863, found their behavior disappointing, 
since “they were not inclined to becoming friends with those [Russians] arriving from the
20Mikhnevich, Varshava i varshaviane, 48.
21 Andrzej Chwalba, Polacy w sAizbie Moskali, (Warsaw: Polskie Wydawnictwo 
Naukowe, 1999), 39.
22Lukasz Chimiak, Gubematorzy Rosyjscy w Krolestwie Polskim, 1863-1915. 
Szkic do portretu zbiorowego (Wroclaw, Funna, 1999), 61; and David Saunders, Russia 
in the Age o f Reaction and Reform, 1801-1881 (London: Longman, 1992), 12.
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interior Russian provinces [in the post-1863 period]. These families were extremely 
standoffish [toward] (choporno) and inaccessible [toward the newcomers].”23 Although 
he did not describe the local Russians as being “Polonized,” he was clearly not pleased 
that they preferred to affiliate with the upper-crust members of the Polish community of 
which they had become a part than embrace their fellow Russians. Mikhnevich noted that 
“Many Russians left their hearts imprisoned with Polish women, married them, set up 
families, and in this way, came closer [sblizhatsia] to the local society.”24 In 1883, the 
director of the Holy Synod, Konstanin P. Pobedonostsev, who had substantial influence 
on Alexander III and the future Nicholas II, visited the Varsovian Russians and 
complained in his diaiy that the Russians there were Polonized.25
Because of the fear of “Polonization” and the potential unreliability of Russians to 
the state, Russian administrators actively discouraged Russian officials from having 
contacts with Poles during the first post-uprising years. In the Lithuanian provinces, 
Vilnius Governor-General Muraviev dismissed or transferred those who married Polish 
women or had ties that were too close to Polish aristocrats. He was convinced that 
(Polish or Polonized) wives of Russian officials “dedicated their honor and virtue” to 
Polish national goals that led to the 1863 Uprising and even complained that Russian
2jS. von Derfel’den, “Iz moikh vospominanii o zhizni w Varshave,” Russkaia 
starina v. 113, no. 2 (1903): 329-334.
24Mikhnevich, Varshava i varshaviane, 48-49.
25Konstantin Pobedonostsev, Memoires politiques, correspondence officielle, 
documents inedits (Paris: Payot, 1927), 262.
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Orthodox men were among the 1863 rebels in his district.26 Additionally, E. Andreevskii 
commented that some Russians feared Warsaw Governor-General Berg would 
“completely fall into Polish hands” because his (Italian) wife was Catholic.27 Officials in 
- the Polish Kingdom who had settled in too comfortably into the Polish environment also 
became suspect in the eyes of gendarmes. Warsaw Gendarme District Oberpolitsmaistr 
Petr Orzhevskii accused these officials of potentially favoring local Polish over Russian 
state interests.28 Ekaterina Nizharadze has shown that the marriage of a Russian official 
to a Polish woman clearly slowed down the career advancement of such functionaries.29 
The Polish landscape was fraught with dangers for the Russian official because perceived 
Polonization posed a real threat to a civil service or military career.
Post-uprising policies of administrative Russification thus required the 
recruitment of loyal and dedicated officials who would be able to resist the dangers of 
“Polonization” as well as increase the number of Russian migrants to Poland. With this 
in mind, capable Russian officials from the empire’s interior were enticed to come to
26Mikhail Murav’ev, Wspomnienia (Warsaw: Zebra, 1990), 40,93; Chwalba, 
Polacy w sfazbie Moskali, 34, 39. Murav’ev earned the appellation “the Hangman” for 
the brutal methods he used in putting down the uprising of 1863 in the Lithuanian 
provinces.
27E. Andreevskii, “K vospominaniiam o grafe Fedore Fedoroviche Berge,” 
Russkaia starina, v. 132, November 1907, 444. Her Catholicism was assumed to be 
equivalent to a Polish influence. Although Andreevskii noted these views among other 
Russians, his own writings on Berg were sympathetic. See also I. Liubarskii, 
“Varshavskii dnevnik i pervyi ego redaktor,” Istoricheskii vestnik 54 (1893), 154.
28Jan Koziowski, “Wyzsi urz^dnicy gubemialni i powiatowi w Krolestwie 
Polskim w latach 1867-1875,” Przeglqd Historyczny 87, no. 4 (1996), 837-38.
29Nizharadze, “The World of Provincial Bureaucracy,” 73.
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Russian Poland with a series of special benefits. Service in Poland of three years was 
made equivalent to four years service in Russia’s interior. Additionally, the expected 
time for attaining honors, distinctions, and other awards was shortened for those in 
Poland. If an official lost work because his post was liquidated, he retained his pay for a 
full year. Those who lived at least two years in Poland also could raise up to three 
children at state expense. If there was no space for these children at the schools, each 
child brought a supplemental remuneration of 100 to 150 mbles per year.30 Russian 
officials also received regular pay bonuses, which could be as much as a fifteen per cent 
every five years, simply for doing service in Poland.31 Finally, church and szlachta lands 
confiscated during the Uprising of 1863 were sold off at bargain prices in the 1860s and 
1870s to these officials.32
These benefits served a purely political purpose because Poland did not constitute 
a “hardship” post. Indeed, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the perquisites 
officials there received became an issue in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. St. Petersburg 
bureaucrats questioned the validity of the “hardship” benefits because there was “no 
geographical, climatic, or cultural basis” for continuing them. The surest argument for 
discontinuing them was that officers who retired from service in Poland often opted to 
remain in the Polish provinces. Furthermore, the distancing of Russian officials from
i0Dziennik Praw Krolestwa Polskiego (1867), 67: 290-95; and Kozlowski, “Wyzsi 
urz^dnicy,” 830-31. The schooling could be in Poland or in the Russian interior if the 
official’s family did not migrate with him to Poland.
3lChimiak,Gubernatorzy, 69.
32Chimiak, Gubernatorzy, 31-33.
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Polish society at large had “in the course of forty years undoubtedly negative results.” 
Instead of de-politicizing the population, the implanted officials only further polarized the 
Polish population from the Russian administration.33
Even with regard to the goal of bringing in enough Russians to de-Polonize the 
administration, the system of benefits failed. Despite the considerable increases in 
Russian migration to the Congress Kingdom, only about twelve per cent of official posts 
(including lower posts such as school teachers, police, etc.) were filled by Russians in 
Warsaw by 1869.34 The situation had not changed much a decade later when 
Oberpolitsmaistr Orzhevskii complained that the shortage of Russian functionaries in the 
Congress Kingdom forced administrators to hire Poles to keep the administrative 
machinery functioning. His estimation was that 80 per cent of the officials in the region 
were Polish.35 One of the few departments that did succeed in weeding out Poles, 
Catholics, and those Russians married to Polish women was the gendarmerie; even 
conversion to Orthodoxy did not protect individuals from disqualification.36 This 
situation is hardly surprising, since this part of the state apparatus was vital in controlling
33Jaskiewicz, Carat i sprawy polskie, 64-65.
34Chwalba, Polacy w sluzbie Moskali, 40.
35Stanislaw Wiech and Wieslaw Caban, eds., “Obzor gubemii Tsarstva Pol’skogo 
v politicheskom otnoshenii za 1878 god,” in Sytuacja polityczna Krolestwa Polskiego w 
swietle tajnych raportow naczelnikow Warszawskiego Orkpgu Zandarmerii z lat 1867- 
1872 i 1878 (Kielce: Wydawnictwo Wyzszej Szkoly Pedagogicznej im. Jana 
Kochanowskiego, 1999), 290.
36Stanislaw Wiech, “Zandarmeria w Krolestwie Polskim (1815-1915),” in 
Sytuacjapoliticzna, 33-34.
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the territory and people. As late as 1899, the Committee of Ministers and the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs continued to demand the appointment of only “people of Russian 
descent” for all positions in Russian Poland.37 The need to reiterate the policy this late 
indicates the continuing failure on the part of the Russian government to fill all the 
desired posts with non-Poles. Even the successfully Russified police exposed the 
problems inherent in such policies during the terror of the 1905 Revolution. In 1906 
Governor-General Skalon complained to Petr Stolypin that the Warsaw Police lacked 
nearly 40 percent of the required staff because there was no one interested in the positions 
under those conditions.38 The goal of a completely “Russian” administration thus proved 
impossible and even dangerous to the state in a crisis.
Although the highest civil posts were reserved for non-Poles, many lower and 
even mid-level positions remained out of necessity in Polish hands. Polish Roman 
Catholics held an overwhelming majority of the civil service jobs in the Congress 
Kingdom, including the specialized positions of doctor, architect, engineer, and land 
surveyor. That Polish domination was particularly noticeable outside Warsaw. The city 
had the greatest concentration of Russians, while the smaller district centers (uezdy) each 
had a handful.39 Kielce governor G. M. Shcherbatov complained that apart from the
37Nizharadze, “The World of Provincial Bureaucracy,” 72.
38Adam Prochnik, “Rzqdy wojennych general-gubematorow w epoce stanu 
wojennego,” in Studia z dziejdw polskiego ruchu robotniczego (Warsaw: Ksi^zka i 
Wiedza, 1958), 368. In the letter he wrote that the department was short of 16 officers, 
40 constables, and over 450 policemen.
39Nizharadze, “The World of Provincial Bureaucracy,” 10.
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gubernatorial post, “the remaining civil offices had to be filled exclusively with Poles.”40 
Thus, the “Russianized” administration of the Kingdom was more superficial than actual.
The failure to Russify the administration fully also affected the reformed court 
system. Despite some changes in the Polish judicial system, they did not go far enough to 
achieve a full Russification of the law code. The Polish civil code was still largely based 
upon the Napoleonic Code, thus necessitating the presence of Polish legal experts. Since 
Russian jurists were not familiar with Polish property law, which was incompatible with 
Russian law, Poles dominated in this increasingly important and busy legal sphere (due to 
industrialization) until the end of the Russian presence in Poland. Russian jurists 
dominated the other branches of law.41 Of the sixteen judges in the Warsaw Court House, 
seven were Poles. In eight of the ten district courts, except for Lublin and Siedlce (with 
large populations of Ukrainian Uniates), Poles held posts as vice-chairs of the courts. 
Polish judges slightly outnumbered Russians (40 of 72) in these district courts.42 Only at 
the very end of the nineteenth century and during the early twentieth did policies slowly 
change to produce a decline in the number of Poles, but that was as a result of attrition, 
and not dismissal.43
The absence of a “Russian” element in many offices, however, did not mean that
40Shcherbatov, “Russkii gubemator,” 596.
41 Artur Korobowicz, Sqdownictwo Krolestwa Polskiego, 1876-1915 (Lublin: 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Sklodowskiej, 1995), 116, 125.
42Korobowicz, Sqdownictwo, 85-90.
43Korobowicz, Sqdownictwo, 96-100.
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the nature of the civil administration was necessarily friendlier to the native population or 
to the Polish officials working for it. All official communication was supposed to be in 
Russian. If a petitioner only spoke Polish, then an official interpreter was utilized. Even 
if the civil servant was a Pole, and many in the lower ranks were, regulations still 
required him to use only Russian and communicate with the petitioner through an 
interpreter. A civil servant who did not follow such procedures could be terminated.
This farcical policy continued in existence until the end of Russian control in the 
Congress Kingdom in 1915.44
Despite the restrictions placed upon Poles within the Kingdom’s administration, 
career advancement and the attainment of prestige were possible. Nizharadze brings up 
an important point concerning the “glass ceiling” that affected Polish servitors’ careers. 
The Table of Ranks carried significant importance in Russian society because it conferred 
prestige, and yet its higher ranks were not beyond the reach of Poles in the Polish 
Kingdom. The highest provincial offices in Poland -  governor and vice-governor -  
carried the ranks 4 and 5, respectively, on the Table of Ranks as indicators of their high 
prestige. Only these were reserved for Russians. The job of medical inspector, although 
not a politically powerful post, provided rank 5 because of its highly specialized 
educational requirements. Poles did succeed in attaining this position. Additionally, the 
predominantly Polish-held positions of doctor, architect, and engineer brought with them 
rank 8, which conferred the status of personal nobility.45 The discrimination Poles faced
44Chwalba, Polacy w sfazbie Moskali, 61.
45Nizharadze, “The World of Imperial Provincial Bureaucracy,” 25,28.
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in the bureaucracy was that Poles without higher educations were far less likely to 
advance along the administrative ladder or attain high rank, while Russians without such 
high formal educations could still attain high ranks and offices.46 What was significant, 
however, was that Polish servitors, despite education, were ineligible for the highest 
offices that carried the greatest responsibility for controlling the Kingdom; prestige was 
available to Poles, but power was not.
Although official regulations and zealous anti-Polish administrators attempted to 
eliminate the Polish language and the Polish elite’s influence from official public life, 
neither of these disappeared.47 Due to the fact that the vast majority of the Polish 
population did not speak Russian, compromises in linguistic policies had to be accepted 
at least in part. In the provinces, “official correspondence was conducted in the Polish 
language; even the Polish legal code was not translated into Russian.”48 Officials also 
found themselves meeting with influential Poles in order to enable their administration of 
the region. Aristocratic, economic, and intellectual elites did not have difficulties in 
communicating with the Russian bureaucracy, since many understood Russian or had 
informal connections that lessened the difficulties of dealing with an occupying foreign 
state. A notable example is the industrialist and financier Leopold Kronenberg, who had
46Nizharadze, “The World of Imperial Provincial Bureaucracy,” 69.
470ne should also remember that this was a highly productive era for Polish 
literature despite the heavy censorship. Authors such as Boleslaw Prus, Eliza 
Orzeszkowa, Aleksander Swi^tochowski, and Nobel laureate Henryk Sienkiewicz 
produced heavily in literary and journalistic fora.
48Shchebatov, “Russkii gubemator,” 596.
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Polish patriotic connections in the years before the 1863 Uprising. A few years after the 
uprising, he was able to return to Poland and establish himself as a major investor in the 
important Warsaw-Vienna Railroad project. Furthermore, he periodically met with 
Viceroy Berg at the Royal Castle to discuss economic affairs. These visits brought angry 
comments from some Russians who complained of the presence and influence of this 
“merchant without rank” (chin).49
The experience that most Poles, however, had with Russian officialdom was far 
different. An important point of contact between the Russian state and the Polish subject 
was the court system. From 1870 onward, official policies dictated that all proceedings 
be carried out in Russian. In the cities, this was less difficult because of the greater 
contact Poles had with Russians, and the greater likelihood that people had learned some 
Russian. In the countryside, however, the situation was dramatically different. Peasants 
protested at having to swear the oath in court in Russian because they did not understand 
the language. What made the requirement even more burdensome was the requirement 
that peasants pay for the translators. The very low incidence of Russian-speaking people 
in these communal (gmina) courts forced judges to admit that the language requirements 
had weakened their juridical competence. They viewed the great delays and animosities 
created by following the regulations as counterproductive. The solution that many jurists
49Ryszard Kolodziejczyk, “Leopolda Kronenberga (1812-1878) portret wlasny,” in 
Studia nad dziejami burzuazji w Polsce. Wybor prac z lat 1956-1998 wydany z okazji 75- 
lecia urodzin autora (Pultusk: Wyzsza Szkofa Humanistyczna, 1998), 253-63.
Kronenberg was the leading industrialist of the Kingdom (and one of the major 
industrialists of the Empire as well), who initially made his fortune through a tobacco 
monopoly. Although of Jewish origin, he converted to Protestantism (Calvinist) and 
thoroughly identified himself as Polish.
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found was to ignore the law and ask witnesses questions in Polish. Court officials also 
did not prevent lawyers, who would have certainly understood Russian, from defending 
their clients in court by using the Polish language.50 Although officials attempted to make 
the use of Polish more difficult, estimates in 1897 declared that Polish was used in at least 
70 per cent of the cases that came before the courts. It is not altogether surprising that 
Russian officials believed that the inability to understand Russian was not always the 
reason for the use of Polish.51
In essence, the intention of creating a fully “Russianized” administrative structure 
in the Polish Kingdom did not work. Polish realities obstructed the plans as they existed 
on paper. Too few Poles had a working knowledge of Russian, and sufficient numbers of 
Russians did not arrive in the Polish territories to staff the necessary posts. Of those 
Russians who moved to Poland, many had little knowledge of Poland or any interest in 
learning its language. In Warsaw, Russians could not create a truly Russian public space 
despite the large concentration of officials and the considerable machinery of state 
administration based there. Russian officials throughout the Kingdom had Poles as 
subordinates and coworkers. Poles continued to outnumber Russians. Even when 
considering that the 1897 census’s rubric of administration included the police and
50Jerzy Kukulski, Sqdy gminne w Krolestwie Polskim. Studium spoleczno- 
historyczne (Kielce: Wyzsza Szkola Pedagogiczna im. Jana Kochanowskiego, 1995), 
228-31.
51Korobowicz, Sqdownictwo, 108.
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gendarmerie, Poles continued to hold over half (51.8 percent) of the posts.52 Only in the 
armed forces did the Russians vastly outnumber Poles, and this was the result of 
including the city’s military garrison. Poles certainly faced discrimination in and 
limitations on civil service careers, but the Russian leadership of the Kingdom also could 
never completely eliminate that Polish element from the ranks of the administration. The 
“Russified” workplace of the civil administration remained heavily Polish.
Yet another problem the Varsovian Russian colony had to contend with was the 
ethnic composition of its membership. A number of the prominent “Russian” officials 
were actually Baltic Germans, but were considered “Russian” by both Poles and Russians 
because they were not Poles. This group was known for its loyalty to the dynasty. Even 
in the face of Russificatory policies and growing Latvian and Estonian national 
consciousness during the late nineteenth century, most Baltic Germans, both rural nobles 
and urban burgertum, rejected German nationalism and remained loyal to the Russian 
state. They constituted a considerable presence in the empire’s military and bureaucratic 
ranks.53 Within Poland itself, the Baltic Germans played a visible role in the highest 
ranks, including the Govemors-General Fedor F. Berg and Pavel’ E. Kotzebue. Although 
the general assumption was that these Germans were Protestants, eleven who served at
52Tsentral’nyi statisticheskii komitet Ministerstva vnutrennikh del, Pervaia 
vseobshchaia perepis ’ naseleniia Rossiiskoi Imperii, 1897g, v. 51 [a] g. Varshava (St. 
Petersburg: Tipografia S. Peterburgskoi Tiurmy, 1904): 158-59, 163. Table 22.
53Michael H. Haltzel, “Baltic Particularism and the Beginnings of Russification” 
in Edward C. Thaden, ed. Russification, 111. See also Henriksson, The Tsar’s Loyal 
Germans.
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the gubernatorial or vice-gubernatorial ranks in Poland were Orthodox.54 The hybrid 
characteristics of some of these officials only serves to illustrate their non-nationalist 
orientations. Such state servitors, although culturally German, did not look to German 
nationalism to shape their identities or define their loyalty to the Russian emperor. 
Because these Baltic Germans were a part of the Varsovian Russian community, the 
Russianness of the community could be described as a position of dynastic loyalty and 
opposition to Poles.
Some Russian nationalists, however, found the German presence in Warsaw 
disconcerting. As late as 1912, General Aleksei Alekseevich Brusilov, who was stationed 
in Warsaw, complained that:
Germans were at the top [of administration in Warsaw]: Governor-General Skalon 
[of French Huguenot origins], married to Baroness Korf; the Governor [of 
Warsaw province], her relative, Baron Korf; the Governor-General’s Assistant 
Essen; the Gendarmes Chief Utgof [Uthof]; the Director of the [Warsaw] branch 
of the State Bank Baron Tizengauzen [Tiesengausen]; Director of the Palace 
Administration Tizdel’ [Tiesdel]; oberpolitsmaister Meyer; [Warsaw] city 
President Miller; Chief Prosecutor Gesse [Hesse]; director of the Chamber of 
Control von Mintslov [von Minelow]; vice-governor Gresser; Chief Judge Lievin; 
chiefs-of-staff to the governor Egelstrom and Fekhtner [Fechtner]; director of the 
Vistulaland Railroad Gesket [Hesket]. . .  [Brusilov himself] replaced Gershelman 
[Herschelmann] and [his] replacement was Baron Rausch von Traubenberg.55
The predominance of Germans in the highest positions of the Russian administration in
54Chimiak, Gubernatorzy Rosyjscy, 76; idem., “Kariery tzw. Baltow w rosyjskiej 
administracji Krolestwa Polskiego w drugiej polowie XIX w.,” PrzeglqdHistoryczny 88, 
nos. 3-4, (1997): 441-58.
55Aleksei A. Brusilov, Moi vospominaniia, 3rd ed. (Moscow: Voennoe 
izdatel’stvo, 1943), 45. It should be noted that Governor-General Skalon, whose family 
settled in the Baltic region, was originally of Huguenot French descent.
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Warsaw was a cause of great concern to the nationalist Brusilov, who sarcastically 
described this administrative roster as a “select assortment” (buket na podbor) for the 
coming war with Germany. The Polish nationalist Roman Dmowski also had noted 
uneasily the heavily German makeup of the Kingdom’s administration on the eve of the 
First World War.56 The German names listed above were “Russian” because they served 
the Russian Empire and represented its authority in a rebellious borderland. Despite 
deteriorating relations with Germany during these years, authorities in St. Petersburg did 
not see the sizeable Baltic German contingent of administrators in the Polish Kingdom, 
which was the likely battleground in a Russo-German war, to be cause for concern.
Baltic Germans were known for their loyalty to the Romanov dynasty and Russia.
The German surnames above, however, do not necessarily indicate German 
identity. Baltic German nobles did not have strong German national identities (they were 
certainly not Reich German). Many also came from families that had come under at least 
partial assimilation to Russian culture. Some Baltic Germans serving in Poland were 
Russian Orthodox; of those identified by Brusilov, Essen and Baron Korf came from 
families that had converted. Other Baltic Germans who staffed the middle levels of the 
Imperial civil service had succumbed to some Russification, at least in part because 
conversion greased the wheels of career advancement. The level of assimilation among 
some Baltic Germans was evident in the example of Piotrkow governor Konstantin 
Miller, who complained in his diary of the corrupt administrative practices of Warsaw
56Roman Dmowski, Pisma (Czestochowa; A. Gmachowski, 1937), 5:189. 
Dmowski generally considered Russia to be the lesser threat because he perceived 
Russian culture as backward in relation to its Polish counterpart.
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governor Medem. He worried that if Medem (who was Russian Orthodox) became the 
Governor-General, the cause of “true Russians” would be threatened because of the 
scandal such a corrupt Russian official could create in Poland. Miller apparently saw 
himself as one of the “true Russians” threatened by the poor example Medem posed.57
The demographic imbalance in the workplace and elsewhere was one of the 
problems the Russian community experienced in Poland. The Russian Orthodox 
population remained insignificant there. In the 1897 census it comprised only 7.06 
percent of the Polish Kingdom. Out of 9.4 million people, 663,784 were Russian 
Orthodox. This population was concentrated in only a few provinces: Siedlce (22.05%), 
Lublin (21.81%), Suwalki (6.14%), Warsaw (5.46%), and Lomza (5.42%).58 Aside from 
Warsaw, all of these provinces were on the eastern border of the Polish Kingdom. 
Warsaw’s numbers were the result of the city’s role as an administrative and military 
center. One Russian traveler to Warsaw noted that “very few fellow countrymen living in 
the Vistulaland are not servitors. The Russian in Warsaw is essentially either a soldier or 
a chinovnik (bureaucrat).”59
57 GARF f. 996, o. 1, d. 5. Diary of Petrkovsk governor K. Miller, 1894, k. 31 (19 
February 1894) as cited in Chimiak, “Kariery tzw. Baltow,” 447-49,453. Miller (1836-?) 
was Russian Orthodox, fought in the army to suppress the Poles in Lithuania, and served 
in Poland from the end of the 1863 uprising. He was governor of Plock (1887-1890) and 
Piotrkow (1890-1904).
58Tsentral’nyi statisticheskii komitet Ministerstva vnutrennikh del, Raspredelenie 
naseleniia Imperii po glavnym veroispovedaniiam (St. Petersburg, 1901), 4. There was 
also an insignificant Old Believer population (9,109 or 0.10 percent). Approximately one 
thousand of these lived in Warsaw district (uezd').
59Mikhnevich, Varshava i varshaviane, 46.
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The relatively high numbers of Russian Orthodox in both Siedlce and Lublin were 
due to the large Uniate (Eastern Rite Catholics) and Orthodox Ukrainian populations.
The official Russian position concerning the Uniate population was that they were 
Orthodox brethren led astray during the pre-partition era; in 1875, the Russian state 
officially forced Uniates in the Polish Kingdom into the Russian Orthodox Church. Not 
all Uniates, however, accepted becoming Russian Orthodox. A. F. Koni, a bureaucrat in 
the procurator’s office who was responsible for crimes against the faith, wrote that former 
Uniates who resisted Orthodoxy opted for “Krakow marriages,” if they lived near the 
Austro-Hungarian border. These individuals crossed the border into Galicia, where the 
Uniate Church was not suppressed, in order to obtain the services of Uniate clerics.
Those who could not cross the border accepted the blessings of traveling missionaries 
who were not Orthodox. He noted that the peasant women were particularly resistant to 
forced conversions and even went to Catholic priests to baptize their children.60 Thus the 
reality Russians in Poland faced was that they represented a much smaller number than 
the census indicated. They were a tiny group comprised primarily of civil and military 
officials. The bulk of the rest of the Orthodox population did not necessarily perceive 
itself to have many “national” commonalities with these Russian officials.61
“ A. F. Koni, “Iz zametok i vospominanii cydebnago deiatelia,” Russkaia starina, 
v. 137, no 2 (February 1909): 238-39,242-44,252. The children would later have 
problems because they did not have the correct documentation; birth certificates belonged 
within the Church’s domain.
61For more on the Uniates, see Theodore R. Weeks, “Between Rome and 
Tsargrad: The Uniate Church in Imperial Russia,” in Robert P. Geraci and Michael 
Khodarkovsky, eds., O f Religion and Empire: Missions, Conversion, and Tolerance in 
Tsarist Russia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 70-91; and Jan Lewandowski, Na
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The number of Russians in Warsaw, nonetheless, did grow after 1863. They had 
been a much smaller part of the population before the uprising. Only a few officials of 
the highest rank were Russian, and the rest of the administration was Polish. Estimates of 
1850 place the Russian Orthodox population at 1,821, or 1.1% of the city’s total.62 After 
1863, when officials in St. Petersburg decided that the Polish territories had to be 
governed by reliable Russians, the numbers of Russians arriving from the rest of the 
empire increased dramatically. Maria Nietyksza’s study of Warsaw’s population had 
shown a consistent rise in the percentage of Russians. Her estimates, which did not 
include the suburbs or the city’s military garrison, put the Russian Orthodox population at 
approximately four percent by the early twentieth century. If one includes the military, 
the percentage of Russians nearly doubles to 7.5 percent, or 46,787 Russian Orthodox 
faithful within city limits. During the same years, the Protestant population, which had 
remained relatively stable, declined from 4.6, to 2.2 percent.63 The Jewish population 
accounted for 39% of the city’s people by the eve of the First World War. Although the 
assimilated Polish Jewish community was small, it did represent an important part of the
pograniczu: polityka wladz paristwowych wobec unitow Podlasia i Chehnszczyzny, 1772- 
1875 (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Sklodowskiej, 1996).
62Witold Pruss, “Skiad wyznaniowo-narodowosciowy ludnosci Warszawy w XIX 
i pocz^tkach XX w.,” in Jozef Kazimierski, et. al. eds., Spoleczenstwo Warszawy w 
rozwoju historycznym (Warsaw: Polskie Wydawnicto Naukowe, 1977), 378.
63Tsentral’nyi statisticheskii komitet, Pervaia vseobshchaiaperepis’, vol. 51 [a]: 
46-47, table 12; Maria Nietyksza, Ludnosc Warszawy na przelomie XIX i X X  wieku 
(Warsaw: Polskie Wydawnicto Naukowe, 1971), 121. Her estimates were 3.5% in 1882, 
3.9% in 1897, and 4.1% in 1913. If one includes the suburbs, the Russian population was 
just over 8 percent (56, 312).
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Varsovian Jewish and Polish communities.64 The city also underwent a population 
explosion as result of increased urbanization and industrialization. During these years 
Warsaw’s population grew dramatically from 163,593 in 1850 to 845,130 in 1913.65
The greatest demographic problem for the Russians, however, was in its 
distribution of the sexes. In 1897, Warsaw province had a Russian Orthodox population 
of 103,677, with well over half of it (70,742) concentrated in Warsaw district (uezd). Of 
this population, only 14.7 percent (16,673 in the province) were women.66 The reasons 
for this imbalance were understandable. In order to effectively control this rebellious 
region, St. Petersburg placed a large military force in the Polish Kingdom and Warsaw. 
Not surprisingly, Poles made up an insignificant part of the armed forces in the region, 
and much of the military came from the empire’s interior. The military constituted the 
bulk of the local Russian community in the city and its suburbs (see Table 2).67 Military
^Stephen Corrsin, Warsaw before the First World War: Poles and Jews in the 
Third City o f the Russian Empire, 1880-1914 (Boulder, Colo.: East European 
Monographs, 1989), 24. See also Theodore R. Weeks, From Assimilation to 
Antisemitism: The “Jewish Question” in Poland, 1850-1914 (DeKalb, 111.: Northern 
Illinois University Press, 2006).
65Nietyksza, Ludnosc, 239. The 1897 census figures, for the city proper and its 
suburbs, bring the population to 683,692.
66Tsentral’nyi statisticheskii komitet, Raspredelenie naseleniia Imperii, 26; idem., 
Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis’, v.51[a]: 46, table 12; and idem., Pervaia vseobshchaia 
perepis ’, vol. 51, varshavskaia gubemiia: 108, table 12. Women numbered 11,748 in the 
district and 10,631 in the city and suburbs.
67Tsentral’nyi statisticheskii komitet Ministerstva vnutrennikh del, Pervaia 
vseobshchaia perepis’ naseleniia Rossiiskoi Imperii, 1897 g, v. 51 [a] g. Varshava (St. 
Petersburg: Tipografia S. Peterburgskoi Tiurmy, 1904): 158-59,163. Table 22. The 
census subdivided the Russian category into Great Russian, Little Russian (Ukrainian), 
and Belarusian groups.
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restrictions prevented men of the lower military ranks from marrying until they became 
28 years old (officers could marry at 23 years of age). Many young soldiers thus were 
single when they arrived in Warsaw.68 As these young soldiers, many of whom were 
from the lower classes, reached permissible marrying age, they looked to the local Polish 
population for wives. Their marriage patterns disturbed the Varsovian colony’s leaders, 
who came to worry that Polonization could similarly creep into their privileged ranks.
Table 2: Administrative and Armed Forces by Native Language
Native Language Administration Armed Forces
Great Russians 1,908 (11) 23, 059
Ukrainians 492 (2) 7,736
Belarusians 120 (0) 740
Poles 2,960 (47) 782
Total (all language groups) 5,710 (64) 37,317
Source: Tsentral’nyi statisticheskii komitet Ministerstva vnutrennikh del, Pervaia 
vseobshchaia perepis ’ naseleniia Rossiiskoi Imperii, 1897 g, v. 51 [a] g. Varshava (St. 
Petersburg: Tipografia S. Peterburgskoi Tiurmy, 1904): 158-59,163, table 22. The 
administrative employee numbers in parentheses are additional female workers.
The problem that higher Russian officials perceived was that the large numbers of 
Russian men coming to Poland would inevitably marry the dreaded Polish woman since
68Beata Drozdowska, “2ycie rozdinne i towarzyskie Rosjan w Krolestwie Polskim 
w latach 1864-1894,” in Andrzej Szwarc and Pawel Wieczorkiewicz, eds., Unifikacja za 
wszelka cene: sprawy polskie w polityce rosyiskiej na przelomie XIX i X X  wieku 
(Warsaw: DiG,2002), 116.
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few eligible Russian women lived there. Just as a later generation of Soviet leaders 
worried about party members marrying (petty-) bourgeois women who could be a 
negative influence, administrators of the late nineteenth century expressed concern over 
the specter of a Polish wife.69 The law did not require the spouse to convert to 
Orthodoxy, although that was clearly preferred. Mixed marriages became an exception to 
Orthodox canon law in 1721, when Swedish men requested permission to marry Russian 
women. The adjustments made to church law demanded that the marriage ceremony take 
place in an Orthodox church, and that the children be reared in the Orthodox faith. In 
1836, a new law reaffirmed this practice and handed the Orthodox Church the 
responsibility for overseeing these marriages and approving their dissolution.70
Mixed marriages in the Polish Kingdom became a concern for Russians because 
of their high visibility. The phenomenon of mixed marriages was not new to the post- 
1863 era. Between 1831 and 1863, over half (55.4 percent) of the marriages performed in 
Warsaw’s Orthodox churches were mixed.71 During the post-1863 period, Ekaterina
69Elizabeth Wood, The Baba and the Comrade: Gender and Politics in 
Revolutionary Russia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 203-05. Wood 
describes a similar problem that resulted from too few available Communist Party 
women.
70Leonid Gorizontov, “Ustawodawstwo dotyczqce malzenstw roznowierczych w 
historii stosunkow rosyjsko-polskich,” Przeglqd wschodni 7, no. 1 (2000), 70-75; and 
Stefania Kowalska-Glikman, “Malzenswta mieszane w Krolestwie Polskim,” Kwartalnik 
historyczny 84, no. 2 (1977), 323.
75Kowalska-Glikman, “Malzenswta mieszane,” 324-25. Kowalska-Glikman 
examined the years 1835,1840, 1845,1850, and 1858. She found 92 mixed marriages 
out of a total of 166. She noted that the percentage of mixed marriages dipped after 1858, 
but did not provide the data, and her study ends with 1870. The dip in mixed marriages 
can be explained by the tense Russo-Polish relations that followed the patriotic
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Nizharadze has determined that approximately 10 percent of married Orthodox 
bureaucrats in the Kingdom were married to Catholic women.72 Beata Drozdowska 
estimates that less than half (just over 40 percent) of all Russian Orthodox faithful in 
Poland, regardless of estate, were married in 1897.73 Although the overall numbers of 
marriages were insignificant, Drozdowska found 229 mixed marriages out of 387 
weddings performed (59 percent) in Kielce Orthodox Cathedral between 1872 and 1894. 
Only after 1889 did the proportion of non-mixed marriage ceremonies surpass that of the 
mixed marriages. Similar proportions of mixed to non-mixed Orthodox marriages 
appeared in Lodz.74 The 1897 census figures for Warsaw indicate that married and single 
Russian-speaking men significantly outnumbered married and single Russian-speaking 
women four to one (see Table 3). Although the Russian-speaking Jewish population (the 
pejoratively named “Litwaks”) was included in this figure (there was a separate Jewish 
language category for the Yiddish language), its gender distribution was fairly balanced 
(2,580 males and 2,026 females) and would not affect the proportion of Russian 
Orthodox married individuals.75 Additionally, Warsaw itself witnessed 2,045 mixed
demonstrations and 1863 uprising.
72Nizharadze, “The World of Provincial Bureaucracy,” 156.
73Drozdowska, “Zycie rozdinne,” 115. The census numbers included all the 
Ukrainian and Belarusian peasants. Nizharadze’s figure covers only the civil servants.
74Drozdowska, “Zycie rozdinne,” 119-20. There were 190 mixed marriages out of 
281 (67.6 percent) in Warsaw through 1889, and 39 mixed marriages out of 106 (36.8 
percent) from 1890 to 1894.
75Tsentral’nyi statisticheskii komitet, Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis’, vol. 51 [a]: 
48,98, tables 13,16. A table combining marital status and religion was not available.
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marriages between 1902 and 1911.76 Representing a significant proportion of local 
weddings, mixed marriages became worrisome to Russian officials. At the same time, 
however, these same officials overestimated the importance of those unions. The reality 
was that the majority of Russian men in Warsaw remained single. Nevertheless, the 
specter of the Polonization of these men through marital unions with Polish women 
loomed large.
Table 3: Marital Status of Russians in Warsaw
Native
Language
Married Widowed Single 
(including children)
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Russian (Total) 16,861 4,197 550 963 29,427 7,643
Great Russian 13,816 4,101 473 946 23,046 7,500
Ukrainian 2,854 73 68 13 5,623 104
Belarusian 191 23 9 4 758 39
Source: Tsentral’nyi statisticheskii komitet Ministerstva vnutrennikh del, Pervaia 
vseobshchaia perepis ’ naseleniia Rossiiskoi Imperii, 1897g, v. 51 [a] g. Varshava (St. 
Petersburg: Tipografia S. Peterburgskoi Tiurmy, 1904): 98, table 16.
Nizharadze’s estimates could be different from the census because she does not include 
the Russian soldiers. Some of the married men did not bring their wives with them to 
Poland. Notable examples were Warsaw President Starynkevich, Varshavskii dnevnik 
editor Nikolai Pavlishchev, and Warsaw University professor Aleksandr L. Blok (father 
of the author). See Drozdowska, “Zycie rozdinne,” 118.
76Tuszyriska, Rosjanie w Warszawie, 78. Tuszyhska did not provide a total figure 
for Orthodox weddings during that period.
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Although the greatest concern was over lower ranking officials, some Russians of 
higher social and official rank also married Polish women. Two chairmen of the Warsaw 
State Theater, Sergei Makhanov and Aleksandr Karandeev, were among that number. 
Varshavskii dnevnik editor Nikolai Pavlishchev married his Polish mistress after his 
Russian wife’s death. The daughter of Viceroy Berg, whose wife was an Italian Catholic, 
married a Polish man. Russians also appeared to be fascinated with Polish ballerinas. 
Shcherbatov complained of Russian men “who were Polonized in particular by young 
[Polish] ballerinas.” The journalist and Warsaw University professor Nikolai V. Berg 
married one, as did General Cherkasov, Warsaw District Gendarmerie commander Platon 
Fredericks, and the above-mentioned Karandeev. Varsovian Russian leaders feared that 
Polonization via marriage could develop into a trend among the upper classes as well.77
Although uncommon, mixed marriages among the highest officials also did occur. 
The Russian Orthodox Archbishop Leontii (archbishop of Warsaw 1873-1891) 
summoned Konstantin Konstaninovich Miller before him after Miller married a Polish 
noblewoman from Kaunas (Kowno), Aleksandra Kancewicz, to inform him that “the 
marriage of a governor of the Kingdom with a Catholic [woman] is an abnormal 
phenomenon.”78 Mixed marriages at this high a level could indicate that Polonization 
was also beginning to affect the upper classes. Another example was Lublin governor
77Sidorov, Russkie i russkaiazhizn’, 157,159; Shcherbatov, “Russkii gubemator,” 
597; and Drozdowska, “Zycie rozdinne,” 121.
78 GARF f. 996, o. 1, d. 2. Diary of Petrkovsk governor K. Miller, 1865-1893, pt. 
1, k. 9-9v as cited in Chimiak, Gubernatorzy Rosyjscy, 103.
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Vladimir Tkhorzhevskii, who married Zofla Glowacka.79 Governors were among the 
highest imperial officials in the Polish territories, and a key part of their mission was the 
denationalization of the region. Marriage to a Polish woman threatened to do the reverse; 
by marrying her, the Russian man became tied to the local Polish society.
Poles, however, did not perceive such mixed marriages as potential victories. 
Polish society looked with great suspicion on those women who became the wives of 
Russians. Polish elites deemed these women to be guilty of national treason or at least to 
be causing national harm. The families also did not necessarily welcome their Russian 
sons-in-law.80 The Roman Catholic hierarchy also opposed such marriages with so- 
called “schismatics” (a reference to the 1054 schism between the Papacy and the 
Patriarchate of Constantinople). Roman Catholic canon law required the children of 
mixed marriages to be reared in the Catholic faith, which put the Polish Catholic 
hierarchy and the Catholic marriage partner in a religious-legal quandary in Russia. Local 
priests were able to make their own decisions concerning a believer’s adherence to church 
law and deny the sacraments accordingly. Count Fredericks, the Warsaw Gendarme 
District chief, commented in his 1868 report that Catholic priests brought the Catholic
79Lukasz Chimiak, “Rosyjscy gubematorzy lubelscy w latach 1863-1915. Szkic 
do portretu zbiorowego,” in Tadeusz Stegner, ed. Mipdzy Odrq i Dnieprem: wyznania i 
narody (Gdansk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdahskiego, 1997), 208-35. Of 17 
governors or vice-governors of Lublin, Thkorzhevskii was the only one to many a Pole 
(two were bachelors). He may not have suffered the verbal lashing of the Archbishop 
because he had a confirmed anti-Polish stand.
80Maria z Lubienskich Gorska, Gdybym mniej kochala. Dziennik 1889-1895 
(Warsaw: Twoj Styl, 1996), 1:16-17. Gorska frequently described the Orthodox faith as 
“schismatic” in her diary.
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wives of Russian soldiers to despair because the priests “denied them Confession, 
threatened them with Hell for marrying Orthodox men, and called them concubines.”81 
Even Aleksandra Miller’s priest denied her the sacraments of Confession and the 
Eucharist at Easter. She finally converted to Russian Orthodoxy.82
As for Russian society, the Polish woman was a threat not only because of the 
perceived damage she could do to her Russian husband serving the state, but also because 
of the real danger she posed to the next generation. Once the mixed marriages produced 
offspring, the problem for Russian elites became one of childrearing. A Polish Catholic 
woman could not be relied upon to rear a loyal Russian Orthodox child. The children of 
mixed marriages, according to an anonymous cleric, “not infrequently were under [the 
influence of] fanatically minded Polish mothers who at all costs attempt[ed] to act in the 
spirit of Catholicism on the weak” children before they could defend the Orthodox faith 
and paternal Russian cultural heritage.** The Polish wife thus was in a position to attack 
the Russian patriarchy at both symbolic (imperial) and actual (familial) levels.84 Mixed 
marriages became dangerous to the children’s national identity because the Russian 
fathers were away from home at work all day and left the children in the domestic sphere
81Stanislaw Wiech, “Raport naczelnika Warsawskiego Okr^gu Zandarmerii o 
sytuacji polityczney Krolestwa Polskiego w 1868 r.,” Przeglqd historyczny 89, no. 1 
(1998): 97. There was the implication that Polish nationalist sentiments, rather than 
theological ones, were behind the priests’ refusals to perform the sacraments.
82Chimiak, Gubernatorzy, 103.
83“Novyi pravoslavnyi khram v Varshave,” Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi 
vestnik, no. 18,15 (27) September 1893: 300.
84The emphasis of attack here is on Russian, and not on patriarchy itself.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
77
“with women [the mothers] who do not speak Russian, cannot teach them the Orthodox 
prayers, or their native language.”85 Russian widow(er)s who entered mixed marriages 
similarly endangered their children, who became “further isolated” in a new “large 
exclusively Polish family.”86 Upper-class families’ employment of mainly Polish women 
as domestic servants only exacerbated fears that Polonization might include them as well. 
Polish gentry wives brought an entourage of old nannies or cooks to whom they had a 
long family attachment.87 Furthermore, Russian children’s daily interactions with Polish 
fellow students and neighborhood children added to the supposed deleterious influence of 
the mother at home. Any Catholic influence upon children threatened a Russian identity 
that equated Russianness with the Russian Orthodox faith and loyalty to the autocracy. 
Participants in the 1863 Uprising who came from such families became a warning to the 
rest of the community.88 Each child lost to the Poles was “to the detriment” of his/her 
nationality and faith.89 In the nationalistically charged environment of Poland -  and
S5Otchet o deiatel’nosti Russkago blagotvoritel’nago obshchestva za 1899 
(Warsaw, 1900), 2.
86Andrei Leont’evich Stefanovich, Zapiska o pervykh muzhskoi i zhenskoi 
gimna.ziia.kh v Varshave, supplement to Tsirkuliar po Varshavskomu uchebnomu okrugu 
1893, no.6,16.
87Danuta Rzepniewska, “Gentlewomen in the Towns of the Kingdom of Poland at 
the End of the Nineteenth Century,” Acta Poloniae Historica 85 (2002): 239.
88Stefanovich, Zapiska o pervykh muzhskoi i zhenskoi gimnaziiakh, 4; Murav’ev, 
Wspomnienia, 36.
s9Otchet o deiatel’nosti Varshavskago Pravoslavnago Sviato-Troitskago bratstva 
za 1897 (Warsaw, 1898), 5; Stefanovich, Zapiska opervykh muzhskoi i zhenskoi 
gimnaziiakh, 15.
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Warsaw in particular -  the discourse concerning the Polish woman exposed the fears 
Russians had of a “Polonization” of Russians in the home while the administration was 
being “Russified.”
Although Polish men were deemed unreliable, Polish women earned a more 
dangerous reputation in the official Russian imagination. In the Russian mind, the Polish 
woman -  be she a noble, bourgeois, or member of the intelligentsia -  was an “eternal, 
unappeased, and uncured conspirator.”90 Middle- and upper-class Polish women became 
the focus of much anxiety and even hatred among Russian leaders in the Polish territories 
because of their active participation in the Polish “patriotic cause.” The representation of 
the dangerous “Polish woman” became a somewhat mythical image in a similar fashion 
to that described by Gay Gullickson of female Communardes.91 Polish women activists 
in the Polish national movement certainly provided Russian officials with material to 
create such fears, and Russian officials responded to real challenges to imperial authority 
orchestrated by them. These women used traditional female concerns, such as 
motherhood, religion, and fashion, to protest Russian domination. The visible activity of 
Polish women in the Polish independence movement challenged the imperial imagery of 
the tsarist regime. The tsar represented the father figure who protected and cared for his
90Mikolaj Wasyliewicz Berg [Nikolai Vasil’evich Berg], Zapiski Powstaniu 
Polskiem 1863 i 1864 roku i poprzedzajqcej powstanie epoce demostracyjni od 1856 r. 
(Krakow: Spolka Wydawnicza Polska, 1899), 1: 171. Peasant women were not a part of 
Russian officials’ imagery of the Polish woman. They (wrongly) imagined the Polish 
peasant to be loyal and thankful to the tsar for emancipation.
91Gay Gullickson, Unruly Women o f  Paris: Images o f the Commune (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1996). See especially the Times and New York Herald 
accounts, 175, 178.
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children, both Russian and non-Russian. The threat that Polish women posed to this 
imagery created a “crisis of patriarchal authority” in Russian Poland.92 Russian officials 
perceived that Polish women, and by extension the feminized Polish nation (Polska), 
would not play the role of the obedient submissive daughters or wife in the “family” of 
the empire and its patriarchal tsar.
The image of Polska served as a powerful symbol for the Polish patriotic 
movement. Throughout the nineteenth century, and well into the twentieth, Polska 
walczqca, ’’Fighting Poland,” has been a popular image. Even the symbol of Warsaw, a 
mermaid with sword in hand and ready for battle, presented the image of a Polish capital 
that was ready to fight and not obey its foreign overlords. These symbols of Poland were 
not the passive images of tradition and motherhood as Germania, Columbia, and 
Marianne had become in Western Europe. Even when Polish nationalists portrayed 
Polska as the supreme mother, they presented her suffering under the yoke of oppression 
so as to inspire her sons to battle the Russians for her freedom. While the Western 
imagery of the woman as defender had been domesticated and made into the respectable 
and passive mother and preserver of tradition, the Polish woman (Polska) could not yet 
undergo the same transformation as long as Poland remained in the hands of foreigners.93
In the case of Poland, Russians conflated the Polish symbolic discourse that
92Karen Petrone, “Family, Masculinity, and Heroism in Russian War Posters of 
the First World War,” in Billie Melman, ed., Borderlines: Genders and Identities in War 
and Peace 1870-1930 (New York: Routledge, 1998), 95.
93George L. Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-Class Morality and Sexual 
Norms in Modern Europe (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 90-95.
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described the nation in familial terms with Polish women themselves. Polska (the 
country) and polki (Polish women) became one and the same. Prince P. A. Viazemskii 
had noted that “as long as there are Polish women on [this] earth, they [the Poles] will be 
able to sing Jeszcze Polska nie zgineia.”94 Russian officials did not have to search far for 
evidence of her nationalist activity. Polish upper- and middle-class women did more than 
simply reproduce future generations of Poles; they also actively participated in the 
national cause. They used the traditional imagery and concerns of femininity to support 
the Polish national cause. Motherhood, charitable activity, and fashion were political 
tools in their hands. While some supported Polish independence through traditional 
means such as sewing uniforms in their homes, others exhibited their patriotic fervor 
through public activism. Examples of women involved in charity, political 
demonstrations, conspiracy, and even in battle in the name of an independent Poland were 
numerous. Women’s public participation in the national cause made it possible for them 
to embody the nation actively engaged in its liberation in the imaginations of both Poles 
and Russians. Such women also reinforced the image of a fighting Poland resisting the 
oppressive Russian tsar-father.
Polish nationalists positioned the mother in the vanguard in the fight for Polish 
national independence because she was the bearer and preserver of Polish culture in the 
face of Russian and German oppression. Since Russian authorities banned the use of 
Polish in schools -  even in casual conversations -  mothers became the most important
y4Sidorov, Russie i russkaia zhizn ’, 40. The song is the Polish national anthem. In 
English the first stanza is: “Poland has not perished as long as we are alive.”
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teachers of the next generation in terms of the national language, religion, traditions, and 
myths. This national pedagogical role was certainly played out by many Polish mothers. 
In her memoir, Aleksandra Pilsudska recalled “how women, sitting at the stove in the 
evenings, told [stories] of the [1863] uprising in a subdued voice.”95 One prominent 
product of such rearing was inter-war general Leon Berbecki, who served in the Russian 
army before World War I at the prompting of his mother so that he could “study the arts 
of war in order to be prepared to serve his fatherland [Poland] in the next uprising.”96 A 
mother who encouraged her son to study the military arts for the subsequent anti-Russian 
fight could hardly fit the role of the “good mother” as defined by Russian officials. In 
such a manner, Polish women were able to use traditional female roles to undermine 
Russian authority in the Polish lands.
Polish society expected an upper- or middle-class Polish woman to assume what 
was termed the “appropriate attitude” in the national struggle. Its central elements 
solidified during the November Uprising of 1830 and continued to influence notions of 
correct feminine national behavior for generations.97 Women demonstrated their national
95Aleksandra Pilsudska, Wspomnienie (London, 1935), 57. See also Jozef 
Pilsudski, Opowstaniu 1863 roku (London: Gryf Publications, 1963), 259.
96CAW (Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe w Warszawie) Akta personalne L. 
Berbeckiego B., 558 as cited in Witold Ludwikowski, “Polscy generalowie w armiach 
zaborczych,” in Slawomir Kalembka and Norbert kasparek, eds. Mipdzy irredentq a 
kolaboracjq. Postawy spoleczenstwa polskiego wobec zaborcow. (Olsztyn: Uniwersytet 
Warmihsko-Mazurski, 1999), 133.
97Anna Barahska, Kobiety w powstaniu listopadowym, 1830-1831 (Lublin: 
Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1998), 10. Barahska 
argues that a number of these elements that had been developed and popularized during 
this period continued to appear in the twentieth century from World War II to the state of
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sympathies by being arrogant towards Russians or barely suffering their presence in social 
settings. In the 1860s, the newly arrived Russian officer, S. von Derfel’den, commented 
that when Viceroy Berg spoke with Polish elite women at a ball, they “invariably 
presented themselves with haughty affectations, and after talking with the Count [Berg], 
haughtily looked around at the public. Their extremely forced manner produced 
unpleasant impressions. Russian ladies, with few exceptions, seem to be made utterly 
happy by the Count-Viceroy’s treatment of them.” Von Derfel’den also complained that 
it was impossible to meet people in family settings because “Polish society completely 
turned away from us.” D. D. Obolenskii also noted the “proud conduct” of a Polish 
noblewoman whose conduct “could not instill respect.” Only in the provinces did Poles 
invite officers to social occasions, but they tended to be poor nobles looking to arrange 
matrimonial matches for their daughters.98
The Polish woman further demonstrated her patriotism by continuing the national 
struggle through the active commemoration of the heroism of her men, which served as 
reminders to other men to carry out their obligations to the motherland. Like the 
Sarmatian or Spartan woman, she sent off her sons, brothers, and husbands to battle.99
Martial Law in 1981 tol983.
98von Derfel’den, “Iz moikh vospominanii,” 329-34; Obolenskii, “Nabroski iz 
proshlago,” 680-81. See also Konstantin D. Khlebnikov, “Zapiski Konstantina 
Dmitrevicha Khlebnikova,” Russkii arkhiv 1907, 6.
" “Sarmatism” was a popular myth/ideology of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. It posited that the Polish-Lithuanian-Ruthenian nobility of the Commonwealth 
actually descended from the ancient Sarmatians. It marked them off as unique from the 
rest of Europe and also espoused an ideology of independence and individual freedoms.
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The favored image of Polish nationalists was the mother with only one son calling upon 
him to avoid disgrace and enter the good fight. Even if she were a widow who was 
dependent upon him, the shame of a son shirking his national duty was unacceptable.100 
Young women also played a role in reminding gentleman callers of their national 
obligations. Kazimeira Rogowska noted in her diary that one suitor was “a friendly 
enough boy, handsome enough, but, it seems to me, that [one] is not a man when he does 
not have truly masculine courage.” She commented that he never became involved in 
anything relating to the patriotic movement: “Is this not true cowardice?”101 She also 
exhibited the “appropriate attitude” by undertaking charitable activities and aid for those 
affected by war.
From the beginning of Polish nationalist protests in the 1860s, Polish women and 
the symbolism surrounding them played an important role in the patriotic movement that 
led to the 1863 uprising. The first national demonstration in the Congress Kingdom after 
the failure of the 1830 Uprising was at the 1860 funeral of Katarzyna ze Schroderow 
(Szrederow) Sowinska (1776-1860), the widow of General Jozef Sowinski (1777-1831), 
who had fought with Kosciuszko in the national uprising of 1794 against the second 
partition of Poland, participated in the Napoleonic invasion of Russia, and died during the
100Baranska, Kobiety w powstaniu, 74-76.
101Kazimiera Paulina Rogowska, Pamiptnik warszawskiej pensjonarM (Warsaw: 
Wydawnictwo DiG, 2000), 98 (entry for 30 January 1862). By this point, one of 
Rogowska’s cousins has already been sentenced to a few months in prison for his 
participation in the Polish national demonstrations.
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1830 Uprising defending Wola, the western suburb of Warsaw.102 Although she would 
have received attention as a hero’s widow, Sowihska gained greater notice precisely 
because she had exhibited the characteristics of a nationally conscious Polish woman 
throughout her adult life. She became the physical representation of the nationalist 
propaganda image of the Polish woman fighting for the nation and national memory. 
During the 1830 uprising, Katarzyna Sowihska and author Klemenyna z Tanskich 
Hoffinanowa103 organized aid for wounded soldiers by establishing the Patriotic 
Charitable Union {Zwiqzek Dobroczynnosci Patriotycznej), which was the first public 
organization in Poland created and run entirely by women. After the uprising’s collapse 
and Hoffinanowa left for Parisian exile, Sowihska attempted to continue the 
organization’s activities until Russian authorities forced the institution’s closure in 1831. 
After the Russian victors established the repressive regime that would last into the 1850s, 
Sowihska was instrumental in assisting political prisoners and exiles. Authorities briefly 
imprisoned her in a convent in Lomza during 1835-1837 for her activities and her protest 
in a published Hamburg newspaper to defend her husband’s honor.104
Sowihska’s funeral on 11 April 1860 became a political event after years of 
national silence. Warsaw police officials were so unprepared that they did not make any
102“Jozef Sowihski,” Encyklopedia historii Polski (Warsaw: Morex, 1995), 2: 396.
103Klementyna z Tahskich Hoffinanowa (1798-1845) was a well-known writer, 
educator, and advocate for women’s education.
104Barahska, Kobiety w powstaniu, 162,324. The protest, which authorities 
considered the last straw, concerned a boy presented to Nicholas I during a banquet as 
Sowihski’s son. She published a condemnation of such a presentation because the couple 
had been childless and she rejected the notion of his infidelity.
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serious attempts to stop the demonstration. The event drew a couple thousand protesters, 
many of whom were young students and craftsmen. The students of the School of Fine 
Arts carried Sowihska’s coffin to the Lutheran cemetery in Wola. They subsequently 
walked to the place where her husband died in 1831, pinned flowering sprigs of jasmine 
from the battle site to commemorate the hero’s death, and then returned to the city’s 
center.105
Sowihska not only acted heroically in continuing her patriotic charitable activities
under the new Viceroy Paskevich’s repressive rule.106 She also embodied the image of
the (female) patriot who fought oppression by whatever means were possible and became
the connection between contemporaries in the national movement and the Sarmatian
gentry(woman) of the old Polish-Lithuanian Republic. Sowihska did not give up the
struggle but continued to fight the hated “Moskal” who had no right to claim any
authority over Poland. When writing of Poland, Nikolai V. Berg, the Warsaw
correspondent for Peterburgskiia vedomosti, stated that:
Men in Poland. . .  may quite simply become bored with fighting and fall into a 
state of torpor, or even completely cease conspiring. [Polish] women, however,
105Teodora z Heurichow Kislanska, “Wspomneinia corki,” in Krzyztof Dunin- 
Wqsowicz, ed., Warszawa w pamiptnikach Powstania Styczniowego (Warsaw: 
Pahstwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1963), 293,298; S. Paniutin, “Sobytiia 
predshestvovavshiia vozstaniiu v Pol’she v. 1861 g.,” Russkaia starina v. 110 (May 
1902): 268; Sidorov, Pol’skoe vozstanie, 76; and Stefan Kieniewicz, Warszawa w 
powstaniu styczniowym, 4th ed. (Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1983), 47.
106Fieldmarshal Ivan “Erevanskii” Paskevich (1782-1856) was a veteran of the 
Napoleonic Wars and earned the title of Count of Erevan for his success in conquering 
the city in the war with Persia (1826-1827). For his role in the conquest of Warsaw in 
1831 he received the title Prince of Warsaw from the tsar. Repression and diminished 
Polish autonomy marked his term as the viceroy of Poland (1832-1855).
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never change and always maintain one and the same note. The Polish man can be
“white,” “red,” “black-yellow” . . .  but the Polish woman can only be “red.”107
The colors that Berg mentions in his commentary had clear political connotations. White 
referred to those loyal to the established (aristocratic and royal/imperial) order; black- 
yellow signified liberals; and the red symbolized revolutionaries, radical democrats, and 
socialists. Thus, according to Berg, military defeat did not dampen the revolutionary 
spirit of Polish women. In 1881, Mikhnevich echoed Berg’s opinion of Polish women 
when he wrote of them as “zealous patriot[s]” who preserve “dream-like fantastic 
illusions [of independence], for which Poles have paid so dearly.” He asserted that the 
Polish “hatred toward us [Russians] which Poles absorb can absolutely be said to come 
with the mother’s milk.”108 While Polish politicians and soldiers surrendered or fled into 
exile, Polish women like Sowihska refused to stop working for national regeneration.
Sowihska’s funeral became the touchstone to remember the Polish national past 
and remind the Polish people of the national mission. As the wife of a martyred general, 
she provided a physical connection between him and the contemporary Polish nation.
Her life story was likened to a national “saint’s life” that guided future generations along 
the path of national virtue. Thus, she fulfilled the Polish woman patriot’s role of 
commemorating the past and nationally educating the young one last time through her 
own funeral. This event created the possibility for people to build a national memory that
107Berg, Zapiski Powstaniu Polskiem, 1: 171. Nikolai Vasil’evich Berg (1823- 
1884) was a writer and linguist. He was given special access to documents by Governor- 
General Berg (not a relation) to write a history of the Polish Uprising. He taught Russian 
at the University of Warsaw after it replaced the Polish Szkola Glowna.
108Mikhnevich, Varshava i varshaviane, 51-52.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
87
valorized the Polish independence movement.
Polish women of the early 1860s also expressed the “appropriate attitude” of 
Polish patriotism through their conscious choice of public attire. After the deaths of five 
protesters in Warsaw in 1861, some women of the city began a “Movement of National 
Mourning” to commemorate the failed 1830 Uprising as well as those recently killed in 
Warsaw. By organizing special liturgical masses to commemorate the recent deaths of 
leaders in the Polish national pantheon, they also tied the Roman Catholic Church to 
expressions of national feeling.109 The most visible aspect of this movement was the 
novel wearing of black to mourn the loss of both human and national life. S. Paniutin 
declared that “One cannot imagine what was happening in the streets -  it was simply a 
masquerade. The entire population dressed in black.”110 Polish nationalists also called 
upon Jews to dress in black.111 The fashion for black extended beyond clothing and 
“dominated the home exteriors, store displays, [and] shop signs.” Aleksander Kraushar 
noted the intense impression this style of dress made against the winter background of the
109Kislanska, “Wspomneinia corki,” 302. The deaths of Prince Adam Czartoryski 
and the historian Joachim Lelewel were two notable examples. See also A. N. 
Kryzhanovskii, “Varshava v techenie 3-go i v noch c 3-go na 4-e oktiabria 1861 goda,” 
Russkaia starinav. 112 (October 1902): 141-44.
110Paniutin,“Sobytiia predshestvovavshiia,” 270,276. He also commented on the 
practice of men wearing traditional Polish gentry costumes such as the kontusz. See also 
Sidorov,Pol’skoe vozstanie, 86, 111, 121-22; Kislanska, “Wspomneiniacorki,” 302; and 
Rogowska, Pamiptnik warszawskiej pensjonarld, 125, 167 (entries for 2 April 1862 and 5 
January 1863).
inSidorov, Pol’skoe vozstanie, 91. The Polish national protests of the 1860s 
marked a high point in Polish-Jewish relations. See Magdalena Opalski, Poles and Jews: 
A Failed Brotherhood (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1992).
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Saxon Gardens because “all the strollers were dressed in mourning. Even the dolls of
little girls were in black dresses.”112
Nikolai Berg, the Warsaw correspondent for Peterburgskiia vedomosti,
commented on the appearance of the sartorial phenomenon in the city. He described one
such “black woman” (chernaia zhenshchina) in mourning:
[She was] delightful, but pale as death. God only knows what kind of 
phosphorous roaming fires sparkle[d] in her glances, what storm clouds [hung] 
over her marvelous brows. Everything is black: the dress, hat, veil, gloves,
burnoose, everything down to the lace Strange Amazons . . .  you have always
played an appreciable role in Polish history.113
The stark contrast of the pale figure in black automatically forced observers to take notice 
of her. The presence of women draped in black in public reminded others of the Polish 
national struggle and of Polish women’s key role in that movement. Berg recognized 
such women as important players in Poland’s past and its present. He also recognized the 
mythical connections some Poles had made to the Sarmatians and the Amazons during 
the seventeenth century when he described such women as “Amazons.” They would not 
settle into the family narrative of the Russian empire as obedient and silent daughters.
Such a fashion and political statement eventually became common in the 
Northwestern region and even in the Polish lands of the Prussian and Austrian partitions. 
Governor-General Murav’ev blamed a Polish noblewoman, Mme. Baczynska, for
U2Alkar [Aleksander Kraushar], Kartki apamiptnika Alkara (Krakow: G. 
Gebethner i Spolka, 1910), 62; and Ochevidets [pseud.], “Posledniaia pol’skaia smuta,” 
Russkaia starina 11, (December 1874), 700.
113Nikolai Berg, “Varshavskiia pis’ma IX,” Peterburgskiia vedomosti, 12 March 
1863 (Old Style), 236.
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introducing the style in Vilnius.114 In the rest of Europe, the Polonaise style of wearing 
black became a fad unrelated to the political issue. Russian officials received disturbing 
reports of such dress at Catholic weddings. Some reports even described Russian 
Orthodox women succumbing to the fashion on various occasions.115 What aggravated 
officials most was that Polish women did not wear black on Polish national holidays; on 
those days women donned the colorful dresses that celebrated life and Polish national 
customs rather death and loss of independence.116
The official response was to arrest and fine women who had no “legitimate” 
reason to dress in mourning. Varsovian officials banned the use of mourning dress and 
national costumes. Other symbols of nationalist sentiment, such as red and white 
cockades, white eagles, and neckties in the national colors also became illegal. Stores 
were also banned from displaying mourning accessories.117 Murav’ev introduced a 25- 
ruble fine, which doubled if the violation was repeated. If a bureaucrat’s family member 
illegitimately wore mourning dress, he would lose his job. He also ordered Mme. 
Baczyriska and her fellow-leaders in the St. Vincent de Paul Society (Mme. Lopacinska
114Murav’ev, Wspomnienia, 62.
U5Sidorov, Pol’skoe vozstanie, 124; and Ochevidets, “Posledniaia pol’skaia 
smuta,” 712.
u6The women participating in such activities of necessity were economically 
advantaged. Poor women could hardly have afforded the wardrobes required for such a 
protest.
117Paniutin,“Sobytiia predshestvovavshiia,” 281.
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and Countess Plater) exiled to the interior of the empire.118 When officials banned black, 
women adopted “bloody mourning,” which consisted of black dressed with red kerchiefs. 
The Polish woman’s counter-response was to change the colors of dress to express 
political protest; they first donned grey, then brown clothes.119
Russian concerns with the “eternal conspiracies” of Polish women made them 
hyper-sensitive to the slightest symbolism of women’s actions and to exaggerate them. 
Attention to female dress reached the height of paranoia when police arrested a woman in 
1863 at a train station in Bielsk Podlaski for wearing green because the color supposedly 
connoted hope.120 Polish women’s fashion as a form of national protest continued to 
register as a possible problem until the end of Russian Rule in Poland. In his 1911 and 
1912 reports, Warsaw oberpolitsmaistr Petr Meier noted that Poles had called for national 
mourning because the the Kholm/Chelm region was to be separated from Poland and 
because the state planned to buy out the private (Polish) owners of the Warsaw-Vienna
118Murav’ev, Wspomnienia, 25, 62; and Mikhail Murav’ev, Sbornik 
rasporiazhenii grafa Mikhaila Nikolaevicha Murav ’eva po usmireniiu Pol ’skago 
miatezha v cevero-zapadnykh guberniakh, 1863-1864 (Vilnius: Tip. A. Kirkora, 1866), 
109, 353-54, 376.
119 Bogna Lorence-Kot, “Konspiracja: Probing the topography of women’s 
underground activities. The Kingdom of Poland in the second half of the nineteenth 
century,” in Rudolf Jaworski and Bianka Pietrow-Ennker, eds. Women in Polish Society 
(Boulder, Colorado: East European Monographs, 1992), 31-35; and Dolbilov, “The 
Stereotype of the Pole,” 59.
120Maria Bruchnalska, Ciche bohaterki. Udzialkobiet w powstaniu styczniowym 
(Miejsce Piastowe: Wydawnictwo Towarzystwa Sw. Michala Archaniola, 1933), 62.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
91
Railroad.121 This protest tactic also appears to have spread beyond the Polish community; 
Finnish women adopted national mourning to protest the Russificatory program of 
Governor-General Bobrikov at the end of the nineteenth century.122 The great danger that 
women’s dress represented in these circumstances was a silent, but persistent resistance 
to Russian authority. It also could serve as a visible reminder to Polish men of the 
national work to be done; women in patriotic dress hinted at the Spartan woman or wife 
warning her men of the disgrace of inaction. Russians in the second half of the nineteenth 
century believed that the Polish nation as a whole was “as explosive as dynamite,” and 
the Polish woman was the “most dangerous” part of it.123
While the image of the woman in the West transformed into a passive mother and 
preserver of tradition, Polish symbolism used these traditional images in the cause of 
national liberation to undermine Russian authority in Poland. The Polish woman as 
mother taught young men to fight for the nation when they came of age. As wife she 
called upon her husband to defend her from shame by not standing aside when the 
national fight was at hand. Finally, the Polish woman used such a traditionally female 
concern as fashion to leave the domestic sphere and make public political gestures 
intended to inflame all who saw her. She had the role of inspiring Polish men to action
121Halina Kiepurska and Zbigniew Pustula, eds., Raporty warszawskich 
oberpolicmajstrow (1892-1913) (Wroclaw: Zaklad Narodowy imienia Ossoliriskich, 
1971), 113-4, 119
122Tuomo Polvinen, Imperial Borderland: Bobrikov and the Attempted 
Russification o f Finland, 1898-1904, trans. Steven Huxley (Durham, N. C.: Duke 
University Press, 1995), 87.
123Berg, Zapiski Powstaniu Polskim, 1: 172.
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and reminding Russian officials that they were not going to be accepted in Poland. As a 
symbol, the Polish woman (“Polska”) could not be domesticated and made passive like 
the French Marianne because foreigners (Russia) had extinguished Polish independence.
After the January Uprising of 1863, Russian and Polish attentions focused on one 
woman, who came to symbolize the fears of many Russians. The individual was a 
Russian general’s daughter, Anna Hemyka Pustowojtow124 (1838-1881), who became a 
partisan fighter alongside Marian Langiewicz, a general in the 1863 Uprising and Dictator 
of the uprising’s Underground Government.125 She was not the first woman to take up 
arms against Russians. The most famous such Polish woman-partisan for contemporaries 
was Emilia Plater of Vilnius (Wilno) who fought and died during the uprising in 1831.126 
Women within the Kingdom joined some army units during 1830 in defense of Warsaw. 
During the 1860s, Polish women participated as couriers for the Polish underground 
government, collected funds to support the uprising and the participants’ family members, 
held clandestine meetings in their homes, and published underground newspapers.127 The
124I have used a polonized version of her surname (Pustowojtowna is another) 
rather than the transliteration from Russian, Pustovoitov, because she consciously chose a 
Polish identity in contradistinction to her father’s Russian one.
125Marian Langiewicz (1827-1887), who was of bourgeois origins, came from 
Prussian Poland. He participated in the 1848 Revolution in Prussia and fought with 
Garibaldi.
126Emilia Plater (1806-1831) came from the Lithuanian territories that were not a 
part of the Polish Kingdom. She incited rebellion there before joining the battle in the 
Polish Kingdom itself.
127Kislanska, “Wspomneinia corki,” 303, 311-13; Emilia Heurichowa, “Pami^tnik 
matki,” in Krzysztof Dunin-W^sowicz, ed., Warszawa w pamiptnikach Powstania 
Styczniowego (Warsaw: Panstwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1963), 288-96; Seweryna
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difference between these examples and that of Pustowojtow is that her path to the Polish 
national pantheon crystalized many of the anxieties of Russians living in the Polish 
Kingdom during the second half of the nineteenth century and exhibited the challenge to 
Russian patriarchal authority by Polish women within a Russian family.
Pustowojtow’s mother, Marianna Kossakowska, came from a property-owning 
szlachta family near Lublin. In 1837, in Lublin’s Roman Catholic St. John’s Cathedral, 
the nineteen-year-old Marianna married a Russian major, Trofim Pustovoitov, from a 
Russian regiment, then stationed in Lublin. Not long afterward the couple moved to 
Zhitomir (in present-day Ukraine) where they bought property. In 1838 Marianna 
returned to Lublin to give birth to her first daughter, Anna Henryka, who contrary to 
Russian law was baptized Roman Catholic.128
Until the rise of the national protest movement in the 1860s, there was little to 
indicate that this daughter of a Russian general would become a Polish patriot.129 Much 
of her childhood was spent with her grandmother in Lublin and her education was
Duchinska, “Wspomnienie moje z roku 1863,” in Krzysztof Dunin-W^sowicz, ed., 
Warszawa w pamiptnikach Powstania Styczniowego (Warsaw: Panstwowy Instytut 
Wydawniczy, 1963), 470-78; Jozef Kajetan Janowski, “Ze wspomnien sekretarza stanu,” 
in Krzysztof Dunin-W^sowicz, ed., Warszawa w pamiptnikach Powstania Styczniowego 
(Warsaw: Panstwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1963), 414,418; and Murav’ev, 
Wspomnienia, 62. See also Bruchnalska, Ciche bohaterki.
128Ryszard Bender, “Henryka Pustowojow w manifestacjach przedpowstaniowych 
1861 r.,” in Barbara Grochulska and Jerzy Skowronek, eds., Losy Polakow w XIX-XXw. 
(Warsaw: Polskie Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1987), 576-79.
129Trofim Pustovoitov (1799-1858) attained the rank of general before he died. 
Local Russian officials believed Henryka to be Russian Orthodox. See A. P. Khrushchev, 
“Otryvki iz dnevnika,” Istoricheskii vestnik 5 (1881): 76
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conventional for a noblewoman. The Kossakowski home did not show any nationalist 
inclinations. Indeed, Henryka’s sister married a Russian officer, and the family 
developed a poor reputation among Polish nationalists because of its close relations with 
Russian officials and its penchant for mixed marriages.130 The family’s behavior 
contradicted the established ideology of the Polish woman. “Good” Polish women were 
supposed to refuse such marriages, even when under duress, unless the Russian man 
could be converted to fight for the Polish cause.131
Although Henryka Pustowojtow’s earliest participation in the Polish patriotic 
movement is clouded by legend and a lack of solid sources,132 the first documented Polish 
nationalist event in which she participated was the one that also propelled her to a leading 
position in Lublin’s patriotic circles in 1861. Lublin’s Polish leaders intended to 
commemorate the city’s importance in Polish history through the observance of the two 
hundred ninety-second anniversary of the Union of Lublin.133 City residents decorated 
their windows with transparent coats of arms of Poland and Lithuania, portraits of Polish
130Bender, “Henryka Pustowojtow,” 583.
131Barahska, Kobiety w powstaniu, 78.
132For a clear explanation of the difficulties concerning the anecdotal and archival 
evidence, see Bender’s article in Losy Polakdw. See also A. G. Katsnel’bogen, “K 
voprosu o biografii A. T. Pustovoitovoi,” Novaia i noveishaia istoriia (1980), no. 1: 173- 
75.
133The Union of Lublin (1569) restructured the relationship between the Polish 
Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, creating a closer state while maintaining 
internal separateness.
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heroes such as Kosciuszko, and other Polish national symbols.134 Although planning for 
the event began much earlier, Russian officials fearing a nationalist protest did not decide 
to ban the celebrations until the eve of the anniversary. The Polish population, however, 
ignored the ban and began the observances at the cathedral on 31 July 1861 (OS). After 
the mass, demonstrators marched to Lithuanian Square (Plac Litewski) in the city’s center 
where an obelisk commemorating the Union stood.
General Aleksandr P. Khrushchev placed soldiers around the obelisk with orders 
to prevent anyone from placing flowers at the monument’s base. Dressed in “traditional” 
Polish costume and the national colors, Henryka Pustowojtow appeared at the head of the 
demonstration. She ignored the soldiers, walked passed them, and placed flowers at the 
foot of the obelisk.133 Others followed the lead of the Russian general’s daughter.
Because of her privileged position, Pustowojtow was able to make a political statement in 
this early period of the nationalist demonstrations that others could not make in the 
situation. Poles would have been arrested before they could embarrass officials in the 
manner she had.
Henryka Pustowojtow, however, did suffer consequences for her Polish national 
actions. Russian officials in Warsaw ordered her sent to her mother in Zhitomir. Her 
grandmother decided that she had to accompany Pustowojtow on the journey. Once news 
of her exile from Lublin spread, crowds gathered at the Kossakowski residence in the 
city, where Pustowojtow spoke to those assembled before leaving. En route to Zhitomir
134Sidorov, Pol’shoe vozstanie, 117.
135Khrushchev, “Otryvki,” 77; Sidorov, Pol’shoe vozstanie, 117.
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Kossakowska unsuccessfully attempted to use her connections with the Imperial Court to 
allow her granddaughter to return to Lublin due to illness.136 Once in Zhitomir, 
Pustowojtow continued her patriotic Polish activities, and may have sparked the Polish 
national demonstrations that began shortly after her arrival. After these disturbances 
authorities finally decided to send her off to a Russian Orthodox women’s monastery, 
since she legally should have been baptized in this church. Her mother then also 
petitioned the Imperial Court on behalf of her “sick” daughter.137
Pustowojtow finally escaped from Zhitomir by donning male dress and returned to 
Poland, where she took an active part in the partisan war against the Russians. She 
became closely associated with Marian Langiewicz during the 1863 Uprising, particularly 
after Langiewicz appointed her an aide-de-camp under the male pseudonym of Michal 
Smok.138 After the uprising’s failure, she escaped and became a part of the Polish emigre 
community in Paris.139
136Berg, Zapiski Powstaniu Polskiem, 3: 28-29.
137Antoni Szymborski, Burzliwe fortuny obroty: moj pamiptnik (1831-1881) 
(Krakow: Znak, 2000), 186; Sidorov, Pol’skoe vozstanie, 188; and Bender, 593-96. Anna 
Henryka’s mother and grandmother also attempted to doctor the birth certificate, with a 
year of birth in 1832, in order to avoid the law that required her registry as Orthodox 
(1836). Sidorov postulates that it was in Zhitomir that the Orthodox Anna became the 
Catholic Henryka.
138Stanislaw Kieniewicz, “Pustowojtow, (Pustowoitoff, Pustowojtowna) Anna 
Henryka” Polski slownik biograficzny 29, no. 2 (Wroclaw: Zaklad Narodowy im. 
Ossolinskich, Polska Akademia Nauk, 1986), 432-34. “Smok” is also an interesting 
choice of surname because it means “dragon.”
139She was a nurse during the Franco-Prussian War and the Paris Commune, 
which briefly landed her in prison. See Katsnel’bogen, “K voprosu,” 174-75.
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Anna Henryka Pustowojtow became a symbol to both Russians and Poles of the 
fighting Polish woman who did not surrender to an oppressor. She was particularly 
dangerous in the eyes of Russians, especially among those living in the Kingdom of 
Poland, because, given her pedigree, she should have acted as a Russian rather than Pole. 
By rejecting her Russian paternal heritage, she also rejected the symbolic patriarchal 
authority of the Russian tsar over his feminized Polish “children.” Furthermore, she 
embodied not only the Polish patriotic ideal but also the fears of the small Russian 
minority in Poland, which had anxieties concerning its own national identity. Her 
narrative exposed the problems and realities Russians in Poland faced.
When Russian officials arrived in Warsaw just after the uprising, they intended to 
destroy the last remnants of autonomy of a rebellious imperial borderland. Reasons of 
state security and centralization, as well as a desire to punish the disloyal Poles, were at 
the heart of the planned Russification. They sought not to eliminate Polish culture and 
Polish life, but to make all public, official life in the Congress Kingdom -  the 
Privislinskii krai -  fit in with the rest of the Russian Empire. To ensure that no further 
rebellions disrupted the state, they intended to Russify the administration and encouraged 
the immigration of thousands of Russians to Poland. Because they could not forego the 
reliance upon Poles in the civil administration, they only succeeded, however, in the 
superficial Russification of the administration. As the number of single Russian soldiers 
grew, officials’ concerns switched to the private sphere. The rank-and-file peasant 
soldiers could not find Russian marriage partners of the appropriate social rank. Once 
these Russians began marrying Polish women, the fear was that their homes and their
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children would be Polonized. That concern also extended to the possibility that 
Polonization could threaten the Russian upper classes. The children’ s own Polish 
mother and the matrilineal family threatened the local Russian family’s national identity. 
The Polish mother was the outsider in her own country who became the internal threat 
producing a chronic instability in the Russian household in Poland.
The example of Henryka Pustowojtow thus symbolized the anxieties for Russians 
serving in Poland in the second half of the nineteenth century. She was the product of a 
mixed marriage and was illegally baptized as a Catholic. Her mother’s family was 
responsible for much of her upbringing in Poland far from the father’s supervision. Her 
mother and grandmother used all means at their disposal to free her, including appeals for 
mercy on the grounds of her illness. Such protestations appeared to gall later Russian 
writers such as Nikolai Vasil’evich Berg because Pustowojtow miraculously returned to 
good health to become a guerrilla fighter against Russian hegemony. Lublin’s military 
commander Khrushchev believed that “the society in which she lived had such a ruinous 
influence on [her]. . .  and was the cause of such reprehensible behavior.”140 She was a 
Russian child whose Polish mother and grandmother had irreparably corrupted her. 
Henryka Pustowojtow not only became a Pole, but an active anti-Russian Polish 
nationalist.
Polish women consistently played an active part in the Polish national movement. 
Indeed, they became potent symbols of resistance because of their sex. Russian officials 
who became concerned at the dangers of the Polish woman were responding to real
140Khrushchev, “Ohyvki,” 76.
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challenges that middle- and upper-class Polish women posed. By blurring the personal 
and symbolic woman, Polska and Polka, Polish nationalists could present each Polish 
woman as a representative of the entire nation. Her presence in black or in patriotic 
colors (red and white) made her into a living propaganda poster. Each black-clad woman 
became Polska, embodying the nation in combat with the Russian oppressor through her 
dresses. Many women used traditional gender roles in their fight against Russian control. 
Traditionally female endeavors such as charitable activity bore distinctly national 
purposes and helped make Sowinska into a symbol of the “appropriate attitude” Polish 
women were to hold. During the early 1860s Polish women used fashion and politicized 
haughtiness towards Russians as a form of national agitation. Finally, as mothers they 
reared children to be Polish nationalists rather than Russian subjects. In this final form of 
activity they became the most subversive and dangerous threat to the small and 
predominantly male Russian population. As their wives, Polish women were in a 
position to “polonize” “Russian” children.
Polish women also appropriated the militarized symbolism of a fighting Polska. 
Polish women had joined in direct military combat during both uprisings (1831 and 
1863), and some had also crossed gender boundaries by using male pseudonyms and 
dress in combat. The story of Henryka Pustowojtow came to symbolize the militarized 
Polish woman. Her mother and grandmother undermined Russian patriarchal authority 
through their use of traditional female roles, and Henryka Pustowojtow challenged the 
symbolic patriarchal authority of the empire by being a rebellious daughter that rejected 
her father’s Russian heritage. The Polish woman as an opponent of Russian patriarchal
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authority (tsarism) became particularly worrisome to Russians in Poland because there 
were increasing numbers of mixed marriages with children at the turn of the century, and 
the fear was that an entire generation might similarly challenge its Russian fathers. Polish 
women in traditional roles as mothers and Russo-Polish daughters as possible Poles were 
both threats to the patriarchy of Russian Poland. In response to this perceived threat, the 
Varsovian Russian community looked to charities as one means of shoring up the 
Russianness of their colony.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 2
CHARITY AND NATION IN WARSAW
Assistance to the needy was an important part of public life in Europe, particularly 
as urbanization and industrialization multiplied the problems of poverty during the 
nineteenth century. In pre-industrial rural settings, smaller local communities bore the 
responsibility of caring for their poor, who were seen as a part of that society. The 
concentration of individuals produced by modem life, however, also concentrated and 
isolated the poor into slums where the higher classes did not tread.1 Poverty became 
anonymous and threatening, particularly as one saw increasing numbers of the poor in the 
cities.
As poverty became faceless and menacing in the nineteenth century, the notion of 
Christian charity gradually lost ground to a humanist philanthropy. Simply helping poor 
people was not enough to the concerned bourgeois and bureaucratic elites of cities and 
countries throughout Europe. The traditional Christian statement that the poor will 
always be among us was not acceptable to upper classes concerned about the possibility 
of social unrest and revolution. Rather than being a part of the greater social fabric, the 
poor became the threat to the bourgeois (and aristocratic) society that was developing
1 An exception here was St. Petersburg, where the poor lived in the wet basements 
of apartment buildings and homes of the wealthy.
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nineteenth-century urban centers. Traditional Christian alms to the poor did nothing to 
end poverty or its visibility. Poverty was a problem that needed a modem scientific 
solution. Philanthropy’s goal was to bring people out of poverty and, thus, transform 
them into productive and supportive members of the social order. Physicians, lawyers, 
and other professionals participated in philanthropic activities with the intention of 
eliminating the social and political threat of poverty.2
Russians considered charity itself to be important to defining Russian life. Adele 
Lindenmeyr has described the pervasive belief among Russians that theirs was a culture 
of giving. The Russian Orthodox Church fostered the ideology of Russians’ exceptional 
benevolence. Only in Orthodox Christianity was the early essence of “true giving,” and 
“only the Russians, the most charitable of all the people, practiced true compassion for 
the poor.” Debates within Russian educated society on charity focused, rather, on 
whether or not Russia should follow the Western pattern of scientific philanthropy or 
continue in the spirit of Christian charity.3 The majority assumed that charity was a 
fundamental part of the Russian character without argument. This assertion was a “part 
of the search for a Russian national identity and mission in the late Imperial period.
2Gareth Stedman Jones, Outcast London: A Study in the Relationship Between 
Classes in Victorian Society (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1971), 241-61; 
Adele Lindenmeyr, Poverty is Not a Vice: Charity, Society, and the State in Imperial 
Russia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 99; Elzbieta Mazur, Dobroczynnosc 
w Warszawie XIX wieku (Warsaw: Instytut Archeologii i Etnologii Polskiej Akademii 
Nauk, 1999), 7-8. See also Mary Lindemann, Patriots and Paupers: Hamburg, 1712- 
1830 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1900); and Peter Mandel, ed., The Uses o f  
Charity: The Poor on Relief in the Nineteenth-Century Metropolis (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990).
3Lindenmeyr, Poverty is Not a Vice, 7.
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Depending on the form it took, Russians’ readiness to help the poor was regarded either 
as the legacy of a precious, unique Orthodox past, or as a weapon in the struggle to 
overcome backwardness and catch up to the West.”4
Among nineteenth-century Varsovian Russians charity also carried great 
importance. The institutions they created, however, possessed characteristics that 
differentiated them from the organizations in the heart of the Empire. The most 
important factor to play a role in their activities was Russo-Polish national politics, which 
permeated the issue of charity in the same way it did nearly every other issue in the Polish 
Kingdom. As Russians became more involved in philanthropy, Poles interpreted sinister 
Russificatory designs behind these activities. Philanthropy became a tool in the conflicts 
between these two nationalities. It also became a means of defining and protecting the 
vital national characteristics that elites believed were threatened within the poor of their 
respective national communities.
The Varsovian Russian charities maintained a semi-official appearance that in the 
eyes of the Polish population appeared to make them into handmaidens of the state rather 
than genuine associations of civic society. The leaders of the major institutions and the 
initiators of many charitable efforts came from the highest stratum of Russian officialdom 
in the Congress Kingdom. The organizations also received heavy financial support from
4Adele Lindenmeyr, “The Ethos of Charity in Imperial Russia,” Journal o f  Social 
History 23, no. 4 (summer 1990): 689. See also Joseph Bradley, “Voluntary Association, 
Civic Culture, and Obshchestvennost’ in Moscow,” in Edith W. Clowes, Samuel D. 
Kassow, and James L. West, eds., Between Tsar and People: Educated Society and the 
Quest for Public Identity in Late Imperial Russia, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1991), 131-48.
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the state -  from both St. Petersburg and the Governor-General’s offices -  or from the 
Russian Orthodox Church in Warsaw.
Charitable efforts also ignored the bulk of Warsaw’s population. Membership in 
these societies and their charitable attention excluded Poles, Jews, and Protestants; their 
only concern was the small Russian population. Finally, social needs drew attention 
because of their national or imperial connections. Poor Russians were of interest 
primarily because of the fear that they “would be lost forever in the mass of non- 
Orthodox people [Poles] to the detriment of our [Russian] nationality and [Orthodox] 
faith.”5 The fear that the lower social orders within the Russian colony would be 
Polonized combined with the tense Russo-Polish conflict after the 1863 Uprising to 
influence their endeavors.
Varsovian Russians did not form their own institutions in a vacuum. Warsaw had 
by the 1860s a long tradition of charitable organization in which the Russian community 
participated. The largest and most important institution in the city, indeed, in the entire 
Polish Kingdom, was the Warsaw Charitable Society (Warszawskie Towarzystwo 
Dobroczynnosci). The leading aristocratic families of the city, the Zamoyskis, Sapiehas, 
and Czartoryskis among others, founded it at the end of 1814 and drew up the charter that 
guided the organization’s activities until the Tsar modified it in 1825. Although at first 
dominated by the aristocracy, all who could pay the required dues could become 
members, and from the institution’s beginning, members of the merchant class had been
3Otchet o sostoianii i deiatel’nosti, sostoiashchago pod Vysochaishim Ego 
Imperatoskago Velichestva pohrovitel ’stvom, Varshavskago Sviato-Troitskago Bratstva 
za 1912 (dvadtsat’piaty bratskii) god (Warsaw: Gub. Pravleniia, 1913), 5.
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on the governing committee. As Warsaw industrialized during the course of the century, 
the new class of industrial families such as the Kronenbergs became equally as important 
as any aristocratic family6.
Nineteenth-century Polish philanthropic organizers believed that their mission 
was “the organization of Christian mercy in a modem and rational manner.” They 
accepted the idea that traditional forms of almsgiving, such as direct offerings of money 
to the poor, would do nothing to improve the lot of the poor and could actually be 
harmful. Poles were familiar with and adopted much of the contemporary thinking on 
philanthropy in the West. Polish social leaders accepted that such offerings supported 
“laziness and vagrancy.”7 The Warsaw Charitable Society’s activities included the 
creation of shelters, the distribution of food, and the provisions of medicine. Work was a 
requirement for those who lived in the Society’s shelters unless they were physically 
unable to do so.8 After the 1831 Uprising, the charity offered schooling for children 
orphaned by the rebellion in its building in the town center. This same period witnessed 
an expansion of Polish charitable activities in Warsaw, but a decline in philanthropy in 
the rest of the Polish Kingdom. More funding, some of which came from the Russian
6On charity in Poland see Czeslaw K^pski, Towarzystwa dobroczynnosci w 
Krolestwie Polskim (1815-1914) (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie- 
Sklodowskiej, 1993). On Warsaw charities see Elzbieta Mazur, Dobroczynnoscw 
Warszawie. For studies of charity during the pre-Partition era, see the special thematic 
issue of Acta Poloniae Historica 87 (2003): “Poor Relief in Multiconfessional Society. 
The Case of the Polish-Lithaunian Commonwealth.”
7K?pski, Towarzystwa dobroczynnosci, 5.
8K?pski, Towarzystwa dobroczynnosci, 66-67.
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state, permitted the Warsaw Charitable Society to increase the number of orphanages and 
to offer more meals, shelter, and medical care for adults.9
After the 1863 Uprising, the importance of Polish philanthropies increased in the 
thinking of Polish elites. Russian officials forced the closure of nearly all types of Polish 
associations because of suspicions that they could be centers for conspiratorial activity. 
The charities were the only type of institution Russian administrators permitted in the 
immediate post-1863 period. Under conditions in which the charitable organization was 
the only public institution open to Poles, its significance grew beyond the problems of 
assisting the poor. Charities became one of the most important areas of social 
organization and action in Polish society because Russian officials denied Poles any other 
locus for a Polish civil society where important social issues could be discussed.10 The 
result of anti-Polish policies was an even greater dedication on the part of Polish upper 
and middle classes to the improvement of the condition of the needy. By the late 
nineteenth century the broad public response fostered the emergence of new forms of 
assistance to the poor on an unparalleled scale.11 Rather than end Polish patriotic activity, 
Russian reprisals only forced Polish activists to shift their tactics.
The charitable institutions played a particularly important role for the Warsaw 
Postitivists, who generally rejected the romantic nationalism of previous generations
9Mazur, Dobroczynnoscw Warszawie 24; K^pski, Towarzystwa dobroczynnosci,
130-31.
10K?pski, 6.
"Janina Zurawicka, “Charity in Warsaw in the Second Half of the XDCth 
Century,” Journal o f  European Economic History 14, no. 2 (fall, 1985), 319.
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because of the heavy toll that recurring uprisings left upon Poland and its people. Rather 
than idolizing the gentry man battling oppression, they placed their faith in the practical 
efforts of the bourgeois entrepreneur, the doctor, or the social worker.12 Because many 
Poles were denied access to high state office, at least within the Kingdom, charitable 
activity offered the opportunity to have an impact on the broader social arena, as public 
discussion of social issues was possible in these organizations. Furthermore, many 
educated Poles without means, and with too much national feeling to work for the 
administration at a lower level, opted for the medical profession. Many of these doctors 
became active participants and advocates for national improvement and declared the 
welfare of the peasants and working classes to be a matter of national concern. Boleslaw 
Prus, who was trained as a doctor at the Szkoh Glowna, wrote in his journalistic 
feuilletons, the Kroniki, that “the person is more valuable than his paintings; the nation is 
more valuable than its artistic creations.”13 Although of gentry origin, his vision of the 
nation expanded to include the rising proletarian class, and he regularly criticized the 
poor physical conditions of Polish factory workers when compared with those of their 
German and French counterparts.14
12Among the leading figures of Polish Positivism were the writers Boleslaw Prus, 
Eliza Orzeszkowa, and Aleksander Swi^tochowski. The rejection of an armed national 
national struggle, however, did not mean the denial of a national battle. They just shifted 
it to the economic and social-educational arenas.
13Boleslaw Prus, Kroniki (Warsaw: Panstwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1958), 6: 
258. Originally in Kurier warsszawski, no. 317,2 December 1883.
14Prus, Kroniki, 10:142. Originally in Kurier codzienrty, no. 160,12 April 1887; 
idem., Kroniki, 14: 354-55. Prus viewed the Polish working class’s health as vitally 
important to ensuring Polish industrial competitiveness.
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Charities both provided jobs to the Polish doctors and activists and offered a 
“practical” alternative to the periodic revolts for national independence that caused so 
much suffering in Poland. This “organic work” advocated by the Warsaw Positivists and 
others intended to preserve the Polish nation through more “practical” endeavors such as 
education, economic development, and social reform. They argued that the best way to 
preserve the Polish nation was to improve the living and working conditions of the urban 
and rural poor, to educate the lower classes (naturally in Polish culture), and to 
industrialize with the intent of exporting manufactured goods to the less-developed 
Russian market. Charitable activity was the new Polish generation’s way of defending 
the nation, and the need for this type of national defense became more important as the 
city’s population exploded Mid the economy industrialized. Only Lodz underwent more 
dramatic growth during this period; its population in 1827 was under 3,000, reached 
100,000 in 1878, and was 329,000 by 1904.13 In the eyes of Prus’s contemporaries, 
national survival demanded charitable activity, and with die passage of time, its 
importance only increased.
An autocracy that was still ambivalent about private organizations in the heart of 
Russia -  regardless of their purpose -  had little faith at all that Polish charities functioned 
purely as “charities.” The importance Polish nationalists attached to charity caused great 
concern among Russian officials because they believed such institutions could serve to
15Stephen D. Corrsin, “Warsaw: Poles and Jews in a Conquered City,” in Michael 
F. Hamm, ed., The City in Late Imperial Russia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1986), 127. Lodz was known as the “Polish Manchester” because of the explosive 
growth of its textile industry. See V. V. Esipov, Varshava i Lodz Ikh proshloe i 
nastoiashchee (Warsaw: Tip. Varshavskago uchebnago okruga, 1907), 17.
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protect and encourage national feeling. The creation of libraries, reading rooms, literacy 
courses, and other educational activities in non-Russian areas particularly disquieted the 
Department of Police for this reason. Russian officialdom also feared that many national 
charities really served as fronts for separatist or anti-government societies. After 
approving the use of model charters for new organizations, authorities in St. Petersburg 
placed restrictions on Polish, Jewish, and Armenian institutions, fearing the national 
activities they might instigate. In 1892, the Governor-General of Warsaw closed the 
reading rooms of the Warsaw Charitable Society, and banned the creation of others for 
this reason.16
Russian officials’ concerns about Polish patriotic attention to charities was not 
completely unfounded. Polish Positivists did not advocate loyalty concerning the 
partitioning regimes. Rather than advocating revolution, they supported social and 
economic change that would strengthen the Polish nation and prepare it for future 
independence. Part of their opposition to rebellion for the time being was that it resulted 
in even greater suffering, and that Poland was not developed enough economically and 
socially to wage such rebellions successftdly. These sentiments, however, did not mean 
they gave up the ideal of independence. Furthermore, some of the activities of the 
charities did exactly what police officials feared. The Warsaw Charitable Society, for 
example, established a number of reading rooms where the Polish language and national
16Adele Linednmeyr, Voluntary Associations and the Russian Autocracy: The 
Case o f Private Charity (Pittsburgh: Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European 
Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1990), 25-30.
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history were clandestinely taught.17 Polish charities concerned with illiteracy among 
Poles were unlikely to teach them the Russian language or its history.
Although the Russian government allowed the Polish charities to remain in 
existence, due to the social usefulness of their work, officials had no intention of leaving 
the institutions with the same level of freedom they had enjoyed before the 1863 
Uprising. On 16 June 1870, Viceroy Fedor Berg issued a decree that reorganized the state 
machinery supervising charities in the “Vistula Region.” The Main Charity Council and 
all the other individual councils supervising and organizing philanthropy in Poland ceased 
to exist. New provincial councils and the Municipal Council of Public Charity in 
Warsaw replaced them, which in turn meant a considerable loss of freedom of action for 
the charities involved. The Municipal Council exercised authority over the hospitals and 
all the philanthropic establishments in the city. The chair of the Municipal Council in 
Warsaw was to be the Viceroy (after 1874, the Governor-General) himself. Russian civil 
servants made up the Council’s majority, and its membership included the head of the 
police, the chief of the municipal department for overseeing philanthropic institutions, the 
inspector of hospitals, and the school inspector. The Poles on the Council represented the 
hospitals and philanthropic institutions. They were non-voting members and could offer 
advice only on questions directly related to their own institutions. Finally, all official 
business was conducted in Russian, and major charitable activities or large donations to
172urawicka, “Charity in Warsaw,” 326.
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charities required the approval of the Municipal Council.18
The Russian response to the 1863 Uprising extended beyond the institutional 
changes the Viceroy enacted. The most immediate response on the part of the Varsovian 
Russians was their exit from Polish society and its philanthropic institutions. During the 
first half of the nineteenth century, Russian leaders regularly participated in Warsaw’s 
charitable organizations and events. As in much of Europe, charitable activity was a 
staple of social life, and participation was a part of any high official’s duty. Until the 
eruption of the revolt, the patroness of the Warsaw Charitable Society regularly was the 
Russian Viceroy’s wife.19 Before 1863, no separate organization of significance that was 
run by Russians to assist fellow Russians existed. Conditions changed after the uprising 
and made participation in Polish society untenable for Russian officials. Russians 
rejected active participation with Polish society because it threatened their careers. Many 
Poles, regardless of their opinion of the uprising, also distanced themselves from contact 
with Russian officials for fear of being perceived as national apostates by fellow Poles. 
The parting of ways between Russian and Polish communities made cooperation within 
the Warsaw Charitable Society impossible. Russians, who had been a regular part of the 
organization until 1863, were no longer comfortable or interested in continuing their 
presence in the Warsaw Charitable Society.20
iSOtchet Magistrata gor. Varshavy (po otdeleniu obshchestvennagoprizreniia) za 
1908 i 1909 gg. (Warsaw: Tip. Kants. Varshavskago Gen. Gub., 1911), 5; K^pski, 
Towarzystwa dobroczynnosci, 139-40; Zurawicka, “Charity in Warsaw,” 324.
19K?pski, Towarzystwa dobroczynnosci, 145.
20Mazur, Dobroczynnosc w Warszawie, 29.
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The Russians’ departure from the Polish charitable societies and functions, 
however, did not translate into an absence of Russian activity in this area.
Before the Uprising, the Warsaw Charitable Society would have cared for the few 
Russians in Warsaw who needed assistance. The nature of Russo-Polish politics after 
1863, however, made that undesirable to the growing Russian leadership. Thus Varsovian 
Russians who had been part of the Warsaw Charitable Society created their own 
philanthropic organizations to care for poor Russians. With their own institutions, 
Varsovian Russians could establish a separate social environment for themselves that was 
free of Polish participation. The Russian Educational Fund and the Russian Musical- 
Dramatic Society, for example, organized concerts, plays, spectacles, lectures, and 
bazaars, which created a “healthy diversion” for Russians while also enlightening them.21 
With the creation of these organizations, the Warsaw Charitable Society lost the 
Viceroy’s wife as its official benefactress, because official support shifted to the Russian 
institutions. As a result, the Warsaw Charitable Society’s status changed from a semi­
official to a private, but tolerated organization.22 The loss of semi-official status also 
reduced its state subsidy to approximately 2000 rubles per year by the end of the 
nineteenth century, yet the focus of its activity continued to encompass the bulk of the
21Otchet o deiateVnosti “Russkago Uchebnago Fonda ” v Varshave za 1908 g. 
(Warsaw: Tip. Russkago Obshchestva, 1909), 9-11. See also Otchet o deiateVnosti 
Russkago muzykal ’no-dramaticheskago obshchestva v Varshave za sezon 1905-6 goda 
(Warsaw: Tip. Instituta Flukhonemykh i slepykh, 1906).
22K$pski, Towarzystwa dobroczynnosci, 145.
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city’s poor.23
Varsovian Russian charitable institutions had many of the same characteristics as 
other charities and associations in Russia and Poland. All had charters, many of which 
followed the state-provided models that governed the organization and its activities.
These societies had specific procedures for self-governance and held periodic elections, 
meetings, reports, dues, and events, which formed their regular business. If elected 
officials were unable to finish their terms of office, the organization had the mechanisms 
in place for an orderly adjustment24 These organizations had the appearance of 
regularized, self-governing institutions that functioned separately from the government 
with agendas determined by pressing social, rather than political, goals.
Varsovian Russian charitable organizations, however, were often dependent upon 
the highest officials in some manner. Many received official subsidies, privileges, or 
received large donations from the personal funds of individuals such as the Governor- 
General or the Archbishop. The Russian Educational Fund, for example, gave particular
23Zurawicka, “Charity in Warsaw,” 325. The state provided 9,300 rubles in 1852. 
See Mazur, Dobroczynnoscw Warszawie, 34. The loss of support was only exacerbated 
by the dramatic increase in people under its purview due to urbanization and 
industrialization.
240tchet o deiateVnosti “Russkago Uchebnago Fonda ” v Varshave za 1908 god 
(Warsaw: Tip. Russkago Obshchestva, 1909), 4; “Ustav Varshavskago Pravoslavnago 
Sviato-Troitskago Bratstva,” Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi vestnikno. 17,1/13 
September 1887,271; “Ustav Varshavskago Obshchestva Religiozno-nravstvennago 
Prosveshcheniia v Dukhe Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi,” Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial ’nyi 
vestnik no. 47,23 November 1902, 574-77; and Otchet o sostoianii i deiateVnosti 
Obshchestva vspomoshchenstvovaniia nedostatochnym studentam Varshavskago 
Politekhnicheskago Institutaza 1911 god (Warsaw: Tip. “Russkago Obshchestva, 1912), 
12-19.
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thanks to Mme. Governor-General Mariia Iosifovna Skalon, a Protestant Baltic German, 
for her aid to the education of Russian youth.25 Others were organized at the initiative or 
suggestion of these officials.26 The governing committees of the largest institutions 
regularly had leading officials elected to them. Some officials, such as the Warsaw 
School District Director Aleksandr L. Apukhtin,27 held posts in many of the important 
institutions throughout the second half of the century. The influence of the officials 
sometimes continued even after they returned to Russia. When Archbishop Leontii left 
Poland to became the Metropolitan of Moscow in 1891, for example, he maintained close 
ties with and provided support for various charities in Warsaw.28 The only organizations 
that appeared to have some distance from the highest echelons of the Russian 
administration were rather minor. Most of them appeared after the 1905 Revolution and 
were short-lived. All the institutions with large amounts of capital and grand missions 
also had close ties to Varsovian officialdom. Rather than being spaces where Russians 
could explore issues independently of the state apparatus and its interests, the close bonds 
between them gave the bulk of Russian charitable activity an official Russian air. Issues
250tchet o deiatel’nosti “Russkago Uchebnago Fonda” v Varshave za 1913 god 
(Warsaw: Tip. Varshavskii Uchebnyi Okrug, 1914), 24. See also Otchet o deiatel’nosti 
Russkago Blagotvoritel’nago Obshchestva v Tsarstve Pol’skom c maia 1872po maia 
1873 (Warsaw: Tip. Varshavskago Uchebnago Okruga, 1873), 16.
26Otchet o deiatel ’nost Varshavskago Pravoslavnago Sviato-Troitskago Bratstva 
za 1-yi god 1887/8 (Warsaw: Tip. Varshavskago Uchebnago Okruga, 1888), 1.
27Apukhtin (1822-1904), was Director of the Warsaw School District 1879-97 and 
earned the hatred of Poles for his Russificatory policies in the school system.
28Otchet Russkago Blagtvoritel’nago Obshchestva za 1891,4-5.
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deemed important to the Russian official leadership became issues of concern to the 
charities.
Another feature that differentiated Varsovian Russian charitable endeavors from 
other Russian activities is the relative absence of arguments in favor of traditional 
Christian forms of charity. The local speeches, articles, and other writings relating to 
charity did not take the traditional Christian perspective that valued the spiritual benefits 
of a personalized relationship between the donor and receiver of alms. Even those 
institutions directly connected with the Russian Orthodox Church did not discuss charity 
in these terms, but rather used the vocabulary of the modem rational organizations 
striving to solve issues of poverty. The official newspaper of the Russian Orthodox 
Kholm-Warsaw diocese, Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi vestnik, for example, used 
the term “abnormal” to describe the conditions of care for Orthodox children in the rural 
areas of the Polish Kingdom that were beyond the Varsovian charities’ reach.29 At the 
founding of the Warsaw Orthodox Holy Trinity Brotherhood the Archbishop Leontii 
stated that “increasing Russian charitable establishments unquestionably guarantees the 
development of the Vistula region in the Russian state and Orthodox spirit.”30 The chief 
cleric of the kingdom declared the importance of charity in terms that connected it to state 
(imperial) goals. He did not stress the importance of giving aid to the poor to an 
individual’s faith. Rather, he emphasized the modem rational approach to poverty and its
29“Uporiadochenie voprosa ovskormlenii i vospitanii pravoslavnykh sirot i 
podkidyshei v Kholmsko-Varshavskii Eparkhii,” Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial'nyi 
vestnik, no. 12,21 March 1899,165.
30Otchet Sviato-Troitskago Bratstva za 1-yi god 1887/8,2.
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reduction or elimination.
Archbishop Nikolai31 also spoke publicly on the issue of charity using modem 
concepts. On 6 September 1908, he gave a sermon at the Russian Orthodox church of 
Piotrtow in which he described the charity of the early Christian community as a 
brotherhood of mutual support. Using quotations from the Acts of the Apostles and 
Paul’s letters, he presented the congregation with the image of a support system that left 
no one wanting. Interspersed with the Christian message was a considerably modem 
concern. Archbishop Nikolai declared that the “proletariat is growing among us not every 
day, but every hour -  the ranks of the unemployed are growing and growing.”32 Poverty 
was no longer acceptable as something that would “always be among us.” It was growing 
rapidly, and it was dangerous. By bringing attention to the new industrial working 
classes, Archbishop Nikolai pointed to the dramatic social transformation Poland and 
Russia were undergoing. This development destabilized the social order that Russian 
authorities in Poland understood and represented. Workers’ poverty and unemployment 
represented a modem threat for which the traditional forms of almsgiving were 
inadequate. Contemporary poverty had to be fought in a manner that would provide a 
genuine support system for workers so that they would not become a threat to the 
established order.
Poles, not surprisingly, interpreted nearly every action by Russian officialdom
3iNikolai (1851-1915) was Archbishop from 1908.
32 Archbishop Nikolai, “Beseda, skazannaia v Petrokovskom sobore,”
Varshavskiia besesdy i rechi Arkhiepiskopa Nikolaia (1908-1909 g.g.) (St. Petersburg: 
Gosurarstvennaia Tip., n. d.), 84.
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with suspicion. They believed that the sinister intent of Russification lay behind the 
charitable activities of the various Russian institutions. The loss of official support for 
Polish organizations after the Uprising certainly aggravated Poles, because the social 
problems the Warsaw Charitable Society faced were only worsening under the double 
burden of rapid industrialization and a population explosion during the late nineteenth 
century. The shift of official support to the minority Russian population only exacerbated 
the Poles’ belief that the national battle with Russia extended to the arena of charity as 
well. Polish frustration with the state of philanthropy in Poland, however, did not change 
for the worse until the arrival of Governor-General Gurko33 and his wife in 1883. While 
Gurko became a part of the hated Russificatory trio that included Archbishop Leontii and 
Aleksandr L. Apukhtin, his wife, Mariia Andreevna Gurko, became active in the 
functions of the Russian charitable organizations. She supported the charitable work of 
these organizations on a level previous wives had not done before due either to a lack of 
interest or ability.
Madame Gurko earned a reputation among Poles as a fanatical Russian Orthodox 
zealot determined to convert all Poles to Orthodoxy and also to get into the pockets of 
Polish Varosivans at all costs for her missionary endeavors. Rather than the few annual 
events that once funded the Russian institutions, she organized numerous balls, concerts, 
and evenings throughout the year. The Polish population was expected to come through 
advertising that simply stated that the events were held “for charitable purposes” without
33Iosif V. Gurko (1828-1901) was the Governor-General from 1883 to 1894.
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stating explicitly which organizations stood to benefit.34 Without a record of her own 
intentions concerning these evenings, one cannot state that she planned “at all costs,” as 
Antoni Zaleski wrote, to get Polish money to fund Russificatory projects. She certainly 
would have hoped to have as many people as possible, regardless of nationality, support 
her charitable events in order to increase revenues. The nature of some of the charities’ 
activities certainly bore an anti-Polish stamp, particularly during the Gurko governorship. 
Yet, Zaleski did not clearly describe exactly what the Russificatory activities she 
supported were. What can be said is that the great increase in activity on the part of the 
Russian organizations only further heightened Polish animosities, which were already 
hypersensitive to Russian activities.
Not all Russian officials active in charity, however, earned the hatred of Polish 
society. The wives of a few individuals did earn Polish admiration because of the non- 
national character of their activities. Mme. Berg, the wife of the last Viceroy, had earned 
a good reputation along with the wife of General Lakhnitskii for their charitable 
activities, and especially for their protection of the clergy and Roman Catholic Church, as 
far as was possible in the immediate post-Uprising years. Berg’s support for the Catholic 
Church can be explained by her own Catholic background as an Italian noblewoman.35 In 
a similar fashion, the wife of Plock governor Count Sergei Ivanovich Tolstoi36 earned a
34Zaleski, Towarzystwo warszawskie, 118.
35Zaleski, Towarzystwo warszawskie, 86.
36Count Tolstoi (1838-1898) was governor of Plock (1879-84) and became 
Warsaw Oberpolitsmaistr in 1884 until 1888.
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strong reputation among Poles for her philanthropy because of its specifically non­
national character. Zaleski described her as the “antithesis of Mme. Gurko” in his 
pseudonymous reportage.37
One of the sources of Polish anger over Russificatory policies in charity was the 
manner in which Russian officials defined “Russianness.” During the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, Russian officials noted the greater need for philanthropic activities 
because the population of Russians grew considerably in the late nineteenth century. The 
increase in the number of military and civil personnel, however, accounted for only part 
of that growth. The unification of the remaining Uniates with the Russian Orthodox 
Church accounted for the larger number. Russian charitable organizations justified their 
mission among these wayward coreligionists as necessary work to bring them back to 
correct religious practice.38 Poles saw assistance to “former” Uniates as little more than 
bribery to bring the disadvantaged into a faith that was not freely chosen. Alexander II’s 
statement during a visit to Warsaw in 1874, when he informed a delegation of Uniates 
that he wished to see people from “old Russian lands” follow the same religion as their 
monarch, only further inflamed Polish sensitivity to Russian activities. The Poles 
believed this statement belied an unquestionably anti-Polish Russificatory policy 
designed to assimilate and absorb Polish and Ruthenian/Ukrainian peoples and land.39 
These same nationalists did not necessarily consider that the Ruthenian-Ukrainian and
37Zaleski, Towarzystwo warszawskie, 166-67.
38Otchet Russkago Blagotvoritel’nago Obshchestva za 1898, 8.
39Lewandowski, Na pograniczu, 106.
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Belarusian peasants in the Chelm-Polesie region might also reject a Polish identity.
Legislation that increased the number of Russians in this manner was possible 
because many Russian officials equated Orthodoxy with Russianness. The charitable 
organizations tended to use the words “Russian” (or “national”) interchangeably with 
“Orthodox.”40 Contemporaries understood that “orthodox” meant “Russian.” Other 
authors of articles and reports regularly used the phrase “Russian nationality and orthodox 
faith” as though one could not exist without the other.41 The state’s ability to enforce its 
religious policies combined with the activities of charity to aid coreligionists came to be 
seen as a real threat to a Polish community undergoing the social transformations wrought 
by urbanization and industrialization. Poles interpreted Russian actions as forcing people 
to enter Russian Orthodoxy by fiat of law and enticing those too impoverished to resist.
Three institutions dominated Russian Charity in Warsaw: The Warsaw chapter of 
the Russian Red Cross, the Russian Charitable Society, and the Warsaw Orthodox Holy 
Trinity Brotherhood. These were the institutions with the greatest financial resources, the 
longest periods of activity, and the closest official support. They were the primary 
organizers of funding for the Russian homeless, aged, orphans, and sick. The Govemor-
40For examples see Otchet o deiatel’noksti Varshavskago Okruzhrtago 
Upravleniia Rossiiskago Obshchestva Krasnago Kresta, a takzhe varshavskoi Obshchiny 
Sester Miloserdiia Sv. Elicavety i Varshavskago Komiteta dlia okazaniia pomoshchi 
otctavnym voinskim chinam i ikh sem’iam za 1891 (Warsaw: Tip. gubemskaia, 1892), 
127-8; and Otchet Sviato-Troitskago Bratstva za 1893,20. See also Otchet Russkago 
Blagotvoritel’nago Obshchestva za 1911; and Otchet Russkago Blagotvoritel’nago 
Obshchestva za 1912.
41 Otchet Sviato-Troitskago Bratstva za 1888/9,2; Otchet Nikolaevskago Priiuta 
dlia soldatskikh detei v Varshave za 1904 (Warsaw: Tip. M. Bresliayera, 1905), 33.
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General (or his wife), the Archbishop, and the director of the Warsaw School District 
regularly participated in the leadership of these organizations. The efforts of these 
institutions also bore a national color, adding an anti-Polish character to their policies that 
earned for Russian charitable activity the condemnation of the Polish population.42
The Russian Red Cross (Rossiiskoe Obshchestvo Krasnago Kresta) most closely 
identified with Varsovian military officialdom. The military officers stationed in Warsaw 
were most likely to participate in the governance of this organization because its official 
mission was the medical care of the Russian army in the district. During periods of war, 
the organization was responsible for maintaining hospitals and providing experienced 
nurses to care for injured soldiers. The organization maintained a fund specifically set 
aside for military support under such circumstances. In the last few years of the Russian 
presence in Warsaw, the state’s concern over increasing terrorism (perpetrated by a 
faction of the Polish Socialist Party, among others) led the chair of the governing 
committee, the Governor-General, to place gendarmes injured or killed by terrorist 
attacks and their families under the protection of the Red Cross43
During peacetime, the Red Cross continued its official military mission and was 
responsible for the largest number of institutions caring for the needy. At the beginning 
of the twentieth century, it operated the Mme. Gurko Orphanage (in the Widows’ Home
42Some of the smaller organizations also have left incomplete records in Poland. 
There might be more complete collections of their annual reports in Russia.
43Otchet Krasnago Kresta za 1910,159-60. For a general description of the 
development of the Red Cross in the Russian Empire, see V. V. Tevlina, “Sotsial’naia 
rabota v Rossii v kontse XIX — nachale XX veka,” Voprosy istorii (2002), no. 1:116-124.
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building), a day shelter for children, low-income rooms for twelve families, the 
Grokhovskii Home for Aged Soldiers (and other Russian Orthodox individuals), the 
Aleksandro-Mariinskii Invalids’ Home, the Mariinskii Widows’ Home, and a temporary 
shelter for sick children.44 Many of these institutions considered their primary 
beneficiaries to be soldiers and their families.
The Red Cross also managed two hospitals in Warsaw. The Emperor Alexander 
hospital, built in 1883, had 24 beds, a pharmacy, and an outpatient clinic that processed 
up to 24,000 patients (no information was provided on their ethnic or religious 
background). The complex also included a Russian Orthodox church, and housed the 
school for the Sisters of Mercy. In 1891 the Red Cross built the second hospital, named 
after the Empress Maria Aleksandrovna, with room for twenty beds for those able to 
pay.45 The society’s 1897 report claimed that the hospitals admitted “the poorer local 
residents without considering their position or faith.”46
These two hospitals were important not only for the medical care they provided, 
but also because they were the centers the society resorted to for the practical training of 
its nurses. At the turn of the century, through the initiative of the Governor-General’s 
wife, Princess Imeretinskaia, construction began on a new building intended to house a 
gynecological clinic in order to provide the Sisters of Mercy with practical experience in
44Obzor goroda Varshavy za 1903 g. (Warsaw: Tip. Kants. Ob. Polits., n.d.), 47.
45 Otchet Krasnago Kresta za 1894,10-11.
46Otchet Krasnago Kresta za 1897, 13.
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caring for women and in assisting with childbirth.47
In addition to the shelters and hospitals, the Red Cross established the Elizabeth 
Community of the Sisters of Mercy on 21 May 1880 as a subsidiary organization to the 
Red Cross. Its purpose was the training and supervision of a nursing staff that would 
work in the military hospitals throughout the Congress Kingdom.48 The nursing school 
began with 49 sisters and 5 students. These were not the only Sisters of Mercy in the 
Polish Kingdom; a separate group of nurses operated without any state support because it 
was Polish and Catholic. The sisters trained by the Russian Red Cross were primarily 
Russian Orthodox. Polish educated society believed that the training and posting of these 
nurses in the Polish provinces served a Russificatory purpose. In the countryside where 
medical attention was more difficult to find, the military hospitals at which these nurses 
worked were often the only available centers for medical attention. Poles believed that 
Russian officials hoped to take advantage of misery and poverty to convert and Russify 
poor rural Poles. Because of the negative image of the Russian Red Cross and its Sisters 
of Mercy, the considerable energy that Mme. Gurko placed in charitable activities for this 
institution contributed to her Russificatory reputation among Polish educated society 49
The training the Elizabeth Sisters of Mercy received provided some legitimacy to 
Polish concerns about the Sisters and their activities once they moved out to staff the
47Otchet Krasnago Kresta za 1898, 9-11. Governor-General Aleksandr 
Konstantinovich Imeretinskii (1837-1900) was of Georgian descent and governed in 
Poland between 1897 and 1900.
**Otchet Krasnago Kresta za 1880, 8-10.
49Antoni Zaleski, Towarzystwo warszawskie, 118-20.
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military hospitals in the provinces. The women trained at the nursing school were 
overwhelmingly Orthodox in all of the Red Cross annual reports examined. Between 40 
and 50 women attended the nursing school, and approximately 15 successfully completed 
the course of studies each year. The largest number of non-Orthodox students was three 
in one year (1896). These students were as likely to be Lutheran as Roman Catholic. The 
chapel built to serve the school and hospital was Russian Orthodox, and no other faiths 
were formally represented on the premises. Naturally, all students were expected to 
participate in the religious Orthodox services.50
The particular courses required were unusual for an adult training curriculum in a 
highly specialized field. The 1892,1893,1894, and 1899 annual reports provide 
descriptions of the courses required per week. The full course of instruction at the school 
required two years of study entirely in Russian. Among the obligatory courses were 
mathematics, hygiene, anatomy and physiology, pharmacology, massage, obstetrics and 
gynecology, children’s illnesses, nervous illnesses, eye diseases, specialized pathology, 
and surgery. The courses that appeared to be unrelated to nursing, however, were 
religion, Russian language, Russian geography, Russian history, and church singing. 
Furthermore, these last-named courses occupied over one third of the students’ course 
time.51 When instructors slightly reduced the course load, they sacrificed some of the
50The annual reports of the Red Cross that I examined were for the following 
years: 1880, 1891-1901, 1910, and 1912.
51 Otchet Krasnago Kresta za 1892,77-78; Otchet Krasnago Kresta za 1892,22- 
23; Otchet Krasnago Kresta za 1894,63; Otchet Krasnago Kresta za 1899,133-34.
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professional courses.52
An explanation for the relatively high number of courses in Russian culture is that 
the Sisters of Mercy served Russian national interests. The Red Cross was providing 
employment for Russian women to assist in the medical care of other Russians. The 
Sisters’ primary mission in military hospitals exposed them to a predominantly Russian 
population. The assumption that the nurses themselves were Russian is fairly safe when 
one considers their religious and family backgrounds. The nursing school attempted to 
develop the building blocks of a separate Russian society within Poland which would care 
for the various strata of Russian society in the area.
Providing these women with a structured cultural curriculum also served as a form 
of social improvement. The largest number of these students, nearly half of each year’s 
group, came from families in the lower ranks of state service. The daughters of priests or 
officers constituted the next largest groups. Combined, these three estates consistently 
constituted the majority of the student population at the nursing school. As daughters of 
families from the lower and poorer ranks, they were less likely to have had the kind of 
education authorities believed was important for an individual in this profession and for 
an individual surrounded by Poles. Contemporary public opinion of nurses generally 
placed them on a par with prostitutes and the lowest social classes. Antoni Zaleski 
described the Russian Sisters of Mercy as being of “doubtful morals . . .  and without any 
pure Christian calling.”33 Russian authorities also feared that poorly educated Russians
S2Otchet Krasnago Kresta za 1893, 22.
53Zaleski, Towarzystwo warszawskie, 119.
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ran the risk of losing their Russian identity under the assimilative pressure of the massive 
Polish population. Providing them with an education could fight both of these problems. 
Better-educated nurses would have better morals to protect their reputations and make 
themselves shining examples of Russian womanhood. Education would also immunize 
the individuals from the harmful effects of so much contact with Poles. An adult Russian 
who may have received some of that course work for the first time was more likely to 
maintain and further develop a sense of Russianness rather than be seduced by Polish 
culture.
Since these Sisters did serve in the provinces, however, it was unlikely that they 
would not have cared for non-Russian patients. The healthcare system did not extend 
beyond the largest cities, and the sick went to whatever place was nearest and most 
affordable. The existence of Polish poverty and misery combined with Russian assistance 
aroused the suspicions of Polish social leaders. They feared that the Russian Sisters of 
Mercy, through offering assistance to desperate individuals, might serve as a means of 
religious conversion and Russification. That concern, however, could not have produced 
any notable results for Russian Orthodoxy. The nurses were unlikely to have understood 
the Polish language fluently, as their formal training did not include Polish language 
lessons. Thus they were unprepared to assist adequately any non-Russian patients 
because of the language barriers they would encounter in the provinces. Their ability to 
serve as conduits of Russian culture to desperate Poles would only have been slight. One 
region where Red Cross leaders and Poles may have imagined that the Sisters could have 
a Russificatory role might have been in the Podlasie and Chelm/Kholm regions. In these
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areas the nurses could have been presented as role models for a former Uniate population. 
However, even in this area, their impact would have been limited. The Uniate population 
there did not necessarily perceive itself as being “Russian” or “Orthodox,” and the nurses’ 
knowledge of Russian would not have improved their ability to communicate with the 
Ruthenian-Ukrainian peasants.
In addition to training muses, the Red Cross also managed a number of shelters 
and homes for adults and children. No other major institution cared for as many adults as 
the numerous homes under the auspices of the Russian Red Cross. These institutions 
generally preferred to care for individuals with some military connection. They were 
most often retired soldiers based in the Polish Kingdom who had not returned to the 
Russian interior. Soldiers’ Polish widows, often Catholic, and invalids were the other 
major groups of adults the society specifically served. Their numbers were not great.
The Grokhovskii Home for Aged Orthodox Soldiers usually housed between ten and 
twelve veterans.34 The Widow’s Home exclusively served military wives and only had a 
few individuals at any time. The largest of the homes was the Alexander-Mariia Invalid’s 
Home, which also contained a women’s poorhouse. The society built it in 1880 to 
commemorate Alexander IPs 25th anniversary on the throne. Its intended residents were 
disabled war veterans, which explains the much larger number of individuals under its 
care. During the early 1890s it housed 266 people,55 and during other periods housed as
54Otchet Krasnago Kresta za 1891,128; Otchet Krasnago Kresta za 1893, 130-
31.
55Otchet Krasnago Kresta za 1893,125.
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few as 70 residents. The Red Cross managed three special homes for children. The 
Mariia Gurko Orphanage was exclusively for girls and sheltered approximately 50 
children. The other sites cared for children who still had at least one parent. A 
temporary shelter existed with room for well over 100 children and a day shelter 
supervised approximately 20 children while parents worked.56
Children and widows were the concern of the other major Russian organization: 
the Russian Charitable Society in the Kingdom of Poland (Russkoe Blagotvoritel’noe 
Obshchestvo v Tsarstve Pol ’shorn). Varsovian Russians who had been part of the 
Warsaw Charitable Society created it in 1866.57 They brought with them the prevailing 
ethos of philanthropy that “work forces the person to respect others as well as himself.”58 
Unlike the Red Cross, this society’s membership was far less military in its professional 
background. The greater part of its membership came from the civil service. On 6 May 
1867 the organization received official approval after attaining its charter from Viceroy 
Fedor Berg. This organization performed a similar function for Varsovian Russians as the 
Warsaw Charitable Society did before 1863. It provided its members a space for 
philanthropic activities, but organized a series of social events exclusive to the Russian 
community in the city.59
56Obzor goroda Varshavy za 1903 g., 47.
51 Otchet Russkago Blagotvoritel’nago Obshchestva 1872/3, 8.
58Otchet Russkago Blagotvoritel’nago Obshchestva za 1873/74, 9.
59Otchet Russkago Blagotvoritel ’nago Obshchestva za 1873/4, 33. I have 
examined the annual reports for the years 1872-1874,1876-1877,1879,1881-1895, 
1898-1905,1907-1908, and 1910-1912.
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The mission of the Russian Charitable Society was to provide assistance to those 
needy Russians living not only in Warsaw, but elsewhere in the Polish Kingdom. While 
Russian authorities denied Polish charities the privilege of establishing branches in other 
cities, the Russian Charitable Society did develop such organizations in the chief 
provincial cities of Poland. The rationale for an extensive organization was that leaving 
the poor Russian population to the care of Polish philanthropy was no longer acceptable. 
The Polish population and its charities could not be depended upon for support because 
of their antagonism towards Russians and Russian authority.60 Furthermore, Russians 
came to believe that the national identities of their own lower classes in Poland could 
succumb to the influence of Catholic Polish charities. Russian philanthropists argued for 
the necessity of their own institutions in order to “strengthen the Orthodox faith and 
maintain Russian nationality among [their] co-nationals in this region.”61 Poor Russians 
became the front line in a cultural battle with Poles, and the Russian Charitable Society 
envisioned itself as the leading protector of poorer Varsovian Russians.
The Russian Charitable Society created a number of programs to assist Warsaw’s 
disadvantaged Russians. The primary locus of philanthropy was the Mariinskii 
Orphanage, a shelter for Russian orphans that opened on 20 August 1868. In 1873 it also 
began providing shelter for the aged poor. During its years of operation (it closed during 
the First World War) it cared for between 70 and 130 children annually and had space for 
20 adults. The institution provided the children with two years of schooling, and work
60Otchet Russkago Blagotvoritel’nago Obshchestva za 1898, 8.
61 Otchet Russkago Blagotvoritel’nago Obshchestva za 1877, 5-6.
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was a standard requirement for all who were physically able. The charity also provided 
for poor Russians with money grants to help families and individuals and free train tickets 
to Russia, which could be used by the recipient either to visit family members or to return 
to the Russian interior permanently.62 At the end of the century, the society added a day 
shelter for poor working parents’ and widows’ children to the Mariinskii Orphanage in 
order to provide them a Russian supervised environment.63
With the official support and involvement of the state administration, the Russian 
Charitable Society became the preferred philanthropic institution in Warsaw. It received 
the state subsidies the Warsaw Charitable Society once had, and both the Governor- 
General and the Archbishop regularly appeared on the governing committee. The close 
ties with the Govemor-General’s office allowed this institution additional privileges that 
others did not receive. Along with the official subsidy and the large personal donations 
from Viceroy Berg in its first years of operation, the charity received a large building 
from the state that had once belonged to the Carmelite order. This gift became a major 
source of income for the society once it began collecting rents from it.64 Using its 
privilege of forming branches, the Russian Charitable Society slowly spread to the 
provincial capitals of the Congress Kingdom. By the end of the century Kielce, Lublin, 
Kalisz, Piotrkow, and Radom also had branches, each of which functioned independently
62Otchet Russkago Blagotvoritel’nago Obshchestva za l873/4, 5-9.
63Otchet Russkago Blagotvoritel’nago Obshchestva za l894, 6.
64 Otchet Russkago Blagotvoritel’nago Obshchestva za l872/3,16. One of the 
post-uprising reforms included the closure and confiscation of monasteries determined to 
be too small or too politically active in the Polish nationalist movement.
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coordinating activities with Warsaw.65
Despite consistent official support and large gifts, the Russian Charitable Society 
had financial difficulties at the end of the nineteenth century. Poor management and 
badly considered construction plans eliminated the surpluses the society had at the 
beginning of the 1890s. In 1898 it found itself unable to fund the Mariinskii Orphanage 
satisfactorily. The institution’s financial difficulties continued until 1900.66 Another 
charity, the Warsaw Orthodox Holy Trinity Brotherhood, came to the assistance of the 
Russian Charitable Society in 1898 by granting it 16,000 rubles to cover part of that 
debt.67
Despite these difficulties, the society’s leaders developed plans for a new 
orphanage building that would house 200 Russian children. The Society’s patron, the 
Governor-General, successfully petitioned the Minister of the Imperial Court in 1898 for 
a plot of land in Warsaw to build the new Mariinskii Orphanage building. The minister 
granted the land rent-free to the charity.68 The Imperial Court permitted use of land for 
the new building on the Imperial villa “Sel’tse” beyond the Belvedere Palace gates in the 
southern part of the city. The location was preferable to the previous site in the crowded
65K$pski, Towarzystwo dobroczynnosci, 213.
66 Otchet Russkago Blagotvoritel’nago Obshchestva za l898,9; Otchet Russkago 
Blagotvoritel’nago Obshchestva za l899,1; Otchet Russkago Blagotvoritel ’nago 
Obshchestva za 1900,7.
67Otchet Sviato-Troitskago Bratstva za 1912 (25-yi god), 9.
68Otchet Russkago Blagotvoritel’nago Obshchestva za 1899, 3.
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Nowe Miasto district.69 The chosen architect for the project was V. N. Pokrovskii, who 
was the architect of the Kholm-Warsaw diocese and designed many Russian Orthodox 
churches in Poland as well as the neo-Muscovite facade of the Staszic Palace. At the 
beginning of the year, yet another petition on the part of the General-Govemor to St. 
Petersburg resulted in a grant of 100,000 rubles from the Emperor to cover a substantial 
portion of the expected costs of construction o f227,000 rubles.70 The rest of the funds 
came from large private donations and loans. Construction ended in 1902, and the new 
orphanage celebrated its opening with the consecration of its Orthodox church by 
Archbishop Ieronim on 10 November 1902.71
As well as caring for orphans, Russian charities came in to help widows and poor 
Russian women. Without relatives nearby, these women often turned to the assistance of 
Polish neighbors. The larger institutions, such as the Red Cross and the Russian 
Charitable Society, provided shelter for elderly or destitute widows, particularly if they 
were military widows. Yet, many women who were younger or more able would have 
slipped through such social supports because they were unmarried or childless. Other 
organizations, which were instituted at the beginning of the twentieth century, came in to 
fill this gap.
The Society of Working Assistance for Russian Women came to the aid of 
women who were “forced to obtain a piece of bread independently.” Its leadership,
69Otchet Russkago Blagotvoritel’nago Obshchestva za 1902, 3.
70Otchet Russkago Blagotvoritel’nago Obshchestva za 1899,4, 6-8.
71 Otchet Russkago Blagotvoritel’nago Obshchestva za l902, 5,10.
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chaired by Mariia I. Skalon, believed that “Russian women particularly have experienced 
grave difficulties from this oppression [that is, needing to live independently].”72 Since 
the women under this organization’s purview were able to work, the charity’s primary 
focus fell upon training them for gainful employment. The institution taught Russian 
women to work in the fashion industry and assisted Russian domestic servants in finding 
employment. Its annual budget grew rapidly; in 1911 it was 10,180 rubles and the annual 
report estimated that the 1914 budget would need 14,650 rubles.73 In 1913 it opened a 
school of fashion and a hat-making shop. The new school had fifteen paying and two 
non-paying students. A previously established cutting school (shkola kroiki, for 
seamstresses?) had 32 students, 13 of whom had earned diplomas that year. The school 
also trained a few young girls to be seamstresses, but its attention fell primarily upon 
adults because the Russian Charitable Society’s orphanages primarily took care of such 
training for girls.74 In all, 90 women participated in the Society of Working Assistance’s 
programs. It also provided a small shelter for women that housed 5 to 7, and provided 
inexpensive meals (9,912 in 1913) that cost women 10-15 kopeks. Furthermore, the 
society established a home for Russian women domestic servants; it housed 52 women.
12Otchet Obshchestva trudovoi pomoshchi russkim zhenshchinam v g. Varshave za 
1913 god (Warsaw: Tip. Okruzhnago Shtaba, 1914), 1. Mariia (nee von Korf) Skalon, 
Governor-General Georgii Skalon’s wife, was of Baltic German origin.
73 Otchet Obshchestva trudovoi pomoshchi, 3. The annual increases averaged one 
thousand rubles.
74Otchet Russkago Blagotvoritel’nago Obshchestva za 1877, 7-8.
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Approximately 400 domestic servants made use of the center for advice and assistance.75 
The Russian Charitable Society also took pride that the education it provided the young 
girls under its care provided them employment as governesses “in a Russian home here in 
Warsaw.”76 The benefit of training poor Russian women in such domestic work not only 
provided them with a means of surviving Warsaw’s urban environment, but also 
produced Russian servants who could be hired to work in the homes of the Varsovian 
Russians themselves to ensure a thoroughly Russian environment.
The dangers of modem urban life in Warsaw that Russian women faced also 
threatened Russians’ religious orientation. During the first years of the twentieth century, 
the Russian Orthodox hierarchy turned to the problem of sustaining the Varsovian 
Russian community’s spiritual needs. The realities of being surrounded by a Polish 
Catholic setting remained threatening, and the problem of secularization in the city’s 
urban and industrial environment became another cause for concern. Archbishop Ieronim 
sponsored the foundation of the Society for the Dissemination of Religious-Moral 
Enlightenment in 1903 as a response. Its purpose was to preserve the (Orthodox) 
Christian faith in the face of a modernizing urban society. The Chair of the 
organization’s governing committee, Archpriest P. D. Kallistov, noted in the inaugural 
speech that the organization needed to foster the development of Russian consciousness 
and to bring the Orthodox people closer to the Church to rescue them from the
75Otchet Obshchestva trudovoi pomoshchi, 2-3.
76Otchet Russkago Blagotvoritel’nago Obshchestva za 1872/3, 9.
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“depersonalizing cosmopolitanism” of modem life.77 The vice-chair of the society, 
Archpriest A. S. Koval’nitskii, remarked in his speech on the founding of the 
organization that “the Russian fatherland was united, grew, and strengthened thanks to 
the united strength of orthodoxy.”78 The need for such activity appeared still more urgent 
after the 1905 Edict of Toleration permitted former Uniates to abandon the Russian 
Orthodox faith. The preservation of the Orthodox Church, not conversion to it, was the 
primary goal of the Society for the Dissemination of Religious-Moral Enlightenment. 
Stressing the notion that Russian identity was equivalent to an Orthodox one, the 
organization’s meetings maintained a “religious-patriotic” theme. Rather than acting as 
the confident imperial lords of their western borderlands, Russian and the Orthodox 
communities increasingly had the sense of being embattled in the Polish Kingdom.79
The Russian Orthodox Church, however, did not begin its sponsorship of 
charitable organizations with the sense of alarm that was noted at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. The first major organization under its auspices was the Warsaw 
Orthodox Holy Trinity Brotherhood (Varshavskoe Pravoslavnoe Sviato-Troitskoe 
Bratstvo). From its inception in 1887, it was closely connected to the Russian Orthodox
77“Otkrytie v g. Varshave Obshchestva rasprostraneniia religiozno-nravstvennago 
prosveshcheniia v dukhe pravoslavnoi tserkvi,” Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhiaVnyi 
vestnik, no. 46,16 November 1903, 564-66.
78“Slovo Protoiereia A. Koval’nitskago na den’ otkrytiia v g. Varshave 
Obshchestva rasprostraneniia religiozno-nravstvennago prosveshcheniia, 2 noiabria 1903 
goda,” Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi vestnik, no. 47,23 November 1903, 574-77.
79“Varshavskoe obshchestvo rasprostraneniia religiozno-nravstvennago 
prosveshcheniia v dukhe pravoslavnoi tserkvi,” Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi listok, no. 20, 
15 October 1911,265-66.
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Church in Warsaw. Archbishop Leontii provided the initiative for its creation, and many 
of its leaders, such as Mitrofan P. Ustimovich, the Holy Trinity Cathedral warden who 
wrote the charter, were a part of the Church’s hierarchy. Its organizational center was the 
Holy Trinity Cathedral, and its foundation in 1887 was part of the fiftieth-anniversary 
celebrations of the establishment of this Cathedral in Warsaw.80
The organization’s mission drew the sharpest line in the battle with Polish 
Catholicism and Polish national identity. During the inaugural meeting of the 
Brotherhood, Archbishop Leontii asserted that increasing the number of Russian 
charitable establishments guaranteed the development of the Orthodox and state spirit in 
the Vistula region.81 By linking philanthropy to Russian state and Orthodox interests in 
Poland, the Archbishop validated the worst assumptions Poles had concerning Varsovian 
Russians and their charitable activities in Poland. Such statements only heightened 
Polish suspicions of Russian intentions, particularly those of the Russian Orthodox 
Church.
Leontii’s initial reason for encouraging the creation of this association, however, 
was not exclusively Russificatory. The fear of Polonization (opoliachenie) also 
motivated the Holy Trinity Brotherhood. In preliminary discussions Leontii warned that
mOtchet Sviato-Troitskago Bratstva za 1-yi god 1887/8, 2. See also (Archbishop) 
Leontii, “Slovo po osviashchenii obnovlennago Varshavskago kafedral’nago sobora 18 
dekabria 1877 goda,” Slova i rechi Leontiia, Arkhiepiskopa Kholmsko-Varshavskago, 3rd 
ed., (St. Petersburg: Izdanie knigoprodavtsa I. L. Tyzova, 1888), 1:295-98. The Holy 
Trinity Cathedral was once a Piarist church. The renovations making it a Russian 
Orthodox church did not transform the facade from a baroque to a neo-Muscovite style.
81 Otchet Sviato-Troitskago Bratstva za 1-yi god 1887/8, 2.
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“certain orthodox children, especially those from mixed marriages, are insufficiently 
protected from latino-Polish propaganda. Others who are at the mercy of fate are 
deprived of all means of existence and find themselves without any contact with the 
Orthodox Church.”82 Nearly all of the Brotherhood’s annual reports -  covering over 25 
years of activity -  echoed these concerns. Active participation in the arena of charity was 
necessary because Russian leaders in Warsaw were concerned about the fate of the 
national identities of poorer Russians in the Russo-Polish cultural conflict.
The Brotherhood’s charter reflected these concerns and its later modifications 
indicate which ones were in the foreground of the brotherhood’s activities. The original 
1887 charter indicated three goals for the Brotherhood. The first was the “strengthening 
and success of Orthodoxy” in Poland. The Brotherhood intended to facilitate 
Orthodoxy’s progress through the free distribution of spiritual books, icons, and other 
religious paraphernalia. The second goal was the protection “from latino-Polish 
propaganda [of] those from mixed marriages, especially children whose father [frequently 
the Russian parent] had died and left [them] with non-Orthodox mothers.” The final goal 
was the provision of material assistance to poorer parishioners.83
Under this charter the Brotherhood placed itself at the forefront of the cultural 
battle with Poles. The first goal stated the Brotherhood’s support of the Russian
82Otchet Sviato-Troitskago Bratstva za 1-yi god 1887/8, 1.
83“Ustav Varshavskago Pravoslavnago Sviato-Troitskago Bratstva,” Kholmsko- 
Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi vestnik, no. 17,1 September 1887,271. See also “O 
prazdnovanii 50-ti letniago iubileia Varshavskago kafedral’nago sobora i 40 letniago 
iubileia sluzheniia v sviashchennom sane Arkhiepiskopa Kholmsko-Varsavskago 
Leontiia,” Beseda, no. 14,15 July 1887,105-06.
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Orthodox Church’s proselytizing mission. The Brotherhood distributed religious books, 
icons, crosses, and other physical items to “Jews and those converting from other 
Christian faiths.” The annual report did not state how many people converted or received 
these items. The Brotherhood also offered the new converts between 3 and 30 rubles for 
clothes and subsistence. Additionally, it intended to help them find work, all with the 
goal of helping the individual to begin his life properly as an Orthodox believer. The 
Brotherhood fulfilled the second goal of protecting orthodox children by offering ten 
stipends to orphans or fatherless children. As the years progressed the number of stipends 
grew to well over 100.84
The Brotherhood’s charitable activity confirmed the worst fears Poles had 
concerning the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian charities in Poland. It clearly 
proselytized among the city’s poorest people and made offerings of money and jobs to 
converts. These activities confirmed Polish convictions that Russian charity cynically 
used the misery and poverty of Poles to acquire converts. Antoni Zaleski described such 
charity as “sacrilegious, because it is political.”85 The political nature of the 
Brotherhood’s assistance to converts is clear, particularly when the tense nature of Russo- 
Polish relations is kept in mind. Furthermore, considering its concern with the protection 
of destitute Orthodox children from “latino-Polish propaganda,” the Brotherhood cannot
84Otchet Sviato-Troitskago Bratstva za 1-yi god 1887/8,4; Otchet Sviato- 
Troitskago Bratstva za 1912, 20.
85Zaleski, Towarzystwo warszawskie, 119-120. Part of the reason Mme. Gurko 
earned the particular ire of Zaleski was that she combined charitable and proselytizing 
activities, and was energetic in both endeavors.
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unhypocritically have claimed a purely Christian purpose behind its activities with adults.
The Brotherhood’s original goals began to shift shortly after its foundation. The 
charter and first annual report indicate that assisting the Russian Orthodox Church in its 
proselytizing mission were considered as important as protecting Orthodox children from 
Polish Catholic influences, or at least it was an important part of the Brotherhood’s raison 
d’etre. During the course of the following year, however, the mission statement 
underwent a modification, declaring that “the main task and Brotherhood’s purpose is the 
education of poorer Orthodox children in the spirit of Orthodoxy and Russian 
nationality.”86 Simply protecting children from “latino-Polish” propaganda was no longer 
enough to ensure that the Russian nation and Orthodox Church did not lose these 
children. They needed to be educated into the culture of the Church and nation. 
Furthermore, the goals of assisting the Church in conversions and assisting the new 
converts diminished in importance. They received minimal attention in the annual report.
By 1892, its fifth year of operations, the Brotherhood revised its official charter to 
indicate that it had only one mission. Its activities were exclusively dedicated to the care 
and protection of Orthodox orphans, particularly those from mixed marriages.87 The 
Brotherhood’s leadership later stated that it ended its missionary work because it did not 
want to interfere in what was the Russian Orthodox Church’s purview.88 The amendment 
of the Brotherhood’s original mission indicated that the political issues that concerned
86Otchet Sviato-Troitskago Bratstva za 1888/9,2.
Otchet Sviato-Troitskago Bratstva za 1912, 6.
88Otchet Sviato-Troitskago Bratstva za 1897,5.
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Varsovian Russian leaders had changed.
Adult proselytization was certainly a failure. Few Polish Catholics, (Polish or 
German) Protestants, or Jews were interested in converting to Russian Orthodoxy. The 
only large increase of Russian Orthodox subjects within the Congress Kingdom came in 
1875 when the Uniate population was forced into union with Russian Orthodoxy. 
Russians understood that the gains for their faith would be minimal. Failure, however, 
would not necessarily be enough of a reason to eliminate missionary activity as one of the 
organization’s purposes from the charter. Ustimovich certainly understood the political 
situation in the Congress Kingdom when he wrote the original draft of the charter; he 
could not have written it into the document without the knowledge that Poles were going 
to be hostile to such an idea. No resident of late-nineteenth-century Warsaw would have 
been politically naive enough to believe that Russian Orthodox missionary work could 
succeed in the city.
Furthermore, the statement that the Brotherhood did not want to encroach upon 
the Church’s pastoral authority cannot be taken seriously because of the Brotherhood’s 
close relationship with the Church hierarchy. The Brotherhood’s meetings of the 
governing committee were in the Archbishop’s offices, and the group had the active 
patronage of the Archbishop. The governing committee’s membership included the 
cathedral warden Mitrofan Ustimovich, the Consistory’s Secretary Mikhail Zamaraev, 
and the archpriests Aleksandr Metanev and Nikifor Gorizontov. The Brotherhood was 
unlikely to tread on the Church’s turf because the two institutions were blurred into each
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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other from the beginning.89
The more likely reason for the shift in the Brotherhood’s mission was that it 
quickly recognized that the problem of Orthodox children was much larger than the 
opportunity afforded by helping destitute adults or the political value of open 
proselytization. Once Varsovian Russian leaders began to examine more closely the 
lower socioeconomic strata of their own population they recognized a serious problem. 
Since 1863 the number of Russians coming to Warsaw grew to fill in civil service ranks 
at all but the lowest levels, and thousands of Russian soldiers occupied Poland. Their 
children soon became a problem for Russian officials.
Charity activists at the end of the nineteenth century determined what constituted 
the Orthodox child’s appropriate surroundings and consistently found the environment in 
mixed Polish-Russian marriages dangerous. Marriage to a Polish Catholic woman 
threatened “the loss of [the child’s] Orthodoxy and nationality.”90 No notions 
approaching a “bi-national” or “bi-cultural” upbringing were acceptable to the Russian 
leadership. The child’s national identity was the battleground in the Russo-Polish 
cultural war, and the fight was a zero-sum game. Thus each Russian child that had 
undergone nativization represented a loss for the Russian community. The mothers of 
these children were the heart of the problem. The leaders of Russian charities understood 
that the mother’s role as the child rearer threatened to change the child’s religious and
89“Rasporiazhenie Kholmsko-Barshavskago eparkhial’nago nachal’stva,” 
Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi vestnik no. 12,15/27 June 1887,190-91
90Otchet Sviato-Troitskago Bratstva za 1897,6.
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national identity as Russian law decreed it. Because one of the parents (usually the 
father) was Russian Orthodox, the child legally was Orthodox, and thus Russian. If the 
father died, the child’s environment became foreign. The mother and her family were an 
alien force that threatened these children. They were “tom away from [their] Russian 
surroundings” and would suffer if they were not removed from the “foreign 
surroundings” enveloping them after the father’s death. Children would be left in a Polish 
family, or the mother (whether she was Russian or Polish) could not properly rear them 
because she was forced to work.91 Such conditions led to Orthodox children becoming 
polonized to the point “that they do not even know how to cross themselves in the 
Orthodox manner.”92 Under the strained circumstances of fatherlessness, the proper 
religious and national education of children was likely to suffer because the greater 
concern of the family was economic survival.
Even if the woman was Russian, the poverty and the isolation from an extended 
family that resulted from widowhood in Poland could threaten Russians with nativization. 
When Ivan Shumilin was four, his father died, and the surviving family found itself in 
financial difficulties. His mother, who was Russian, rented out one of their rooms to a 
Polish woman because apartments were expensive and took half of her pension.
Shumilin described her as a “part of the family” once she moved in, and under the 
influence of her presence he and his sisters “learned to speak Polish from our youngest
9lOtchet Sviato-Troitskago Bratstva za 1897, 5; Otchet Russkago 
Blagotvoritel’nago Obshchestva za 1899,2.
92Otchet Russkago Blagotvoritel’nago Obshchestva za 1899, 2-3.
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years.”93 Poles, some of whom had worked with his late father in the district court, were 
also regular evening visitors at the Shumilin home. Another Polish influence appeared in 
the guise of the domestic service Shumilin’s mother hired from a Polish woman: 
“Naturally, conversation with her was in Polish.”94 Shumilin believed that Varsovian 
Russians “unintentionally succumbed to Polonization and often used Polish words or 
Polonisms.” Russian children used the Polish language to speak with Polish friends.95 
He recounted one experience when he was attacked by Polish youths on the way to the 
First Boys’ Gymnasium. The only words that came to mind to end the Poles’ harassment 
were “przekl^ty Moskal,” the meaning of which he did not really understand.96 The 
influence of Polish people on those children, who “learned to speak Polish,” worried the 
Varsovian Russian leadership.
Varsovian Russian leaders came to believe that the only way to protect Russian 
children, especially those whose fathers were dead, was to separate them from the vast 
array of Polish influences. One means of doing this was to ensure a completely Russian 
school environment, something the First Boys’ and Girls’ Gymnasia provided. Russian 
officials responsible for education rejected enrolling Russian students among Poles in the
93Bakhmeteff Archive, Columbia University, New York, Shumilin Papers, box 6, 
“Varshava v nachale XX stoletiia,” 4; idem., “Staraia Varshava,” 10.
94Shumilin Papers, “Staraia Varshava,” 6.
95Shumilin Papers, “Staraia Varshava,” 2-3.
96Shumilin Papers, “Varshava v nachale XX stoletiia,” 10. See also idem.,
“Staraia Varshava,” 2. A rough translation would be “damned Russky.” Most likely, the 
Poles were stopped in their tracks by the shock of a Russian hurling such an insult at 
them.
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regular gymnasia where the students would enter an “overwhelming mass of alien 
(inorodnye) peers, subjecting [the Russian students’] faith and nationality [to Polish] 
influence, ridicule, and every manner of insult.”97 Shumilin credited his attendance at the 
First Boys’ Gymnasium for instilling in him a “higher religiosity, [Russian] patriotism, 
and national feeling.”98
One charity hoped to instill the “appropriate” national feeling through excursions 
of school children to the Russian interior. Intending to put the summer holidays to good 
use, and to get the children away from Polish neighborhoods, the organization in 1903 
planned a tour of the important cities of central Russia. Twenty-one students, primarily 
from Warsaw and Lodz, took advantage of the opportunity. The cities they saw provided 
them with a lesson in the medieval and early-modern history of Russia in only 22 days: 
Smolensk, Moscow, the Trinity-Sergius Monastery outside Moscow, Rostov, Iaroslavl’, 
Nizhnii Novgorod, Kazan’, and Vladimir.99 No mention was made of ever planning a trip 
to see St. Petersburg. Apparently, the true source of Russiannes could be found in the 
heart of the old Muscovite state, but not in the capital of the contemporary empire.
Russian charities also came to the aid of educational officials to provide for 
Russian students. The Russian Educational Fund declared a two-fold mission: first to
"Stefanovich, Zapiska o pervykh muzhskoi i zhenskoi gimnaziiakh, 14.
"Shumilin Papers, “Varshava v nachale XX stoletiia,” 10.
99Otchet Obshchestva codeistviia vospitaniiu i prizreniiu detei v gorod Varshave 
za 1903 god (Warsaw: Tip. Varsh. Inst. Glukh. i clep., 1904), 2. The organization also 
organized summer camps in the suburbs of Praga for Russian children as a healthy 
alternative to the cities.
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provide material assistance for Russian students in all of the schools, including the 
University of Warsaw; and second, to create “wholesome diversions” for school-age 
youth that were Russian in content.100 During the early twentieth century, other 
organizations also provided some form of assistance to needy children. The Association 
of Russian Homeowners in Warsaw provided a small stipend for poorer intelligent 
Russian students.101 After the Russo-Japanese War, the government also stepped in to 
provide a subsidy for the children of fallen soldiers. Children from the lower ranks 
received 70 rubles per year until they were 6 years old; then the sum increased to 125 
rubles until they reached the age of 10. The gubernatorial committee overseeing the 
disbursements later included the offspring of police officers who had been killed during 
the Revolution of 1905.102
The gymnasia of Warsaw, however, were not deemed sufficient to protect Russian 
children. In 1888/1889 the Brotherhood was the first to argue in favor of “fencing off’ 
the endangered Russian children. They estimated that 1,500 children were without the 
support of Orthodox schools and churches because they lived at some distance from a city 
with a strong Russian community. Of those children, 300 were at high risk of being lost
100Otchet “Russkago Uchebnago Fonda” za 1908,22; and Otchet “Russkago 
Uchebnago Fonda” za 1913,5.
101 Otchet o deiatel’nosti Pravleniia Obshchestva Russkikh Domovladel’tsev g  
Varshavy i Varshavskoi gubernii za 1910 god (Warsaw: Varshavskaia Esteticheskaia 
Tip., 1911), 11-13; Otchet Obshchestva codeistviia vospitaniiu za 1903 god, 1.
102Archiwum Panswowe miasta stolecznego Warszawy (APW). Varshavskii 
gubemskii komitet po obrazovanii Varshavskago i uezdnykh komitetov po prizreniiu 
detiam lits pogibshchikh voine s Iaponiei 1905-1906, sygn. 1,23.
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to the Russian nation and Orthodox Church because they were either fatherless or 
completely orphaned. The Brotherhood came to the conclusion that the only solution 
which would save these children from Polonization was to build a shelter for 300 children 
at some distance from Warsaw and other Polish cities. The preferred site was near the 
fort of Novogeorgievsk. It lay near a railroad station; the fort had a sizeable Russian 
population; and the nearby Russian colony of Aleksandrovsk had a Russian Orthodox 
church. The Russian Orthodox Archbishop’s summer residence was also nearby. The 
Brotherhood’s leaders believed that constructing this kind of orphanage would properly 
defend the children’s nationality and faith.103 Their proposal, however, never succeeded 
because military interests disallowed any construction on that site.104 The Russian 
Charitable Society came to similar conclusions as the Brotherhood. The Mariinskii 
Orphanage became too small, and the Society’s committee decided in 1898, in the midst 
of financial difficulties, to plan for a new building. The existing building, apart from its 
inadequate size, did not meet the desired goal of properly separating these Russian 
children from the outside world. It stood in the crowded Nowe Miasto district in a 
predominantly Jewish quarter. The new location placed the orphans near the Tsar’s 
Warsaw residence.105
The support for insulating Russian children from the outside Polish world only 
intensified during the 1890s. In 1893 Andrei Leont’evich Stefanovich, director of the
103Otchet Sviato-Troitskago Bratstva za 1888/9, 2-3
m Otchet Sviato-Troitskago Bratstva za 1912, 5-6.
105 Otchet Russkago Blagotvoritel’nago Obshchestva za 1899,3-4.
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First Boys’ Gymnasium, warned of the dangers of Russian children’s Polonization with 
the example of Russian children even preferring to respond to Russian Orthodox prayers 
in Polish. He stated that too many children were “so polonized that we already have lost 
the right to call them Russians.”106 He joined Apukhtin in the fight to Russify the Staszic 
Palace’s facade during this period.107 The school was supposed to be an island of pure 
Russianness to protect its students. The leading officials in the civil, military, and clerical 
hierarchies became determined to defend the fragile boundaries of their national group.
The demographic structure of the Varsovian Russian community and the heavily 
charged national politics that permeated life in Poland affected the nature of Russian 
charity in Warsaw. Because the Russian community never reached great numbers 
anywhere in Poland, charities could not form any type of independence from state 
interests. Too many of the chief philanthropists were also leaders in government, and 
they openly used their positions of power to benefit the societies. The three most 
important Russian charities in Warsaw had such strong ties to different state institutions 
that separating them from the official government bodies proved difficult. The Red Cross 
was associated with the military, the Russian Charitable Society belonged to the civil 
bureaucracy, and the Holy Trinity Brotherhood to the Russian Orthodox Church. High 
Russian officials sat on the committees of most organizations, and their views as 
chinovniki influenced their charitable activity.
100 Stefanovich, Zapiska o pervykh muzhskoi i zhenskoi gimnaziiakh, 3-4.
107Both Apukhtin and Stefanovich were members of the Warsaw Orthodox Holy 
Trinity Brotherhood.
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The distrust between Russians and Poles made any charitable activities suspect. 
The Russian administration, hoping to minimize Polish national agitation, cracked down 
on Polish charities, which it associated with Polish nationalist activities, and did its best 
to control the only public institutions that were left to the Poles. As Polish freedoms 
disappeared, the importance of philanthropy to Poles only increased. Russian charities 
drew the ire of educated Poles who interpreted Russian activities as little more than 
Russificatory in nature. The reality that the smallest part of the Varsovian population 
benefitted from state subsidies while the Polish majority received little assistance 
confirmed to Poles that the Russian state had only harm in mind for Polish people.
Yet the Polish perceptions of Russian ill will were misplaced, because Russian 
philanthropic activities exposed the great anxiety present among Varsovian Russians. 
They recognized that they were a small community with an unbalanced gender 
distribution, and they believed that mixed marriages weakened the Russianness of the 
family, especially when the wife was Polish. The Polish women became one of the great 
enemies in this cultural war. Her national fervor was assumed to be great and she had 
access to Russian children as the wife of a Russian man. Through her function as mother, 
the Polish Catholic woman could undermine the Russian national identity of the child.
Examination of Russian charity in Warsaw also makes clear that not all Russians 
were bureaucrats lording over Poles. Although the majority were part of the official civil 
or military service, there were also people who became a part of the city’s working-class 
population. The children of low-ranking soldiers did not have guaranteed futures in the 
government’s hierarchy because of their Russian background. The training that women
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and children received from these charities led them towards occupations in the crafts or 
menial sectors of the urban economy; few of the orphaned children attained the education 
required for a civil service post.
The poor and orphaned children of mixed families were only the most visible 
example of the problem to the Russian community. As the Russian population grew 
during the middle of the post-Uprising period, the numbers of these children were likely 
to first become noticeable. When Varsovian Russian leaders confronted increasing 
poverty among the widows and children of migrating Russians, the specter of the Polish 
mother appeared to threaten the child’s national identity. They looked at the marginalized 
part of the Russian colony and worried about its national health and survival in a Polish 
sea. They feared that their community was eroding socially, in spite of its military and 
political strength in Poland.
Their response to the problem of impoverished Russians in Poland was to 
organize philanthropies. Each organization attempted to tackle some aspect of the issue, 
yet a common feature that appeared within most of their endeavors was the preservation 
of Russian nationality and Orthodoxy. By attempting to help marginalized Russians, 
these institutions were also defining the elements that they believed were important to 
sustain Russianness. Both the Russian Orthodox faith and the Russian language became 
determinative markers of identity to the leaders of these organizations. Even non­
religious organizations such as the Russian Charitable Society came to this conclusion.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the concern over national identity led Russian 
Varsovian leaders to argue in favor of greater protection for the endangered members of
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their community. In the philanthropic arena, this translated into orphanages that would 
remove Russian children from the wider Polish population. On Warsaw’s city streets, the 
attempts to define Russianness became important landmarks during the late imperial era.
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CHAPTER 3
FINDING A RUSSIAN GENEALOGY: 
NEO-MUSCOVITE ARCHITECTURE IN WARSAW
In the late nineteenth century, Russian and Polish Varsovians interpreted 
Warsaw’s public architecture with diametrically opposed conceptions of the city’s past 
and future. Many Poles still thought of the city as the capital of Poland, albeit occupied 
and in a partitioned homeland. Ultimately, they hoped for the recovery of Polish 
independence, with Warsaw once again serving as the governmental and cultural seat of 
Poland. The occupying Russians, however, viewed Warsaw as merely the provincial 
center of the Privislinskii krai and denied that it could ever be a capital city like St. 
Petersburg or Moscow. Yet, they did envision transforming Warsaw into a Russian 
space. During the second half of the nineteenth century, Russian administrators 
supported numerous building projects that utilized prominent public space in Warsaw and 
across the Polish Kingdom with the intention of clearly establishing the permanence of 
their presence in the region. By the 1890s, these endeavors culminated in a school in the 
former Staszic Palace and in the St. Alexander Nevskii Cathedral and proclaimed a 
political and national message to both Poles and Russians.
The Russian rulers in Warsaw understood, as did most imperial masters, the 
importance of making political statements through architecture. Large public monuments
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and buildings inscribe the political ideologies of the ruling elites and embody their 
relationship with the subject population. The way in which space is used and the choice 
of symbols create a grand narrative of authority that is all the more powerful because it is 
permanent During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the British shifted 
between an “Indo-Saracenic” style and an “Orientalized” (Roman) Classicism to convey 
empire and their role as the lords of India. They claimed to be successors to the previous 
Mughal empire through the adaptation of architectural elements in the buildings of the 
previous rulers of India. By employing features of Roman architecture, they linked then- 
own empire to one they saw as their European forebear. The French in Saigon (Vietnam), 
in contrast, consciously opted for the Second Empire’s classical style in the late 
nineteenth century because it was devoid of all Asian influences, and thus manifested the 
superiority of Western, and particularly French, culture. The intention of the builders in 
both the British and the French cases was to express the permanence of their territorial 
occupation through the permanence of stone. Although Warsaw’s Russian administrators 
did not have the opportunities of the British in New Delhi or the French in Saigon and 
Algiers to create many grand buildings that could define an entire city, they did intend to 
make a similar political statement of their permanent domination in Poland.1
Since Warsaw was one of the most western cities of the Russian empire, both
'For architecture and British India, see Thomas R. Metcalf, An Imperial Vision: 
Indian Architecture and Britain’s Raj (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). 
For Saigon, see Gwendolyn Wright, The Politics o f Design in French Colonial Urbanism 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), esp. chapter 5, “Indochina: The Folly of 
Grandeur.” For Algiers, see Zeynep £elik, Urban Forms and Colonial Confrontations: 
Algiers under French Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
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geographically and culturally, neither classical nor neo-classical architectural references 
signifying the occupying power would have been as effective as in British or French 
possessions in Asia and Africa. Not only were such forms already familiar to Poles, but 
they also heightened Polish notions of belonging to the European “West” rather than to an 
“Asiatic” Russia. By mid century, the city’s appearance bore the distinct mark of the neo­
classical Italian architect Antonio Corazzi.2 In contrast, Russians opted for a specifically 
Russian architectural form so that Poles understood that they were a part of the Russian 
Empire, and that they were to gaze to the east, rather than west, for guidance. Wishing to 
create distinctive “Russian” monuments in Warsaw, they turned to the neo-Muscovite 
style, which became the hallmark of Russian autocratic power across the empire.
During the late nineteenth century, Russian architects strove to identify just what 
elements defined a specifically Russian style. In a fashion similar to the artists and 
designers of other countries, Russians looked for a national style inspired by pre-modem 
motifs that was distinctive from the contemporary urban setting.3 The neo-Muscovite 
style they created was a modernist response that eschewed the “universalism” of the
2Antonio Corazzi (1792-1877) was an Italian bom architect who arrived in 
Warsaw early in the century and quickly became the chief architect of the Polish 
Kingdom. He lived and worked primarily in Warsaw from 1819 to 1846. His projects 
helped to define a specifically Polish variant of the neo-classical style. Among his 
buildings, the most famous is the Teatr Wielki. He also designed the Staszic Palace and 
the GieMa (Stock Exchange), later called the Bank Polski (on the Plac Bankowy, much of 
which he designed). For a biographical sketch, see Piotr Biegariski, Palac Staszica. 
Siedziba Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawkiego (Warsaw: Towarzystwo Naukowe 
Warszawskie, 1951), 29-48.
3The Polish “Zakopane Style” and Odon Lechner’s Postal Savings Bank (1899- 
1901) and the Museum of Applied Arts (1891-1896) in Budapest are examples of other 
“national styles.”
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Classical style. As with other “national styles,” it was a contemporary composite of 
architectural features serving modem nationalist purposes rather than faithfully 
reproducing ancient forms. Architects looked for answers in the architecture of the 
seventeenth century, when Muscovite Rus’ had freed itself from the Mongol Yoke, but 
had not yet been tainted by Peter I’s westernization. The buildings of Moscow’s Kremlin, 
churches in Vladimir, Rostov and other medieval cities of Suzdalia (the heart of what 
became the Muscovite state), all inspired contemporary architects to create a version of 
pre-Petrine Russian architecture for modem cities. This style saturated building fa?ades 
with decorative motifs from Muscovite architecture. Architects employed kokoshniki 
(superimposed arches), pointed gables, tent roofs, or domes resting on drums to create a 
pre-Petrine appearance that intended to remind the observer of a “purer” Russian epoch 
before Muscovite culture acquired western corruptions during Peter the Great’s reign. 
Among the major examples of the style were the Church of the Resurrection of the Savior 
on the Blood (1883-1907, designed by Alfred Parland) in St. Petersburg and the 
Historical Museum of Moscow (1874-83, designed by Vladimir Shervud).4
Upon Alexander Ill’s accession to the throne in 1881, the neo-Muscovite style 
acquired imperial support that grew and lasted through Nicholas II’s reign. Alexander III 
insisted upon a Russian style reminiscent of the Muscovite tsars for the Church of the
4On the neo-Muscovite or historicist style (also referred to as the Slavic Revival, 
or neo-Byzantine by Polish scholars), see Evgeniia I. Kirichenko, Russkii stil (Moscow: 
Izdatel’stvo Galart, 1997); William Craft Brumfeld, A History o f Russian Architecture 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 393-424; George Heard Hamilton, The 
Art and Architecture o f Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 388-395; and 
Kristi Ann Groberg, “Petropolitan Reliquary: Temple of the Resurrection on the Blood, 
1881-1998” (PhJD. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1999).
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Resurrection of the Savior on the Blood, which was built on the spot where Alexander II 
had been assassinated. Richard Wortman has argued that the Russians used revival 
architecture in this neo-Muscovite style as a way of restoring a lost purity; he refers to it 
as an “inverted archaeology- [i.e.,] monuments constructed to resurrect an invisible 
national past.” Having adopted the more “truly Russian” style, Alexander III and 
Nicholas II indicated their disavowal of Alexander IPs modernizing reforms in favor of a 
mythologized Russia. Under Nicholas II, the regime attempted to sacralize the autocracy 
through a closer association with Russian Orthodoxy. Imperial ideology at the end of the 
nineteenth century fostered the image of an Orthodox tsar who had a direct link with his 
Russian (russkii) people. The style also broadcast a nationalist message. Orthodoxy 
became an important part of modem Russian identity, particularly in borderlands with 
people of other faiths, and a traditionally inspired architecture made that relationship 
explicit. Between 1881 and 1905, it became the dominant model for Orthodox church 
architecture. Churches in this style sprang up in provincial towns across the empire, and 
thus helped create a more uniform “Russian” landscape from Estland to Central Asia.5
In building symbols of the Russian Orthodox East in Catholic Warsaw, the matter 
of architectural style proved vital. Varsovian Russians expressed interest in and the need
5Richard Wortman, Scenarios o f Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian 
Monarchy, vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 244-56; Gregory Freeze, 
“Subversive Piety: Religion and the Political Crisis in Late Imperial Russia,” The Journal 
o f Modern History 68, no. 2 (June 1996): 308-50; Austin Jersild, “Faith, Custom, and 
Ritual;” and Paul W. Werth, “The Limits of Religious Ascription: Baptized Tatars and 
the Revision of ‘Apostasy,’ 1840s-1905,” The Russian Review 59, no. 4 (October 2000): 
493-511.
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for erecting an edifice in a “purely Russian architectural style” in this borderland.6 Neo- 
Muscovite architectural forms, at the height of their popularity during the fin-de-siecle, 
most easily transmitted the imperialist message in Warsaw. The architect of the Nevskii 
Cathedral, Leontii N. Benois (1856-1928), was noted for opining that this style “best 
reflected the mood of the Russian people.”7 In the Polish context, the neo-Muscovite 
style not only provided a dramatic contrast to Warsaw’s baroque and neo-classical 
palaces and Catholic churches, but also made visible a Russian past where none had 
previously existed.
By employing the neo-Muscovite style, Varsovian Russians inscribed their own 
narrative that linked Warsaw to the rest of Russia. The building projects and the 
historical arguments that inspired them helped to construct a Russian collective memory 
in Poland. Benedict Anderson argues that the national past has to be written backwards, 
from the present to a legendary past, because the nation has no clear moment of birth.
The national narrative, thus, begins with the realities of the contemporary nation when 
searching for its origins.8 Likewise, Russian imperialists combed the past for usefiil 
moments to justify the domination of Poland in die nineteenth century and to legitimate 
the Russian empire.
The First Boy’s Gymnasium (renovated 1892-97), which opened in what had been
6A. K., “Pravoslavnyi sobor v Varshave,” Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi 
vestnik, no. 11, 1 (13) June 1893,178.
7V. Shingarev, “K osviashcheniiu novogo kafedral’nago sobora v Varshave,” 
Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi listok, no. 10,16 Mayl912 (OS), 148.
8Anderson, Imagined Communities, 205.
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the Staszic Palace, and the St. Alexander Nevskii Cathedral (built 1894-1912) on Saxon 
Square (now Pilsudski’s Square) created a Russian genealogy in stone for the Russians 
living and working in Warsaw. Although contemporary Russians had, for the most part, 
been recent arrivals to Warsaw, the narratives created around these buildings suggested a 
much earlier lineage of Russian (or Orthodox) presence that they could claim as their 
own. The site of the Staszic Palace was the temporary burial site of Tsar Vasilii Shuiskii, 
who died in Polish captivity in the early seventeenth century during the Time of Troubles. 
The Nevskii Cathedral claimed to be the most recent symbol of a maturing Orthodox 
presence that began before the late-eighteenth-century partitions; through its namesake, it 
also hearkened to Medieval Rus’ and its conflicts with and victories over the Catholic 
West. These buildings became “memory palaces” that reminded Varsovian Russians of 
the historical narrative and the part that this western outpost of the empire had in it. 
Additionally, Russian authorities attempted to subject a “social amnesia” upon the Poles 
by writing a Russian memory over significant Polish sites. The Staszic site was 
associated with Polish national enlightenment and the intellectual revival in the wake of 
the Partitions, while Saxon Square was linked to the eighteenth-century Wettin kings of 
the Commonwealth. Their prominent placement in the city’s center further magnified the 
importance of both sites.9
9Peter Burke, “History as Social Memory,” in Thomas Butler, ed., Memory: 
History, Culture and the Mind (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 97-113. The Wettins 
(Albertine branch) were the Electors of Saxony (thus, Plac Saski), two of whom were 
elected to the Polish-Lithuanian crown: August II (r. 1697-1733), and August III (r. 1733- 
1763). The last Wettin to rule in Poland was Frederick August, as the Grand Duke of the 
Duchy of Warsaw (1807-1815).
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The “Russian” style in architecture was not used during the entire period of 
Russian rule in Poland, however. During the first third of the nineteenth century, when 
Polish autonomy still functioned in the kingdom, no major Russian-inspired projects 
developed. Russian administrators built rather little during their stay in Warsaw, in part 
at least, because many of the offices that they might otherwise have built already existed. 
Warsaw was, after all, the capital of a once independent state, and between 1815 and 
1831 it had all of the autonomy and separate administrative infrastructure of a state. The 
offices of the Russian govemor-generalship only had to utilize those spaces.
Furthermore, the city also provided a wealth of large aristocratic palaces along prominent 
thoroughfares for the state to use. The offices of the Governor-General and the Warsaw 
governors serve as one good example. They occupied the Viceroy’s Palace (the 
President’s Palace) on Krakowskie Przedmiescie; the palace had been the Varsovian 
residence of the Konicepolski, and since the seventeenth century, of the Radziwill family. 
In 1818 it was purchased to be the residential palace of the Viceroy, General Aleksander 
Zajqczek.10 After the November Uprising of 1830-31, the conquering viceroy, General 
(Count) Ivan Paskevich moved his residence first to the Belvedere Palace, and later to the 
Royal Castle. The Viceroy’s Palace then became the home of the Kingdom’s viceregal 
and gubernatorial administration.11
10Zbigniew Bania and Tadeusz S. Jaroszewski, Palac Rady Ministraw (Warsaw: 
Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Nauk, 1980), 76,111. Aleksander Zajqczek (1752-1826) was 
a Polish general who fought for Napoleonic forces and entered the service of Alexander I 
after the Congress of Vienna.
uBania and Jaroszewski, Palac Rady, 98. Ivan Paskevich (1782-1856) (Viceroy, 
1831-56) was also titled the Prince of Warsaw for his role in defeating the Poles in the
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The November Uprising of 1830-31 and the subsequent loss of autonomy for the 
Poles led to two major building projects on the part of the Russians: the transformation of 
a Piarist church into the Russian Orthodox Holy Trinity Cathedral, and the construction 
of the Citadel. The cathedral became the home of a new Russian Orthodox diocese. The 
Citadel was a military complex that both protected Warsaw in the event of war and also 
threatened the city if it dared to rebel. Until the 1860s, the Holy Trinity Cathedral and the 
Citadel were the only major projects that symbolized the Russian state in Warsaw.
The Holy Trinity Cathedral was the culmination of both political aims and long- 
unfulfilled intentions. In order to tie the Congress Kingdom more closely to the empire, 
Warsaw became the seat of a new Russian Orthodox eparchy at the suggestion of 
Viceroy-Fieldmarshal Ivan Paskevich, with Bishop Antonii Rafal’skii as its first prelate 
in 1834.12 Although there apparently were plans before the uprising to build a Russian 
Orthodox Cathedral where the Staszic Palace currently stands, nothing came of them in 
1818 other than the razing of the monastery and church of the Observationist Dominicans 
(Matka Boska Zwycipska)}3
Now that Warsaw had an Orthodox bishop, it needed a cathedral. Rather than 
building a completely new structure, the Piarist monastery church on Dluga street, near
November 1830-31 Uprising and “Erevanskii” for his military successes in the Caucasus 
region.
12A. N., “Kratkii ocherk istorii Varshavskoi eparkhii,” Varshavskii eparkhial ’nyi 
listok no. 14, 1 August 1908 (OS), 115. Bishop Antonii briefly held the bishop’s post in 
Warsaw before becoming the Metropolitan of St. Petersburg and Novgorod.
13Piotr Paszkiewicz, Pod berlem Romanowow, 97.
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the Stare Miasto, was taken and adapted for Russian use. Antonio Corazzi (Karachchi) 
and Andrzej Goloriski designed the modifications for the church as well as the adjoining 
building (once part of the Piarists’ school), which became the residence of the Orthodox 
bishops.14 The Polish baroque structure only suffered moderate changes that made it 
appear much like the neo-classical churches of Catherine II’s St. Petersburg (see Figure 
1). It did, however, still bear the political message of conquest; the nine church bells, 
weighing over 36,000 pounds, were made of the cannon the Polish army used during the 
November Uprising.15 The church was consecrated on 18 July 1837 (OS) and served as 
the cathedral until the completion of the St. Alexander Nevskii Cathedral in 1912.16
Although the architectural style was not neo-Muscovite, the Holy Trinity 
Cathedral had strong political overtones. It cemented Russia’s presence in Poland in spite 
of the fact that the size of the Russian community during the inter-uprising period 
remained insignificant and did not require a large church or the establishment of a 
Russian Orthodox eparchy. The importance of this building and the bishopric was
14Mitrofan Petrovich Ustimovich, Varshavskii pravoslvanyi kafedral’nyi Sviato- 
Troitskii sobor. Kratkii istroicheskii ocherk (1837-1887), (Warsaw: Tip. Varshavskago 
Uchebnago Orkruga, 1887), 7-8; Ryszard Mqczyriski, “Stoleczny palacyk ksi^dza 
Humahskiego,” Rocznik Warszawski 27 (1998), 25-61. The Piarists received a former 
Jesuit property and an indemnity of nearly 54,000 rubles as well. They specialized in 
education.
15A. N., “Kratkii ocherk istorii Varshavskoi eparkhii,” Varshavskii eparkhil ’nyi 
listokno. 14, 1 August 1908 (OS), 115.
16“ Rasporazhenie Kholmsko-Varshavskago Eparkhial’nago nachal’stva ot 28-31 
maia cego 1887 goda o prazdnovanii 50-ti letniago iubileia Varshavskago Kafedral’nago 
Sobora,” Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi vestnik, 15 (27) June 1887, no. 12,190-91; 
Ustimovich, Varshavskii pravoslvanyi kafedral’nyi Sviato-Troitskii sobor, 26-27.
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Figure 1. The Holy Trinity Cathedral, ca. 1890-1900. Source: Library of Congress Prints 
and Photographs Division, Photochrom Collection. LOT 13419, no. 136.
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reiterated in a speech on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary by Nikolai Matveevich 
Orekhovskii, of the Warsaw Judicial Chamber. He declared that the cathedral’s jubilee 
celebrations also marked the fulfillment of “the first blessed turning point in our 
government’s politics concerning this region.” By establishing this bishopric and 
cathedral, Russians defended the “unity of the empire” and embarked upon the “first steps 
towards establishing Orthodoxy and the Russian state principle (grazhdanstvennost ’)” in 
Poland.17 The lack of a revival style did not lessen the political impact such structures or 
the institutions they housed made upon the subject population. The very existence of 
Russian institutions in the former Polish capital marked the permanent ties between the 
two countries as well as Poland’s subordination to St. Petersburg.
The Alexandrian Citadel was the other significant inter-uprising project. The 
primary purpose of this military complex was to guarantee Polish compliance to Russian 
authority. With its military garrison and the infamous prison, “X Pawilon,” where 
participants in the Polish nationalist and socialist movements suffered imprisonment and 
execution, the Citadel became an infamous marker of Russian oppression of Poles. This 
building did not need the additional architectural flourishes of any “Russian” style to 
convey its political message. In addition to threatening Poles with military action, the 
Citadel also destroyed a portion of Warsaw and hampered urban growth. In order to 
make room for it, military planners required the wholesale razing of the Zoliborz 
neighborhood and the surrounding area on the left bank of the Vistula River in 1832-1834
17“Rech’ N. M. Orekhovskago,” Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi vestnik, 1 
(13) August 1887, no. 15, 345 [sic, should be page 245].
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to ensure the base an unobstructed view of and access to the rest of the city. The 10,000 
inhabitants of the neighborhood were forced to find other homes. Construction of the 
main part of the base was completed in 1836. By 1838 Fort Sliwicki, across the river in 
the Praga district, provided the Citadel with lines of communication to the right bank of 
the river. Between 1846 and 1853 a ring of forts strengthened the Citadel’s defensive and 
offensive position. The military complex physically limited the city’s growth because no 
construction was permitted north of it. Inadvertently, the Citadel also served to preserve 
the oldest part of Warsaw, the Stare Mias to, from destruction and renovation. While 
other European cities cleared away their medieval centers for modem, orderly streets, the 
Citadel’s presence prevented such modernization in Warsaw and forced the city’s center 
to move to the south.18
During the second half of the nineteenth century, additional military construction 
further limited urban growth just as Warsaw witnessed a population explosion. While the 
Citadel itself established the northern limit to urban development, a series of 30 small 
forts choked off expansion to the west and south. Between 1878 and 1890, when Russo- 
German relations were cooling, military planners built this string of forts around the city 
with the intention of ensuring Russian control of Warsaw and its important railroads in
18Stanislaw Lagonowski, Historia Warszawskiej Cytadeli (Pruszkow: Oficyna 
Wydawnicza “Ajaks,” 2001), 24-49; Stefan Krol, Cytadela Warszawska (Warsaw: 
Ksi^zka i Wiedza, 1978), 12-19. The Citadel was named in honor of Alexander I, the 
creator of the Polish Congress Kingdom. Fort Sliwicki was named in honor of a Polish 
officer in the Russian army who distinguished himself in the battle for Warsaw in 1831.
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the event of war or another uprising.19 No stone buildings were permitted within the belt 
these forts created around Warsaw; the erection of wooden structures and even the 
planting of trees required specific permission from military officials. Since Warsaw was 
unable to grow outward, builders filled every available space. By the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the city was one of the most densely populated urban centers in the 
empire, with four times the density of St. Petersburg and three times that of Moscow.
Not until after 1911 did authorities permit developers to build within this belt of 
fortifications. Changes in military thinking, and the recent experience gained in the 
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), made the forts obsolete.20
Because of the problems created by restrictions in geographical expansion, 
urbanization, and industrialization, Polish elites continually called for major 
modernization plans that would keep Warsaw on par with the other great capitals of 
western Europe. As the population rapidly increased, the infra-structural problems of 
water, sewage, and transportation became pressing issues. At the century’s end, Warsaw 
was the third largest city in the empire, only smaller than Moscow and St. Petersburg. 
Polish novelist and journalist Boleslaw Prus complained that “Warsaw stands on 
garbage” because of the poor conditions.21 Ferdynand Hoesick wrote that in the Warsaw
19Marian Drozdowski and Andrzej Zahorski, Historia Warszawy, 4th ed.
(Warsaw: “Egros,” 1997), 244-46; Krol, Cytadela Warszawska, 16.
20Corrsin, Warsaw before the First World War, 13; Kieniewicz, Warszawa w 
latach 1795-1914,195-96; and Krol, Cytadela Warszawska, 16.
21Boleslaw Prus, Kroniki, 3: 132. Prus, in particular, frequently wrote about 
matters of health and hygiene as well as the sorry state of affairs of Varsovian 
infrastructure in his feuilletons. For more examples see idem., Kroniki, 6:121-22
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of the 1870s water and sewer works were “an audacious dream,” and proposals for 
modem street lighting ’’did not even withstand the most sparing criticism.” He also 
quoted Henryk Sienkiewicz in describing Warsaw as “hell for every nose that was not 
bom in it.”22 During the 1880s, newspapers such as the Kurier Warszawski and the 
Gazeta lekarska called for dramatic changes.23 The President of Warsaw, Sokrates 
Starynkevich (1875-1892), responded by embarking upon a series of projects that 
modernized the city’s infrastructure and expanded its green spaces.24 To match the 
pressing urban needs, the city’s budget grew dramatically from 2.4 million to 16.1 million 
rubles between 1883 and 1914. Starynkevich’s administration used these increased funds 
to provide the city with new water and sewer systems, public transportation, and the 
beginnings of electrification.25
(originally in Kurier warszawski, no. 113,21 May, 1882); idem., Kroniki, 14:156-57 
(originally in Kurier codzienny, no. 195,17 July 1894); idem., Kroniki, 15: 89-97 
(originally in Kurier Codzienny no. 101,11 April 1897).
22Ferdynand Hoesick, Warszawa. Luzne kartki z przeszlosci Syreniego Grodu 
(Warsaw: Ksi^gamia Sw. Wojciecha, 1920), 347-48, citing Sienkiewicz’s quote from his 
feuilletons in the Gazeta Polska from 1873.
23Anna Sloniowa, Poczqtki nowoczesnej injrastruktury Warszawy (Warsaw: 
Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1978), 80-81.
24Staiynkevich’s (1820-1902) programs earned him the genuine love of the city’s 
Poles, especially since he had to fight bureaucratic red tape in the Governor-General’s 
office and in St. Petersburg. He is the only Russian whose name was not removed from 
the streets and plazas upon Polish independence. To this day the Plac Starynkiewicza and 
a bust of him exist in Warsaw. See Anna Sloniowa, Sokrates Starynkiewicz (Warsaw: 
Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1981).
25Corrsin, Warsaw before the First World War, 12-16; and Corrsin, “Warsaw: 
Poles and Jews,” 122-51. On the modernization of the city’s infrastructure, see Sloniowa, 
Poczqtki nowoczesnej injrastruktury.
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Russians in Warsaw soon noted the positive results of these investments. In 1881, 
Vladimir Mikhnevich praised Warsaw as an attractive city with well-built, predominantly 
stone, buildings.26 Ivan Shumilin, who grew up in Warsaw, remembered a beautiful city 
-  a “miniature Paris” -  with many parks, palaces, and monuments.27 He commented on 
the city’s “impeccable cleanliness” (bezykorizennaia) with watchmen cleaning the 
pavements and roadways as much as five times in a day.28 At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the chief editor of the Warsaw Statistical Committee, V. V. Esipov, 
wrote of the lowered mortality rates that resulted from the city’s new water and filtration 
systems. He remarked that Warsaw’s healthier environment placed it on an 
“incomparably higher [level] than St. Petersburg and Moscow, and infinitely higher than 
Krakow or L’viv.” Varsovian conditions were “more favorable than even Berlin and 
Dresden.”29
Unlike the leading citizens of other major European cities, Polish leaders had 
limited formal influence over the city’s policies.30 The Russian government refused to
26Mikhnevich, Varshava i varshaviane, 30.
27Shumilin Papers, “Staraia Varshava,” 10-11.
28Shumilin Papers, “Varshava v nachale 20 stoletiia (Moi gimnazicheskie i 
studencheskie vospominaniia),” 22.
29V. V. Esipov, Varshava i Lodz Ikh proshloe i nastoiashchee (Warsaw: Tip. 
Varshavskago uchebnago okruga, 1907), 9; and Esipov, Privislinskii krai, 15. Esipov 
credited Starynkevich as the man responsible for pushing through the projects.
30Although there was no city duma, Starynkevich did seek Polish input by filling 
the responsible committees with Polish economic and intellectual elites. See 
Drozdowski, Historia Warsawy, 247.
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extend to Warsaw even the limited self-rule of the urban duma reforms enacted during the 
Great Reforms because of the January Uprising. Later attempts to introduce even 
rudimentary self-governance never came to fruition. The President of the city and the 
Warsaw Oberpolitsmaistr were the two most important local officials; both of them were 
appointed and both were non-Polish in the uprising’s aftermath. Any public expenses 
over five thousand rubles had to receive the approval of the Governor-General, while 
projects over 30,000 rubles needed the sanction of the appropriate ministry in St. 
Petersburg. Not until the First World War, when Prince Zdzislaw Lubomirski took the 
reins of the Warsaw Presidency under German occupation in 1915, did Poles gain a 
greater control of municipal affairs.31
After 1863, church-building projects garnered particular interest among Varsovian 
Russian leaders, and they adopted the Neo-Muscovite style then to remind Poles visually 
of Russian control at multiple urban points. The second half of the nineteenth century 
was one of the last major periods of church construction in Warsaw until the post­
communist era; all the denominations erected sizeable public structures during these 
years. By the end of the century, there were nearly 40 Russian Orthodox sanctuaries, 
either free-standing or attached to some other building such as a school. Some of the 
construction is easily explained since the number of arriving Russians dramatically 
increased; consequently, the amount of religious space to accommodate them did so as 
well. Many of the churches and chapels served a particular military garrison, orphanage, 
school, the Orthodox cemetery, or were a part of the royal palace complex, such as at
31Kieniewicz, Warsawa w latach 1795-1914, 191.
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Lazienki. Only one, the Church of St. Mary Magdalene in Praga, was designed as a parish 
church.32 The greater number of Russians in the city, however, did not fully explain the 
increasing number of Orthodox churches. In the words of a Russian clerical writer, “the 
multiplying Orthodox churches in Warsaw broadcast the grandeur of the Russian 
Orthodox soul.”33 These buildings, particularly in their Russian revival forms, were 
pronouncements of Russian military, political, and spiritual power.
Poles found the construction of these Russian churches infuriating because they 
perceived these buildings to be attempts to Russify the cityscape itself. The numerous 
gold-domed Orthodox churches, the many military and civil uniforms, and the Russian 
street signs all created the superficial impression that Warsaw was a Russian city. The 
state-funded Orthodox churches, according to members of the Polish intelligentsia, 
“granted the skyline a Byzantine appearance.”34 Many Poles took the neo-Muscovite 
fa?ades of these buildings to be an orientalization of their “Western” city. Poles argued 
for modernization, but the appearance of onion domes implied the opposite to them.
32Paszkiewicz, Pod berlem Romanowow, 78-114. Paszkiewicz describes each of 
the churches built after 1863. Also, the Kholmsko-Varshavskii epakhial’nyi vestnik 
regularly published articles on the construction of Orthodox churches and chapels in the 
Kingdom of Poland.
33“Pravoslavnaia tserkov Sv. Marii Magdaliny v Varshave na Prage 
(Okonchanie),” Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi vestnik 15 (27) September 1895, no. 
18,293.
34Jan Stanislaw Bystroh, Warszawa (Warsaw: Paristwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 
1977), 251-52. Many Polish writers, particularly those who opposed Russian rule, used 
the words (Neo-)Byzantine and (Neo-)Muscovite almost interchangeably. Accuracy was 
not their goal; they were emphasizing the “Eastern” (“Oriental”) quality of Russian 
culture. The “Polishness” of the city was also not critically examined by them either; 
there was also a large unassimilated Jewish population.
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Even Russians traveling to Warsaw commented on the city’s Russified 
appearance. Vladimir Mikhnevich noted in 1881 that the gold-domed “orthodox temples, 
monuments and memorials to Russian honor and Russian fame, the mass of government 
offices, [and] the Russian two-headed eagles” all created the superficial impression that 
one lived in a Russian city. Yet, it was “undoubtedly more European than even larger 
[Russian] cities.” 35 The painter Aleksandr Benois, a relative of the St. Alexander Nevskii 
cathedral’s architect, wrote in his memoirs of the “sharp, rather ‘tactless,’ and even 
directly insulting invasion of Russian nationalism in this purely western city.” He 
particularly commented on the “Russian style” that was applied to the Staszic Palace, 
with the monument to Copernicus at its front.36 The poet Aleksandr Blok briefly came to 
Warsaw in December 1909 at the death of his father, University of Warsaw professor 
Aleksandr L’vovich Blok. His experience of the city and the Russian community there 
contributed to the creation of the poem Retribution. In an earlier version of the work, he 
described Warsaw as gloomy because it was ruled by “Russian military philistines who 
built Russian Orthodox churches” in the Polish capital.37 These visiting Russians 
recognized that the neo-Muscovite style Russian officials employed in Warsaw served 
chauvinistic purposes.
35Mikhnevich, Varshava i varshaviane, 8, 24. Italics in the original.
36Aleksandr Benua [Benois], Moi vospominaniia v piati knigakh, vol. 2 (Moscow: 
Nauka, 1990), 44-45.
37Adam Galis, Osiemnascie dni Aleksandr a Bloka w Warszawie (Warsaw: 
Czytelnik, 1976), 123-4. The lines, later deleted, are: “Ne tern li pasmuma Varshava / 
Chto v sei stolitse poliakov -  / Tsarit nakhlianaia orava / Voennykh russkikh poshliakov? 
/ Chto stroit russkie sobory / . . . ”
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The first of the Russian Orthodox churches in the neo-Muscovite style was St. 
Mary Magdalene’s in Praga, which served the burgeoning Russian population there. 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, Praga was little more than an 
underdeveloped suburb on the right bank of the Vistula River. However, its growth after 
the January Uprising quickly made it an important industrial and commercial part of 
Warsaw. By the end of the century, Russian speakers (both native Russians and Russian- 
speaking Jews) constituted a significant 12.3 percent of this district’s population. They 
included individuals working for the Russian military as well as newly arrived Russians 
who filled the civil service, railroad, and education posts denied to Poles.38 The presence 
of the two major railroad stations linking Warsaw with the rest of the Russian Empire 
also encouraged Russian settlement on this side of the river.39
This large inflow of Russians into Praga, particularly as it underwent urbanization, 
lent it the character of a Russian city. The physical indicators of Russianness that were 
present throughout Warsaw -  the sound of spoken Russian on the streets, the sight of 
military and civil service uniforms, and the signs and placards in Cyrillic wherever the 
eye roamed -  were especially noticeable in Praga.40 One Russian visitor commented that
38Jan Berger, “Praga w swietle wyniku spisu ludnosci 1897 roku,” Kronika 
Warszawy, no. 113-114 (2000, no. 3-4), 70.
39Ihe stations were the Warsaw-St. Petersburg, currently the Wilenski, built in 
1862; and the Warsaw-Terespol’, currently the Wschodni, built in 1866.
40Agata Tuszynska, “W oczach Polakow. Polacy i Rosjanie. Zycie codzienne w 
Warszawie w latach 1865-1905,” Zeszyty laistoryczne 81 (1987), 3-20. This article 
attempts to paint a picture of the Varsovian street from the point of view of a Polish 
flaneur.
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“everywhere, in the stores, in the restaurants, and in all the public places, at every turn,
[people speak] Russian [One sees] Russian uniforms at every step.”41 Additionally,
as new buildings rose to create neighborhoods, colors reminiscent of a Russian town 
coated the new wood structures and created a contrast with the city’s left bank (the city’s 
center).42 In the midst of this Russian district, Varsovian Russian rulers ordered the 
construction of a church in 1867-1868 that was “built completely in the Russian 
[style].”43
St. Mary Magdalene’s Church received considerable official attention from its 
inception. Its chief sponsor was the Governing Commission’s Director of Internal and 
Spiritual Affairs, Prince Vladimir A. Cherkasskii. The Governing Commission wanted a 
building that was prominent and distinctly “Russian;” it rejected the single-domed 
original plan for one with five domes. This choice reflected a preference for the 
Muscovite over the Byzantine-inspired Kievan Rus’ style. The pentacupular form
41Mikhnevich, Varshava i varshaviane, 7-8.
42E. Szawnkowski, “Praga w latach 1814-1880,” in Jozef Kazimierski, ed., Dzieje 
Pragi (Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1970), 172-73. Praga continues to 
be more “Russian” to the present day. Russians who migrate to Warsaw tend to live in 
this area, and many of the hawkers at the Stadion Dziesipciolecia come from the former 
Soviet Union.
43“Pravoslavnaia tserkov’ Sv. Marii Magdaliny v Varshave na Prage,” Kholmsko- 
Varshavskii eparkhial ’nyi vestnik, 15 (27) August 1895, no. 16, 261-62. One interesting 
feature of this article is the description of Russian Varsovians, rather than Orthodox 
Varsovians. The assumption is clearly that Russian equals Orthodox. While some 
described this church as “Russian,” N. O. Akaemov referred to the style as a “Byzantine- 
Venetian” style. See, N. O. Akaemov, Dostoprimechatel’nosti Varshavy (Warsaw: 
Politseiskaia Tipografiia, 1897), 47; N. O. Akaemov, PutevoditeVpo Varshave (Warsaw: 
n.p., 1902), 80.
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became the dominant pattern for church architecture in Muscovy at the end of the late 
fifteenth century with the construction of the Dormition Cathedral. The repetition of this 
style symbolized the Grand Prince of Moscow’s gathering of the Russian lands under his 
sovereign power.44 Additionally, only Russian master craftsmen and stone masons’ artels 
worked on the building 45 The Empress Mariia Aleksandrovna’s donation of an icon of 
St. Mary Magdalene to the church testified to the imperial family’s interest in the project. 
The consecration ceremonies on 29 June 1869 (according to the Julian calendar) began 
with a religious procession from the Holy Trinity Cathedral across the river that included 
the donated icon.46
By choosing Aleksandrijksa street (Aleksandriiskaia, presently Jagiellonska street) 
for this “Russian-styled” church, Russian officials issued a conqueror’s message to Poles. 
St. Andrew’s Catholic church stood on this site before the Polish Commonwealth fell in 
the Third Partition. The Russian assault on Praga during the Kosciuszko Uprising of
44Brumfeld, A History o f Russian Architecture, 92-111. The change in 
architecture reflected the decline of Constantinople’s influence over Moscow because of 
the Byzantine union with Roman Catholicism after the Council of Florence (1439) and 
the final collapse of the Byzantine Empire in 1453.
45“Pravoslavnaia tserkov’ Sv. Marii Magdaliny,” no. 16,262; Paszkiewicz, Pod 
berlem Romanowdw, 84, 87. The local building committee was not necessarily looking 
for a “purely Russian”-built building, however. They intended to add gas lighting to this 
church and ordered a modem system from Berlin, but this modem technology created an 
interesting controversy. Archbishop Ioanniki wanted wax candles, believing that they 
were symbolic of the Christian’s soul softening in the presence of Christ’s light. The 
Holy Synod decided in favor of the wax candles. For information on the interiors and 
iconographic program, see Paszkiewicz, Pod berlem Romanowow, 88-91.
46“Pravoslavnaia tserkov Sv. Marii Magdaliny v Varshave na Prage 
(Okonchanie),” Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi vestnik, 15 (27) September 1895 no. 
18,291.
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1794 destroyed the church and much of the suburb; the battle concluded with a massacre
of Praga’s population.47 That Polish defeat at the hands of the Russians spelled the end of
the Commonwealth. After the unsuccessful January Uprising of 1863, Russians
announced the Poles’ permanent subjection by situating an Orthodox church there.
This location also presented a message to Russians who lived in Warsaw and
those who visited or traveled through it. The Church of St. Mary Magdalene, which
dominated the skyline of late-nineteenth-century Praga, was carefully located near the two
railroad stations that linked Warsaw to the rest of the Russian Empire. Anyone arriving
from Russia’s interior, the 80,000 soldiers stationed there, and the thousands of people
passing through the stations would clearly see the domes of this Russian Orthodox
church. The following impression created by the visual image of St. Mary Magdalene
was offered by the Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi vestnik in 1895:
Heading for Warsaw from the station [the visitors’] very first glance is of a 
beautiful temple, obviously Orthodox, obviously Russian. The sight of this 
temple delights their Russian feeling and more or less compels them to forget the 
sad past for Russians in this borderland and in the West-Russian region in 
general.48
According to the same author, the church “reminds the Russian soldier of his dear 
homeland, [and] the Russian bell’s pealing soothes in his heart the idea of Poland as the
47Paszkiewicz, Pod berlem Romanowdw, 83. The Kosciuszko Uprising was a 
response to the Second Partition and the impending loss of Polish independence. It was 
recognized as the last attempt to save the old Rzeczpospolita (Commonwealth). For more 
on Praga and the Kosciuszko Uprising, see Andrzej Zahorski, Warszawa w powstaniu 
Kosciuszowskim (Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1985), 322-32.
48“Pravoslavnaia tserkov’ Sv. Marii Magdaliny,” no. 16,262.
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place where much Russian blood was shed.”49 This stone representation of home put 
Russians at ease in what they understood was hostile territory. The passage of more than 
thirty years since the January Uprising had not changed the nature of Polish-Russian 
relations.
The Russian character of Praga was also important in ceremonial functions. High
officials, particularly the Imperial family, who visited the Polish Kingdom all arrived in
Praga. The Tsar’s tour of Warsaw began with the visual message that he was still in
Russia when the train rolled into the Warsaw-Petersburg Station and when the imposing
gold domes of St. Mary Magdalene came into view.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the neighborhood surrounding the church
and railroad stations had become highly urbanized and the political importance of the area
again drew official attention. Among the other major structures to appear was the rival
St. Florian’s Catholic church. After fifty years of activity, St. Mary Magdalene’s needed
major renovations. Its political importance was reiterated by the Orthodox Archbishop
Flavian in a letter to the Oberprocurator of the Holy Synod on 14 March 1894. He argued
for state funds because the church was
erected by Russians in a visible location near the entrance to Warsaw so that it 
could serve as a symbol of Orthodoxy and Russian national dignity.. . .  The 
nearly finished massive Catholic church [St. Florian’s ] . . .  brings attention to 
itself from all those arriving [and] inclines [them] to rather unflattering 
comparisons with the Orthodox church in its current state.50
49Ibid.
50RGIA, fond 799, inv. 25, no. 10, as cited in Paszkiewicz, Pod Berlem 
Romanowdw, 91.
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Russian officials recognized that the state religion could not appear to be the “poorer 
cousin” of Polish Catholicism.
Although the church of St. Mary Magdalene was the first major Varsovian edifice 
to employ a neo-Muscovite style, it did not have the same symbolic significance of the 
two tum-of-the-century projects, the Staszic Palace and Nevskii Cathedral. The Mary 
Magdalene Church’s highly visible location certainly lent it a propagandists value. What 
it lacked, however, was a useful historical narrative that provided a collective link 
between Varsovian Russians and a distant Russian past; it did not serve as a “memory 
palace” for the Russian population. Furthermore, it was in Praga, and not the city’s 
center. The Warsaw of Polish history is predominantly on the left bank of the river;
Praga was only a suburb until the late nineteenth century. As a result, St. Mary 
Magdalene’s did not contest any powerful Polish historical narratives. Praga was a 
relatively blank slate when it came to the collective memories of both Poles and Russians. 
By contrast, the Staszic Palace and the Nevskii Cathedral were in and around locations 
dense with meaning to Poles. These Russian projects also were able to create links to a 
Russian past. One was Tsar Vasilii Shuiskii’s burial site, and the other’s namesake was a 
sainted medieval Russian ruler. St. Mary Magdalene’s church did not have a historical 
Russian meaning, but its neo-Muscovite style served as a precursor to the massive St. 
Alexander Nevskii Cathedral erected on the eve of the First World War.
Since the 1863 January Uprising, official construction projects increased in both 
number and political importance. The pre-uprising practice of using Polish architects 
became less frequent. The greatest number of the new buildings were religious in nature,
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and they reflected the neo-Muscovite style to a lesser or greater degree (some were more 
ornate than others). By the end of the century this style became firmly ensconced as the 
only appropriate form for a Russian Orthodox church. As a result of the flurry of 
construction by the Russian Orthodox Archbishopric, the neo-Muscovite style peppered 
Warsaw’s skyline. With the beginning of renovations on the Staszic Palace and the 
subsequent building of the Nevskii Cathedral, Russian leaders erected two of the most 
powerful political-cultural symbols justifying Russian power in Warsaw. Due to their 
central historic locations Poles found these two projects more infuriating than other 
examples of Russian architecture.
The Fin-de-Siecle Renovations of the Staszic Palace
The Staszic Palace became a target for Russian authorities because it represented 
the aspirations of a national-intellectual revival among Poles during the nineteenth 
century. It is located in the very center of Warsaw on the city’s primary street, 
Krakowskie Przedmiescie (see Figure 2). The Roman Catholic Holy Cross Church is 
only a few feet north of it, and the gates of the University of Warsaw can be seen from it 
as well. A few minutes’ walk north along the street, one will find the Royal Castle and 
the Stare Miasto. Also within easy walking distance are the Teatr Wielki, Saxon Square, 
and its gardens (Ogrod Saski). During the nineteenth century, the immediate 
neighborhood included the homes of the aristocracy, the “entire [Polish] intelligentsia; the 
[city’s] main offices; [and] first-rate stores, banks, private institutions, buildings, and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Figure 2: Map of Left-Bank Warsaw. 1. The Holy Trinity Cathedral; 2. The Old City 
(Stare miasto), with the Royal Castle in the southeast; 3. Teatr Wielki; 4. Saxon Square, 
with the Saxon Gardens to the west; 5. University of Warsaw; 6. The Staszic Palace; 7. 
Lazienki Palace. The #  denotes the approximate location of St. Mary Magdalene’s 
Church in Praga (off of the map).
Source: http://www.bialik.netaxis.qc.ca/sec4ih/warsaw/geo.htm (Examined 20 October 
2006).
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gardens.”51 Along with its location, the building itself also bore great symbolic value to 
Polish society. The Polish Society of the Friends of Science, under the leadership and 
sponsorship of Stanislaw Staszic, erected the palace in 1820 to serve as its center; the 
building’s popular name (it was not officially called the “Staszic Palace”) was a nod to 
the sponsor who had strongly supported intellectual endeavors in Poland throughout his 
life.52 The palace was intended to be a center for the development of Polish national 
enlightenment, which educated Poles hoped could eventually lead the way to Polish 
independence. Antonio Corazzi, who had a hand in much of Warsaw’s major 
architectural projects in the first half of the nineteenth century, designed the building, 
which was among his first projects.53 This style connected Polish culture with the broader 
Western European culture and also announced the intellectual accomplishments and 
aspirations of the Polish nation. To further emphasize the value of science to the nation, 
the Society commissioned a bronze monument of Nicholas Copernicus, which it placed in 
the center of the square in front of the building. After the 1830 Uprising, Russian 
authorities closed the Society and shipped its possessions to Russia.
51Wiktor Gomulicki, Przewodrtik po Warszawie wydany staraniem Wielkiego 
Hotelu Europejskiego w czterech jpzykach (Warasw: Wydawnictwo Artystyczne i 
Filmowe, 1991, reprint of Hotel Europejski, 1881), 2-3.
52Stanislaw Staszic (1755-1826) was one of the key figures of the Polish 
Enlightenment. After the fall of the Commonwealth, he strongly advocated education as 
the means of reviving the Polish nation. He was a member of the Duchy of Warsaw’s 
Directorate of Education, and after 1815 also participated in the Congress Kingdom’s 
Department of National Enlightenment.
53Bieganski, Pahc Staszica. 39-40; also Lukasz Gol^biowski, Opisanie 
historyczno-statystyczne miasta Warszawy, 2nd ed. (1827; reprint Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo Artystyczne i Filmowe, 1979), 155-57.
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For the next few years the building faced an uncertain future. Russian 
government authorities rented out various rooms for the benefit of the school district’s 
financial accounts. It even became the home of the Directorate of the Lottery for a short 
time. In 1857 the viceroy offered the building to be the site for the new Medical-Surgical 
Academy, but the Academy’s director found the premises unsatisfactory. On 12 January 
1865 it finally became the home for the Russian First Boys’ and Girls’ Gymnasia.54 The 
mission of the gymnasia was to educate Russian children “in the spirit of the Orthodox 
faith and Russian nationality.”55 These institutions were the first secondary schools 
designed by the Warsaw School District specifically for the Russian population. Of the 
various uses the Staszic Palace served during the partition era, its role as a secondary 
school was of the longest duration (1865-1915). Only children of Orthodox-Russian 
parents attended this school, which served to provide them with the desired “purely 
Russian comer” in Warsaw.56
54Biegariski, Palac Staszica, 75; Stefanovich, Zapiska o pervykh muzhskoi i 
zhenskoi gimnaziiakh, 11, 34; Paszkiewicz, Pod berlem Romanowdw, 79; Dmitrii V. 
Tsvetaev, “Uchrezhdeniie russkikh gimnazii v Varshave,” Zhurnal Ministerstva 
Narodnago Prosveshcheniia 24, no. 12, section 3 (1909): 162-78. Prince Vladimir A. 
Cherkaskii, the director of Internal and Religious Affairs in the Polish Kingdom, was 
crucial in founding the gymnasia.
55Stefanovich, Zapiska o pervykh muzhskoi i zhenskoi gimnaziiakh, 18. The Ukaz 
of 30 August 1864 specifically created such exclusively Russian institutions. Initially, the 
First Boys’ and Girls’ Gymnasia shared the Staszic Palace, but that was quickly deemed 
inappropriate, since boarding houses were also part of the ukaz’s requirements. The 
Girls’ Gymnasium moved to a former Basilean monastery on Miodowa street in 1865 and 
later to a building near the Plac Bankowy.
56R. E. D., “ Proshchan’e b. Popechitelia Varshavskago uchebnago okruga, A. L. 
Apukhtina s pervymi Varshavskimi gimnaziiami 2 marta 1897 goda,” Kholmsko- 
Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi vestnik, no.6,15 (27) March 1897, 108.
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Varsovian Russians were concerned that their children would become culturally 
Polish through daily interactions with Polish fellow students and neighborhood children. 
The First Boys’ and Girls’ Gymnasia were to be the foundation upon which their Russian 
nationality and Orthodox faith could be securely built. Additionally, the director of the 
First Boys’ Gymnasium, Andrei Leont’evich Stefanovich, warned of the physical dangers 
Russian children could suffer. He brought to the attention of Russian parents “one 
horrible fact, that in one of the Polish Kingdom’s gymnasia, a Russian student was nearly 
hanged by his non-Russian classmates because he was firm in his Russian and Orthodox 
convictions and did not give in to the suggestions of Polish propaganda.”57 This story 
created a picture so vivid that Russian newspapers in Warsaw would repeat it as late as 
1907.58 By omitting any specific location or date, Stefanovich created the impression that 
such instances could, and did, happen throughout the Kingdom and served to reinforce 
the image of the “dangerous and treacherous” Pole. The physical removal of Russian 
children from a Polish environment within the walls of this building promised to protect 
their physical bodies as well as their cultural identities.
Because of its significance to Poles, the Staszic Palace’s renovation poisoned any 
hopes of improved Russo-Polish relations at the end of the nineteenth century. Poles 
were displeased that the seat of Polish science and intellectual revival had become a 
Russian secondary school. The decision to transform the facade from Corazzi’s neo-
57Stefanovich, Zapiska o pervykh muzhskoi i zhenskoi gimnaziiakh, 3.
58“Pervyia Varshavskiia gimnasiia i tserkov pervoi muzhskoi gimnazii,” Nedelia 
okrainy, no. 6,16 (29) April 1907,2-6.
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Classicist to the neo-Muscovite style only added to the hostility Poles felt toward their 
overlords (see Figures 3,4, and 5). Andrei Leont’evich Stefanovich, the director of the 
Boys’ First Gymnasium, supported the facade’s transformation despite his admission that 
this building was “one of the most beautiful buildings of Warsaw.”59 This project, 
however, was not simply a plan to Russify a school building. Nor was it simply 
following the trend of applying the style deemed appropriate to religious architecture.
Not all large building projects had such a political agenda. The Warsaw Polytechnic 
Institute (1899-1902, Stefan Szyller), for example, would have fit in any Western 
European city of the period with its classically inspired style. Adopting historical 
interpretations of an era considered to be backward (especially the Muscovite) would not 
have been seriously considered for an institution producing engineers and scientists.60
What made the application of the neo-Muscovite style unusual for the Staszic 
Palace was that its primary function was not religious but educational and that it was the 
only such building to undergo such a transformation. This architectural design was 
associated primarily with churches, not schools. Other institutions, such as schools, 
orphanages, and homes for the elderly, did not acquire the external ornamentation 
evocative of Muscovy when builders added chapels or churches to them. For instance, 
the sister institution of the Boys’ First Gymnasium, the Girls’ First Gymnasium (which in 
1876 moved to a building near the Plac Bankowy), also underwent significant renovations
59Stefanovich, Zapiska o pervykh muzhskoi i zhenskoi gimnaziiakh, 11.
60Malgorzata Omilanowska, Stefan Szyller, 1857-1933, vol. 1 (Warsaw: Fundacja 
“Historia pro Futuro,” 1995), 46-47,148; Kieniewicz, Warszawa w latach 1795-1914, 
264-65; and Drozdowski and Zahorski, Historia Warszawy, 248.
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Figure 3: The Staszic Palace in its present state, according to Corrazzi’s designs. Rebuilt 
by Piotr Biegariski, 1947-50. Photo, Robert L. Przygrodzki.
Figure 4: The Staszic Palace fa?ade according to Pokrovskii. Postcard in author’s 
collection.
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Figure 5: Detail of the Staszic Palace fa?ade according to Pokrovskii. Image courtesy of 
the Center for Social Studies, Instytut Filosofii i Socjologii, Polska Akademia Nauk 
(IFiS-PAN).
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beginning in 1884 -  including the building of an Orthodox church -  but did not receive 
the same treatment. Only the interior of the church, the Holy Mother of Kazan, was “in 
the Russian style.”61 The church’s silver-framed icon of the Holy Mother of Kazan in 
particular evoked an anti-Polish sentiment. It was to remind the Russian schoolgirls “of 
the great miracle that saved Moscow and all Russia from the Polish invasion in 1612.”62 
Religious instruction in Warsaw reinforced the historical animosity between Russians and 
Poles by casting Poles as the villains deserving their present state of subjugation. This 
was a theme that gained particular coherence with the Staszic Palace.
Because of the role Tsar Vasilli Shuiskii played in Russo-Polish history, and since 
the Staszic site briefly held his remains, Warsaw’s Russian leadership had been keen on 
physically Russifying the site. The location represented for Warsaw’s Russians the nadir 
of Russian history and also the highest point of Polish history. Shuiskii came to power 
during the Time of Troubles (1589-1613) after the murder of the False Tsar Dmitrii, who 
had married a Polish woman and had the support of a large Polish retinue and army. 
Shuiskii ordered the massacre of the Poles in Moscow and fought against them during 
much of his brief reign.63 Zygmunt HI Waza (reigned 1587-1632) responded by claiming
61 Stefanovich, Zapiska o pervykh muzhskoi i zhenskoi gimnaziiakh, 26. Before 
1883, this building also housed offices. Through the assistance of Governor-General 
Gurko, the entire building came to the possession of the school.
“ Stefanovich, Zapiska o pervykh muzhskoi i zhenskoi gimnaziiakh, 26.
63Shuiskii, however, did not enjoy popular support. There were also other 
pretenders who competed for the throne. Shuiskii particularly earned the ire of Zygmunt 
III for allying himself with Sweden, because Zygmunt had been at war with Sweden in his 
dynastic claim for that throne.
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the Russian throne and embarking upon a conquest of Russia. In 1610, Shuiskii became 
hetman Stanislaw Zolkiewki’s (1547-1620) captive as Polish troops occupied Moscow. 
Shuiskii, along with his brother Dmitri and sister-in-law Catherine, was taken to Poland 
and died in captivity two years later in Gostynin Castle near Warsaw. In 1620, Zygmunt 
m  had Shuiskii’s remains brought to Warsaw and built a mausoleum in Warsaw’s outer 
limits on Krakowskie Przedmiescie where the Staszic Palace later stood.
The site, however, only briefly held Shuiskii’s remains. By 1634, with the 
conclusion of peace between Poland and Muscovy, Russian diplomats, at the request of 
the new Romanov Tsar Mikhail, brought Shuiskii’s remains to Moscow. In 1648, in a 
final gesture to the Russians, the Polish king shipped to Russia the memorial’s marble 
plaque commemorating the Polish victory over Moscow and the Shuiskii’s burial. Not 
long after, the mausoleum was tom down and the land became the site of a monastery and 
church for the Observant Dominican Order. There was no record of the existence of any 
structure resembling the “genuine, original chapel” in 1819 when the church was 
demolished.64 The land’s connection with a dead Russian tsar had been nearly forgotten 
until the early nineteenth century. Alexander I briefly mentioned the possibility of 
building a Russian Orthodox church there, and in 1816 the viceroy, General Jozef 
Zajqczek, ordered the monastery’s buildings razed with that intention. The connection 
with Shuiskii, however, had not become important enough in the early nineteenth century 
to complete such a project. The land instead became the site of the Polish Society of the 
Friends of Science’s Staszic Palace.
64Tsvetaev, Varshavskoe Obshchestvo Lubitelei Nauk i ego dom, 46.
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It was only after the Russians had appropriated the building for the boys’ and 
girls’ gymnasia and fears of the Polonization of Russian children developed that 
Shuiskii’s captivity took on critical importance. Interest in the Shuiskii narrative revived 
when the mausoleum’s ruins were uncovered after a boy was injured in the school’s 
courtyard when his leg slipped into a hole that led to the ruins’s discovery.65 The Staszic 
Palace quickly became the focal point in the Russian cultural battle with Poles to prevent 
the Polonization of Russian children by providing a useable collective memory for the 
Varsovian Russian community. The building of the pre-Petrine-inspired fagade was 
meant to insulate Russian children from the outside Polish world and create an 
environment conducive for the transmission of Russian culture. This memorial to the 
Muscovite-era tsar would remind passersby of a Russian Orthodox church which could be 
found “only in Orthodox Moscow, ancient Rostov and Great Novgorod and [which 
would] be a fitting patriotic memorial to the great devout and tsar-loving Russian 
nation.”66 The plans were the inspiration of the director of the school district, Aleksandr 
L’vovich Apukhtin (1822-1904). Throughout his career, Apukhtin was one of the most 
ardent supporters of projects that promised to further Russian culture within the Polish 
Kingdom. The Staszic Palace’s renovation was his last major effort before his retirement
65Stefanovich, Zapiska o pervykh muzhskoi i zhenskoi gimnaziiakh, 37. 
Stefanovich, the director of the school, did not provide a specific date for the accident.
66“Novyi pravoslavnyi khram v Varshave,” Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi 
vestnik, no. 18,15 (27) September 1893, 301.
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in 1897, and he actively supported it through its early stages.67 Apukhtin also organized 
charitable efforts among Russians that raised over 80,000 rubles needed for the 
renovations.68
In 1891 Stefanovich joined Apukhtin in the drive to complete the project and took 
formal control of the building committee. Under their leadership, the renovations 
followed a “Russian” national direction. The committee decided to hire the Kholm- 
Warsaw Russian Orthodox archbishopric’s architect, Vladimir Pokrovskii, to design what 
would be a completely new building.69 Pokrovskii finished his plans in 1893, and the 
planning committee sent the proposal to St. Petersburg that year for approval. In an 
attempt to bolster the project’s success, the committee added the professional views of 
University of Warsaw professor Dmitrii Tsvetaev and St. Vladimir University (Kiev) 
professor A. V. Prakhov regarding the archaeological ruins’ pedigree as Shuiskii’s 
gravesite. They also confirmed that there was a genuine chapel, the so-called Kaplica 
Moskiewska, that accompanied the mausoleum.70
In St. Petersburg, however, scholars and officials initially did not echo the 
Varsovian Russians’ enthusiastic support for the plans. The academic community
67Sidorov, Russkie i russkaia zhizn “A. L. Apukhtin (nekrolog),” Beseda no. 22, 
15 November 1903,345-46. During his term as director of the school district (1879- 
1897), Apukhtin Russified the educational system by eliminating the Polish language and 
Polish history from all schools. He thus earned the hatred of the Poles, who named his 
term in office the “Apukhtin Night.”
68“Pervyia Varshavskiia gimnasiia,” 2-6.
69Paszkiewicz, Pod beriem Romanowow, 98.
70Ibid.; Stefanovich, Zapiska opervykh muzhskoi i zhenskoi gimnaziiakh, 37.
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questioned the historical interpretations of professors Tsvetaev and Prakhov, and the 
strongest resistance to the proposal came from the archaeological committee responsible 
for the conservation of monuments. The representative of the St. Petersburg Academy of 
Fine Arts on the Ministry of Interior’s Technical Committee also voiced strong 
reservations to Apukhtin’s project. He questioned its artistic quality and the destruction 
of a major work representing Varsovian architecture. Part of the difficulties the project 
faced also resulted from a scandal caused by the Varsovian Russian leadership. In the 
rush to begin the project local officials dismantled the building’s upper stories in early
1892, before the proposal had been submitted, let alone approved. Bureaucratic 
procedures had clearly been violated. The project’s fate was uncertain until the end of
1893, when Apukhtin’s intercessions to Alexander III finally succeeded in obtaining the 
support needed to get the project approved.71
In appointing Pokrovskii as the project’s architect, Apukhtin’s committee made 
clear its intentions for the Staszic Palace. As the archdiocese’s architect, many of his 
projects had been Russian Orthodox churches that followed the neo-Muscovite style then 
popular among Russian urban planners throughout the Empire. Rather than maintaining 
Corazzi’s neo-Classical style, Pokrovskii’s intention was for the building to recall the 
Muscovite past. The most radical changes were to be made to the facade. Pokrovskii 
chose a highly ornamental style that evoked memories of Moscow’s sixteenth- and
71Sidorov, Russkie i russkaia zhizn ’, 173; Paszkiewicz, Pod berlem Romanowow,
99.
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seventeenth-century Kremlin.72 The Historical Museum of Moscow was one neo- 
Muscovite building that exerted a strong influence on the design of the renovated Staszic 
Palace. In the interior the main staircase and the old meeting hall of the defunct Polish 
Society of the Friends of Science were to undergo substantial modifications to make room 
for a large rectangular church on the second floor that would eclipse the previous chapel. 
Pavel’ A. Svedomskii was commissioned to paint the church’s main iconostasis and 
numerous other paintings in the building.73 Only the monument to Nicholas Copernicus 
on the square in front of the building would remain untouched.
Not surprisingly, the Polish response was negative. The Polish-language 
newspaper in St. Petersburg, Kraj, declared that there was no doubt that the new fa?ade 
would “strengthen national feelings” in the Russian students enrolled there.74 The 
memoirs of Ignacy Balihski unflatteringly compared the building’s ornamentation to “the 
style of the colorful towels from Iaroslavl.”75 Ultimately, Polish opinion of this project 
was best expressed by the speed with which the neo-Muscovite fa?ade was replaced by 
Corazzi’s original designs to house the Warsaw Scientific Society after the rise of an
72Bieganski, Palac Staszica, 79-80.
73“Pervyia Varshavskiia gimnasiia,” 2-6. Pavel’ Aleksandrovich Svedomskii 
(1849-1904) was known for genre and historical painting and also decorated the Vladimir 
Cathedral in Kiev.
74“Przebudowa gmacha dawnego Palacu Staszicz,” Kraj, no. 25,1894 cited in 
Paszkiewicz, Pod berlem Romanowow, 97.
75Ignacy Balinski, Wspomnienia o Warszawie (Warsaw: Pansatwowy Instytut 
Wydawniczy, 1987), 42.
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independent Polish state in 1918.76
Because Poles continued to look upon the building as important to their own 
national past, they perceived the renovations to be violations of both national dignity as 
well as good taste. In 1898, the Polish journalist Stefan Demby wrote an article in the 
Czech-language Prague paper, Slovansky Prehled, about Polish students of the Third 
Gymnasium. The photographs of these students included various Varsovian monuments 
of national importance as backdrops, including the original Staszic Palace, the Royal 
Castle with the King Zygmunt column, the Mickiewicz monument (which was only 
recently erected), and the Sobieski monument at Lazienki Park. By including Staszic, 
these Poles refused to surrender that Polish public space to the new Russian narrative. 
Russian officials recognized the political nature of the photographs and suspended the 
students.77
Local Russian officials and reporters actively supported the renovation plans and 
described the controversy over the building’s appearance as yet another great battle 
between the Russians and the Poles. The Russian press declared the project to be a 
“patriotic and holy” endeavor that commemorated a martyred Russian ruler and reacted to 
Polish hostility with the argument that the presence of Russian Orthodox churches in the 
very center of Warsaw should not upset Poles since Roman Catholic churches existed “in
76Biegahski, Palac Staszica, 80.
77Stefan Demby, Z Warszawy. Korespondencje do miesipcznika “Slovansky 
PmhlecP w Pradze w latach 1898-1914, trans. Katarzyna Bartoszewska (Warsaw: 
Biblioteka Narodowa, 1997), 8-9. Originally in Slovansky Pfiehled, no. 1, September 
1898.
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the center of the Orthodox Russian capital, on Nevskii Prospect.”78 Such arguments 
conveniently ignored the different meanings the respective buildings had under 
contemporary conditions. Roman Catholic churches in St. Petersburg served a powerless 
minority in the empire’s capital, while Russian Orthodox churches in the center of 
Russian-occupied Warsaw physically expressed Russian power over Poles.
Shuiskii’s story continued to attract the attention of Varsovian Russians even after 
the building’s completion. Since the most dramatic episode of this tsar’s history took 
place in Warsaw, he played the chief heroic role in this part of the empire. The University 
of Warsaw’s professor Dmitrii Tsvetaev became one of the important popularizers of the 
Shuiskii narrative and its relation to the Staszic location.79 His work evidenced a great 
interest in this site that briefly interred the tsar’s remains well beyond the seventeenth 
century. Through his many studies of Shuiskii and the location over the three intervening 
centuries since Shuiskii’s death, Tsvetaev fashioned a genealogy for the contemporary 
gymnasium that originated with the mausoleum. The building site’s early years as a tsar’s 
mausoleum defined its entire future; all other uses -  as the Observationist Dominicans’ 
monastery, the Polish Society of the Friends of Science, or the Russian First Boys’
78“Novyi pravoslavnyi khram v Varshave,” Kholmsko- Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi 
vestnik, no. 18,15 (27) September 1893,301.
79See Dmitrii Tsvetaev, Tsar Vasilii Shuiskii s brat’iami na Varshavskom seime 
(Warsaw: Tipografia Varshavskago uchebnago okruga, 1905); Tsar Vasilii Shuiskii i 
mesta pogrebeniia ego v Pol ’she. 1610-1910 g.g. (Warsaw: Tipografia Varshavskago 
uchebnago okruga, 1910); and “Plenenie tsaria Vasiliia Ivanovicha Shuiskago s 
brat’iami,” Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnago Prosveshcheniia 359, no. 5, section 2 
(1905): 31-49.
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Gymnasium -  were of secondary importance.80
Mitrofan P. Ustimovich was another important popularizer of the Shuiskii 
narrative and Polish perfidy during the Time of Troubles. As an archpriest (proterei) of 
the Holy Cross Cathedral, he also found these fragments of a Russian past in Poland to be 
useful pretexts for the construction of Orthodox churches. He wrote a history of the 
Gostynin Castle, some 100 kilometers west of Warsaw. As the site of Shuiskii’s 
imprisonment, death, and initial burial, it was of great interest to the Varsovian Russians. 
In the fifth (final) part of this history, Ustimovich argued in favor of the policy of building 
Orthodox churches in every district of the Polish Kingdom. However, the town of 
Gostynin, a district center, deserved priority because of the Shuiskii connection. He 
ended by declaring, “the national dignity of our state, the honor of the Russian people, 
and the precepts of the church” need it.81
Emphasizing the Staszic site’s Russianness, however, was not sufficient to the 
mission of its re-commemoration in honor of Shuiskii. Its Polish significance had to 
decline proportionately. Tsvetaev’s essay on the Staszic Palace intended to demolish the 
popular Polish myths surrounding the building and its namesake. He argued that archival 
evidence did not support the stories that Staszic donated the land to the Society of the
80Dmitrii Tsvetaev, Zakrytie Varshavskago monastyria dominikanov observantov 
(Warsaw: 1898); Dmitrii Tsvetaev, Varshavskoe Obshchestvo Liubitelei Nauk i ego dom 
(nc: np, nd?), 1, 7,31,45. In each of these pages of this rather short essay he repeated the 
Shuiskii link. See also Tsvetaev, “Uchrezhdeniie russkikh gimnazii,”173.
81M. P. Ustimovich, “Gostynskii zamok. Mesto zatocheniia, konchiny i pervoi 
vremennoi usypal’nitsy tsaria Vasiliia Ioannovicha Shuiskago. Istoricheskaia zametka 
(okonchanie),” Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi vestnikno. 19, 9 May 1899, 247-48. 
The earlier articles appeared in nos. 13,15,16, and 18.
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Friends of Science.82 The article minimized Staszic’s importance to the property, in
effect erasing him from the location’s narrative:
As far as the significance of Staszic is concerned, not only was he not its 
proprietor, but he was not even among the individuals who strove and wished to 
acquire it for themselves. The Offices of the Government Commission of 
Religious Affairs and National Enlightenment -  through whom the matter 
proceeded -  furthered this transfer as the only influential office. All the stories 
that he bought this land with [its] monastic buildings or their ruins himself and 
donated them to the Society, should be dismissed. As property of the State, not 
formerly anyone’s private property, the square was donated to the Society by the 
government itself.83
In this passage, Tsvetaev had depersonalized the donation. Because a bureaucratic 
process led to the donation, the government deserved the title of benefactor. “Social 
amnesia” on the part of the Poles was necessary for Shuiskii to play the central role in a 
Russian collective memory.
In the drive to prove the appropriate nature of their plans for the site, the 
Varsovian Russian leadership appropriated and modified the history of early seventeenth- 
centuiy Russia and Poland to suit their needs. No one questioned that the general site 
once contained the dead tsar, but leaders supporting the renovations adopted an 
interpretation of the conditions of his burial that had little support outside of Warsaw’s 
Russian community. The historian Dmitrii Tsvetaev had written on this issue and argued 
that a fully functioning church had once existed there, in part because of the common
82Tsvetaev, Varshavskoe Obshchestvo, 1-2. He was correct on many of these 
points, but the thrust of the essay attempted to lessen the building’s significance as a 
Polish national symbol.
83Ibid., 7. The individuals who managed the said office were Polish supporters of 
the Society.
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name, “the Muscovite chapel,” used in the seventeenth centmy to designate the burial 
place.84 Professor Prakhov also claimed that archaeological evidence supported the 
existence of a structure large enough for a chapel.85 Additionally, some eighteenth- 
century Russians and Poles believed an Orthodox chapel had been erected on the land at 
the time of Shuiskii’s burial, but that position had not been supported by historical and 
archaeological evidence. Polish and many other Russian scholars, who only found 
evidence of a burial crypt, rejected Tsvetaev’s and Prakhov’s claims.86 Poles and 
Russians debated this point because the question of a functioning church that held 
services for the dead tsar was important to Varsovian Russians’ political claims.
Orthodox services held on this site would have consecrated it as a spiritual part of Russia, 
commemorating a “saintly prince” who died for his country. Shuiskii could be tied to 
earlier princes such as Boris and Gleb, who died and earned a “secular sanctification.”
He became saintly because contemporary Russians re-interpreted his story as a martyr’s 
life for Russia.87
84Russian travel guides of the city regularly mentioned the Muscovite chapel when 
describing the Staszic Palace. See Akaemov, Dostoprimechatel ’nosti, 41; and Akaemov, 
Putevoditel’, 73.
85Wladyslaw Tomkiewicz, “Warszawa jako osrodek zycia artystycznego i 
intelektualnego,” in Maria Bogucka et al. eds., Warszawa w latach 1526-1795. Dzieje 
Warszawy, tom //(Warsaw: Pahstwowe Wydatnictwo Naukowe, 1984), 157; and 
Tsvetaev, Tsar Vasilii Shuiiskii i mesto pogrebeniia, 113-15.
86Tsvetaev, Tsar Vasilii Shuiskii i mesto pogrebeniia, 560; Paszkiewicz, Pod 
berlem Romanowow, 96.
87For the “saintly prince” and “secular sanctification,” see Michael Chemiavsky, 
Tsar and People: Studies in Russian Myths (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), 5- 
43.
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The tsar’s presence in Warsaw became an important means of constructing a local 
Russian history. During the 1890s Russians in Warsaw mapped out points in the city that 
had linkages, however brief, to past Russian rulers. Ustimovich tied the Romanovs to 
Warsaw with a book on the Metropolitan Filaret, the father of the first Romanov tsar, as 
another important Russian who suffered imprisonment at the hands of Poles during the 
Time of Troubles.88 Some leading Russians in Warsaw intended to commemorate these 
sites with monuments in order to represent Warsaw’s history through a Russian prism.89 
They wished not only to commemorate Shuiskii, but also to blot out the shame of their 
once having been at the mercy of the Poles. In such a fashion, they hoped the Poles 
would be made to understand that such a humiliating situation had been reversed 
permanently and that Poles would never again have supremacy over Russians. The 
surest way of clarifying the new power relationship involved erecting on the site of the 
former mausoleum a Muscovite-styled building that contained a new Orthodox church 
dedicated to serve the Russian children studying there.
Once the project had the approval of St. Petersburg, the particular symbols 
connected with the new church were designed with the contemporary political
88M. P. Ustimovich, Mitropolit Filaret i Tsar Vasilii Shuiskii vp o l’skompleny, 
(Warsaw: Tipografiia Varshvskago uchebnago okruga, 1913). F. Orlov rejected 
Ustimovich’s claim that Filaret was imprisoned in the bell tower of St. Ann’s Church 
near the Royal Castle in Warsaw. See F. Orlov, Legenda o Filarete Nikitiche, 1614- 
1615, 3rd ed. (Petrograd: Tip. T-va A. S. Suvorina, 1915).
89A. A. Sidorov, Russkie gosudari v Varshave. (Warsaw: Artisticheskaia 
Tipografiia Satumika Sikorskago, 1897). This 28-page pamphlet served as something of 
a guidebook to the various sites connecting Shuiskii, Peter I, and the modem tsars to 
Warsaw.
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environment in mind. Before the renovation, the school had a small chapel on the second 
floor dedicated to Saints Cyril and Methodius, the monks who had introduced 
Christianity and literacy to the Eastern Slavic world. The new church was larger and 
employed some of the most popular icon artists of the day. Intending it to be the home of 
Russian students in Warsaw, Apukhtin used the Smolnyi Institute of St. Petersburg as a 
model. He dedicated the church in the name of St. Tatiana, whose day of observance 
coincided with the opening of the First Boys’ and Girls’ Gymnasia. The choice of 
Tatiana also created a connection between the third-century Christian martyr who refused 
to bring offerings to pagan gods and the Russian tsar Shuiskii who was martyred in his 
fight against the Poles.90
The bells in the church’s towers sent a distinct political message to both the city’s 
Russians as well as the Poles. The largest bell bore the images of two saints, Basil the 
Great and Alexander Nevskii, Prince of Novgorod (1218-63). Russian leaders intended 
to recall the ancient roots of the Orthodox Church by using the image of St. Basil the 
Great, one of the Church Fathers of the fourth century. St. Basil connected modem 
Russia to the Byzantine (Eastern Roman) Empire, offering a cultural lineage as ancient as 
the western one claimed by Poles. The name also made a direct connection with Shuiskii 
-  Vasilii is the Russian version of Basil. In choosing Nevskii, Russian officials employed 
a symbol of Russian might. Nevskii was a popular saint not long after his death and was
90See I. Bukharev, Zhitiia vsekh sviatykh prazsnuemykh pravoslavnoiu greko- 
rossiiskoiu tserkoviiu. (Moscow: Tip. T-va I. D. Sytina, 1896), 30-31.
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memorialized for his victory over the Swedes on the Neva River in 1240.91 It should be 
remembered that both Sweden and Poland invaded Russia during the Time of Troubles 
and also that the Polish Waza (Vasa) kings were themselves Swedes who claimed the 
Swedish throne.92 The bell bearing the images of Saints Basil and Nevskii also bore the 
phrase: “God is with us. Understand this pagans.” The same words appeared on a 
monument to fallen Russian soldiers in Warsaw’s Wola district erected in 1847.93 Here 
was a clear warning to Poles that Russian power could not be extinguished.
The other bells indicated that the traumatic national experience of the Time of 
Troubles had been reversed, because divine favor had been bestowed upon Russia and its 
rulers. The next largest bell bore reliefs of St. Tatiana the Martyr and St. Nicholas the 
Miracle Worker, the latter being an obvious reference to the heir apparent, Nicholas. 
Apukhtin made a point of noting in his 1893 proposal for the project that there would be a 
chapel dedicated to St. Nicholas in thanks for the “miracle” that saved the life of the then- 
prince Nicholas on a visit to Japan in 1891. The patrons of the old school chapel, Cyril
91Pawel Klimow, “Ikonografia Aleksandra Newskiego w religijnym malarstwie 
rosyj skim XIX i pocz^tku XX wieku. O Zwi^zkach kultu, kultury, i polityki w sztuce 
rosyjskiej,” in Dariusz Konstantynow, Robert Piaseczny, Piotr Paszkiewicz, eds., 
Nacjonalizm w Sztuce i historii sztuki 1789-1950 (Warsaw: Instytut Sztuki-Polska 
Akademia Nauk, 1998), 117-26.
92Warsaw also owed its status as the capital to Zygmunt III, who made it his 
permanent seat. Additionally, the Column of Zygmunt III, across from the Royal Castle, 
marks the beginning of Krakowskie Przedmiescie, while the Staszic Palace is its end.
93Piotr Paszkiewicz, “Pomniki carskie na zachodnich rubiezach Imperium 
Rosyjskiego i ich tresci ideowe,” Przeglqd wschodni 7, no. 1 (2000): 133-34. The 
monument commemorated the Russians who defeated the Poles during the November 
1830-31 Uprising.
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and Methodius, made their appearance on the third largest bell. In all, the bell tower held 
ten bells, and was completed in October 1897.94 In early March 1898 the iconostases 
were completed.
So important was the renovation of the First Boys’ Gymnasium that it earned the 
attention of the emperor himself. Alexander Ill’s support of the renovation plans saved 
them from a bureaucratic death and put the project’s construction on a fast track.
Although Alexander III died (1894) before he could visit Warsaw to see the project, it did 
become a part of Nicholas II’s itinerary on his official state visit to Warsaw in September 
1897. The tour of the new school building took place on 22 August (3 September) in the 
afternoon. As with many official state occasions, all the school officials gathered, the 
students sang, banners and flags waved, and flowers flooded the building to greet 
Nicholas II and Alexandra. The Imperial Couple toured the unfinished church, where 
artists were still painting the frescoes.95
Nicholas’s presence represented the Russian response to the exile and death of 
Shuiskii under Polish control nearly three centuries before. By visiting the memorial to a 
predecessor’s suffering and death, Nicolas II acted as the participant in the final chapter 
of the Shuiskii narrative constructed by Varsovian Russians. The first Romanov tsar, 
Mikhail, began the process of correcting the wrong that Poles had done to Shuiskii by
94Tsvetaev, Tsar Vasilii Shuiskii i mesto pogrebeniia, 555; Paszkiewicz, Pod 
berlem Romanowow, 100-1.
95“Prebyvanie Ikh Imperatorskikh Velichestv v Varshave,” Kholmsko-Varshavskii 
eparkhial’nyi vestnik, no. 17,1 (13) September 1897,310; “Prebyvanie Ikh 
Imperatorskikh Velichestv v Varshave,” Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 224,23 August (4 
September) 1897,1.
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bringing his remains back to Moscow. Nicholas closed the narrative by coming to the 
building that commemorated Shuiskii’s suffering and his fight against the Poles. As the 
Russian ruler of Poland, he personified the message of the renovation: Russia would 
never again be at the mercy of Poland.
The following year, on 3 (15) November 1898, the Orthodox Church’s 
Archbishop Ieronim consecrated the gymnasium’s church of St. Tatiana the Martyr. 
Smaller celebrations had been held during construction to consecrate the erection of the 
cross and the placement of the bells. At this celebration of the project’s completion the 
leading proponents of the renovation, Apukhtin and Stefanovich, were prominent, as was 
most of the leadership of the Congress Kingdom; governor-general Aleksandr 
Imeretinskii, the rectors of the University and Polytechnic Institute, and the rest of the 
civil and military leadership all attended. (Oddly, no mention was made of Sokrates 
Staiynkevich, the President of Warsaw).96
The important role of the Orthodox Church in the education of Russian children 
naturally became a part of the celebrations. Children of mixed marriages, impoverished 
families, and orphans were declared to be the ones who would benefit from the increased 
attention to education instituted by the leaders of the school district and the Congress 
Kingdom. The new building and its church were the physical indicators of this attention
96“Torzhestvo osviashcheniia khrama Varshavskoi i muzhskoi gimnazii,” 
Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi vestnik, no. 22, 15 (27) November 1898, 452. 
Starynkevich was not popular with Russian officials, in part because he succeeded in 
making himself the only genuinely loved Russian among the Polish population.
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to Russian children. The primary focus of those participating, however, was political.97
The other purpose of the 1898 gathering was to memorialize the temporary burial 
place of Tsar Vasilii Shuiskii, his brother Dmitrii, and the latter’s wife, Catherine. The 
Russian press quoted conservative Nicholas Karamzin98 (1766-1826) as an authority on 
the period, describing Shuiskii’s life as “disastrous but not inglorious.” The new church 
served to remind Russians and Poles that Russia’s period of suffering was in the past and 
would not be repeated. The archpriest’s speech did not concern itself with the spiritual 
education of Russian youth as much as it did with commemorating Shuiskii’s memory 
and the appropriateness of a Muscovite-styled church as the physical means of that 
commemoration. The emphasis on Shuiskii and the building’s neo-Muscovite style 
exposed the building’s purpose.99 The school and church did not simply fill an 
institutional gap that the Russian community needed for its own functioning. Varsovian 
Russians wanted to legitimize their presence, warn the Poles, and protect their sense of 
“Russianness” in their own community.
The event also served to strengthen the propagandists connection between the 
three nineteenth-century Russian emperors with the site. The speakers interpreted the 
link that Alexander I, Alexander n, and Alexander III had with the former burial site as
97“Torzhestvo osviashcheniia khrama,” 450-52.
98Nicholas Karamzin created a publishing phenomenon in the early nineteenth 
century when his multi-volume History o f the Russian State was published and sold out 
in a matter of weeks. This work created intense debates and had an immediate effect on 
Russia’s intellectual and literary environment.
" “Torzhestvo osviashcheniia khrama,” 451-52.
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battles against the Poles. Because Alexander I thought it would be appropriate to build a 
church to commemorate Shuiskii’s burial on the location, authorities razed the old 
Dominican church in 1816. Russian authorities in Warsaw at the end of the century had 
every reason to believe that they were finally executing Alexander I’s plans, noting that 
“the wishes of our Sovereign [to build a church at this site] were not fulfilled at that 
time.”100 Speakers at the consecration invoked Alexander El’s name with the reminder 
that the building became the First Boy’s Gymnasium during his reign. That institution, 
they pointed out, benefitted Russian education rather than Polish enlightenment. Finally, 
speeches also pointed to Alexander III as the patron of the current project.101 In 1904 
Russian officials made their final contribution to the Staszic Palace’s “Russification” 
after the death of the director Apukhtin by utilizing it as a space for public mourning. 
Russian school authorities placed the catafalque underneath the arcade at the front of the 
building for the public viewing of Apukhtin’s remains.102
The political importance of the architectural project continued beyond the 
Revolution of 1905. The Russian nationalist Octobrist Party103 editors of Nedelia okrainy 
reminded their readers that “the bell of our Orthodox temple drones and tells the long sad 
story of the Russian tsar’s imprisonment, through his death, to the liberated Rus’ which
100Sidorov, Russkiie gosudari, 28.
101“Torzhestvo osviashcheniia khrama,” 450-52.
I02Paszkiewicz, Pod berlem Romanowow, 100.
103The Octobrist party was a nationalist party that supported the imperial 
concessions offered by the October Manifesto during the 1905 Revolution and argued 
against further liberalization.
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then imprisoned Poland for all ages.”104 They redefined Shuiskii’s captivity: no longer 
the nadir of Russia’s history, it had become the legitimator of the contemporary political 
situation. Poland had committed a “crime” by imprisoning a Russian tsar, and that crime 
led to Poland’s punishment in the form of its own imprisonment under Russian control.
The theme of historical judgement made in stone continued through the turn of the 
century into the final years of Russian occupation in Warsaw. Along with the Staszic 
renovations, the Russian administration embarked upon a new construction that 
proclaimed a similar verdict upon the Poles. The St. Alexander Nevskii Cathedral 
reminded all the residents of Russia’s predominance in the region. Rather than being a 
tolerated Orthodox community in an independent Poland, the Orthodox minority defined 
the terms of the relationship with the Catholic Polish majority.
The Aleksandr Nevskii Cathedral
The St. Alexander Nevskii Cathedral was another project with explicitly political 
intentions that far outstripped its sacral functions. The anti-Polonism behind its 
construction was not perceived by only Poles reading between the lines of Imperial 
policies. It was explicit, and noted as such in the Varsovian Russian press. The Octobrist 
weekly, Nedelia okrainy, declared that
The nation does not write its history in only one book. It also writes it each time
in hand-crafted memorials as soon as relations between nations are definitively
104“O meste pervoi usypal’nitsy Tsaria Vasiliia Ioannovicha Shuiskago,” Nedelia 
okrainy, no. 3,26 March (8 April) 1907,2.
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set. Thus have Russo-Polish relations been written for the ages, and as a result of
this law, so has been bom our new Orthodox cathedral, which has a right to exist
as a historical memorial for ages.105
The religious mission of the Nevskii Cathedral vanished in the face of the political 
imperative of reminding Poles that they had permanently lost their independence, and that 
a Russian Tsar would reign indefinitely over Warsaw. The building was the embodiment 
of Russia’s victory over an ancient foe.
The cathedral also indicated the maturation or revival of Orthodoxy in Poland. 
Rather than being an imperialist import, Russian apologists claimed that Orthodoxy had 
always existed in the western borderland. Along with the Orthodox Ruthenians of the 
eastern reaches of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Orthodox rite had left its 
mark within the ethnic terrain of the Poles. The Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi listok drew 
lines that tied past Orthodox believers to the contemporary Russian Orthodox diocese of 
Warsaw. One article began the history of the diocese by describing the first Orthodox 
churches in the Commonwealth, the majority of which were Greek Orthodox churches 
serving Greeks who “fled the horrors of the Turks.” 106 By the nineteenth century, the 
“Greek temples in Warsaw, Kalisz, and other places have transformed into Russian 
[Orthodox temples].107 During Poland’s early modem period, the presence of important 
aristocratic families (Leszczynski, Sanguszko, Sapieha, and others) who continued to
105“Sobor Russkago zapada,” Nedelia okrainy, no. 1,12 (25) March 1907,2.
106A. N. “Kratkii ocherk istorii Varshavskoi eparkhii,” Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi 
listok no. 14,1 August 1908,114-19.
107A. N. “Nachalo khristianstva v Pol’she,” Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi listok no.
15,16 August 1908,127.
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support Othodoxy and its monasteries, even after the Union of Brest (1596), provided 
evidence of Orthodoxy’s persistence in the face of growing Catholic hostility.108 Moving 
further back in time, the author argued that Orthodoxy even originated among the earliest 
Polish rulers. He noted that, “it is known that the first temples built in Poland were of the 
Greek type,” and that Pope Adrian II had conferred the title “Apostles to all the Slavic 
lands” to Sts. Cyril and Methodius.109 Another writer declared that the ancient Polish 
tribes “had originally worshiped the Orthodox faith,” and thus, the new cathedral even 
bore importance to Poles.110 Because the origins of Christianity in Poland were of the 
Orthodox (or Greek) Rite, Russian polemists suggested that the Poles, like all Slavs, 
really should have been Orthodox. Rather than an alien and unwelcome intrusion, 
Russians could assert that “there has always been a living and active Orthodox” Church 
community in Poland. The Nevskii Cathedral possessed a genealogy that could even 
claim the earliest Polish Christians.111
108Those Orthodox bishops in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth who resisted 
both Constantinopolitan and Muscovite ecclesiastic authority turned to the Papacy for 
support. In exchange for accepting Papal authority, these churches would maintain the 
Eastern rite and their own ecclesiastic hierarchy. The result was the creation of the Greek 
Catholic (Uniate) church. Not all the bishops accepted the Union, despite royal support, 
and they had powerful supporters, particularly in the wojewoda of Kiev, Prince Konstanty 
Vasyl Ostrogski. The result was a schism within Orthodoxy of those who accepted papal 
authority, and those who did not.
109A. N. “Nachalo khristianstva,” 125.
110A. K., “Pravoslavnyi sobor v Varshave,” Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi 
vestnik no. 11,1 (13) June 1893,178-79.
lnA. N. “Nachalo khristianstva,” 127; “O pravoslavii v Pol’she,” Varshavskii 
eparkhial’nyi listok no. 1, 1 January 1912, 7-10; R.E.D., “Nachalo khristianstva v Pol’she 
i stepen ego posleduiushchago rasprostaneniia v pervonachal’nuiu epokhu
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
209
The choice of location for the church provided an opportunity to emphasize the 
existing political realities of Russian imperial power in the city. Saxon Square (Plac 
Saski) was centrally located, with the Teatr Wielki, the Royal Castle, the Stare Miasto, 
and the prominent hotels-the Bristol and the Europejski (which rested along one side of 
the square) all accessible within a short walk. Anyone with business in the city’s center 
was likely to pass by and at least catch a glimpse of the building or its high bell tower.
The square formed the foreground for the Saxon Palace, built during the eighteenth 
century by the Wettin Elector-King of Saxony and Poland, August II. After the Third 
Partition of Poland, Warsaw briefly fell to the Prussians, and the palace served the 
Prussian military forces. With the conclusion of the Congress of Vienna, Poland was tied 
to Russia through the Romanov dynasty and the location became the home of the Warsaw 
Military district’s offices. On 29 November 1841 an obelisk (designed by Antonio 
Corazzi) was erected in the square’s center to honor the Polish generals who died at the 
hands of insurgents during the November Uprising of 1830-31 because of their loyalty to 
Nicholas I. This obelisk was moved to the Plac Zielony (now Plac Dqbrowskiego) for
sushchestvovaniia Pol’skago gosudarstva. Sochinenie Anatoliia Sakovicha. Vil’na. 
1892,” Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi vestnik no. 2,15 (27) January 1893,28-29. 
The last is a book review that declared the importance of the question of Polish ritual 
observance (Greek or Latin) due to the need of Poles to become “closer to other Slavic” 
peoples. The interest in the question among Russians was to assert that Poles originally 
were Orthodox and the best hope for their future was a return to Orthodoxy. These 
articles also ignored the rather fluid nature of early medieval Christianity. The Polish 
tribes accepted Christianity well before the Schism of 1054 had split the Roman West and 
the Orthodox East. The differences in ritual were still perceived as variations within one 
universal Church.
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this cathedral,112
To the west of the square and palace were the Saxon Gardens (Ogrod Saski),
which were opened to the public in 1727 and became one of the central public spaces of
Warsaw. “Located in the very center of the city,” wrote the Pole Wiktor Gomulicki, “this
public garden fused with Warsaw’s fate so much so that it would be difficult for a true
Varsovian to live without it.”113 The massive domes of the cathedral rose over the palace
arcades that framed the eastern edge of the gardens (see Figures 6 and 7). The view they
created forced upon Gomulicki’s “true Varsovian” the reminder that the city’s masters
were Russian, and not Polish.
As in the case of other Russian Orthodox churches in Warsaw, the Nevskii
Cathedral partially Russifed the city’s appearance and marked out just where Russia
began, and where the rest of Europe ended. In an appeal to Muscovites (for donations),
Russian leaders in Warsaw declared,
This church, due to its location in a frontier region, should majestically and 
proudly raise its cupolas and golden cross over the Russian people to declare that 
Orthodox Russia supports them in their faith. By its very presence . . .  the 
Russian Church declares to the world. . .  that in the western borderlands along the 
Vistula River, the mighty Orthodox reign has irrevocably taken root.114
After the partial completion of the cathedral, one journalist echoed that sentiment, stating
112Piotr Paszkiewicz, “The Russian Orthodox Cathedral of Saint Alexander 
Nevsky in Warsaw. From the Histoiy of Polish-Russian Relations,” Polish Art Studies 14 
(1992): 63-71.
113Gomulicki, Przewodnikpo Warszawie, 18.
114AGAD, Kancelaria General-Gubematora Warsawskiego, sygn. 6469. See also 
A. K., “Pravoslavnyi sobor v Varshave, Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi vestnik, no. 
11,1(13) June 1893,178.
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Figure 6: The Nevskii Cathedral and Bell Tower as seen from the Saxon Gardens. 
Postcard in author’s collection.
Figure 7: The St. Alexander Nevskii Cathedral. Postcard, 1920, in author’s collection.
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that “Old Orthodox Rus’ has risen again in Warsaw” in the form of this cathedral’s 
interior.115 The Orthodox diocesan paper declared in 1913 that “under the dome of this 
magnificent temple we find ourselves on Russian soil.”116 From the project’s inception, 
the power and glory of Orthodoxy and of imperial might were intertwined. Announcing 
to Russians, foreigners, and to Poles that Russia belonged in this region, the cathedral 
also symbolized the permanence of the Russian nation and of Orthodoxy in Poland. 
Despite the population’s Catholicism, Orthodoxy had “taken root” because of the 
presence of the church and the state that built it.
The relationship between Orthodoxy and Slavic nations became an important 
factor in defining the differences between the Poles and the Russians. In Russian 
intellectual circles of the mid-nineteenth century, the Slavophiles had argued that 
Orthodoxy was the Christian rite naturally suited to the Slavic peoples. The words 
“Russian” and “Orthodox” had become synonymous.”117 Likewise, the words “Pole” and 
“Catholic” had become nearly interchangeable to Russian authorities who had learned to 
distrust the Poles for their persistent desire for and actions in the name of Polish
115“Sobor Russkago zapada,” 3.
116“Varshavskaia eparkhiia istekshem 1912 godu,” Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi 
listok, no. 1, 1 January 1913 (OS),ll.
117A.K., “Pravoslavnyi sobor v Varshave, Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi 
vestnik, no. 11,1 (13) June 1893,179. See also Andrzej Walicki, The Slavophile 
Controversy: History o f a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought 
(Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1989); and Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, Russia 
and the West in the Teaching o f the Slavophiles: A Study ofRomantic Ideology 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952).
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independence.118 In the opinion of Russian officials, Poles had condemned their future 
because they had relinquished the true faith of the Slavs. By the turn of the century, 
Russian identity had developed strong connections with Orthodoxy. These sentiments 
reverberated in the written descriptions of the Nevskii cathedral. The pealing bells of the 
cathedral reminded residents “that all Catholic Slav [nations] lost their independence, 
while the Orthodox Slavs preserved theirs.” By abandoning its true Slavic nature for 
Catholicism, Poland faced “destruction in a German sea.”119 Furthermore, in the eyes of 
the Russians, the corresponding message for Russians was that their nation’s greatness 
was closely tied to Russian Orthodoxy.
Russian imperialist discourse regularly tied empire with Orthodoxy, particularly in 
Poland with its hostile Polish Catholic priests. Representations of the emperor as the 
Orthodox tsar had long been a vital part of imperial ideology. The close relationship 
between church and state created the logic for the construction of such a large building as 
the Nevskii Cathedral. Governor-General Iosif V. Gurko, the chief proponent of the 
project, wrote in his report to the Tsar in 1889 that “the existing [Orthodox] churches . . .  
suggest that they are part of a barely tolerated” religion, and not the splendid state religion 
of the empire. He further noted that the exteriors of the existing churches “do not
U8Weeks, Nation and State, 55-56.
119“Sobor Russkago zapada,” 2. This article’s author rather disingenuously placed 
Russia in the role of protector of Poles from the Germans, conveniently ignoring the vital 
role of Russia in destroying the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
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correspond to the greatness and power of the Orthodox creed.”120 In 1893 he declared 
that “looking upon the present Orthodox temples in Warsaw is painful and distressing for 
the religious and national feelings of the Russian person.”121 In his eyes, the dignity of 
the Russian state and the Russian nation demanded that grand Orthodox buildings 
dominate the skylines of all the empire’s major cities. The fact that the Russian Orthodox 
Church served a small population in Warsaw made little difference, since it represented 
the state.
The historical relationship that Russia had with Poland was also reflected in the 
Nevskii site. Not only was this terrain now Russian, but the presence of grand Russian 
Orthodox architecture was a historical judgement upon the Poles, with the Russians 
serving as the executioners. Russian journalists in the Polish Kingdom wrote that the end 
of the “suffering forced upon the West Russian people by the Polish government in 
Warsaw [the old Commonwealth]. . .  is sufficient reason for raising in Warsaw a 
monumental church testifying to the greatness of Russia.”122 The long history of 
antagonism between the Polish state and Muscovy continued after the Polish Partitions in 
the form of the recurring anti-Russian Polish uprisings. Russian officials took Poland’s 
current state of subordination to Russia, Germany, and Austria as a historical judgement
120A. Powierza, “Z dziejow soboru prawoslawnego w Warszawie (Ze zrodel 
archiwalnych),” Droga, no. 3, 1924, cited in Paszkiewicz, “The Russian Orthodox 
Cathedral,” 65.
121“Vozzvanie,” Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi vestnik, no. 11,1 (13) June 
1893,169.
122A. K., “Pravoslavnyi sobor v Varshave, Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi 
vestnik, no. 11,1 (13) June 1893, 180.
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for Polish perfidy vis-a-vis Russia. Russia’s past suffering at Polish hands was to be paid 
with Polish shame in the present through Russian monumental architecture in the Polish 
capital.
The selection of Alexander Nevskii as the patron of the cathedral bore specific 
political meanings in Russia and abroad. In choosing him, Russian officials opted for a 
symbol of Russian power. He was a member of the ruling Riurikid dynasty that ruled the 
principalities of medieval Rus’ and later gained popularity as the defender of Orthodox 
Russia against an aggressive Catholic West. Shortly after his death, Nevskii became a 
popular saint and was commemorated for his victory over the Swedes on the Neva River 
in 1240. Under Peter the Great, Nevskii gained official support as Russia’s protector 
against its traditional enemies and became the patron saint of Peter’s new city. Thus, 
Nevskii symbolized Russian strength when facing its enemies, and Russian officials used 
his image wherever they intended to leave an impression of Russian power. During the 
nineteenth century, Russian authorities erected numerous churches dedicated to Nevskii 
in the western borderlands, Europe, and even China.123
Additionally, secular and religious officials made note of the shared name of the 
saint and three nineteenth-century Russian emperors on occasions commemorating 
churches connected to Nevskii. Noting that “the name Alexander is a glorious and sacred
123Pawel Klimow, “Ikonografia Aleksandra Newskiego w religijnym malarstwie 
rosyjskim XIX i pocz^tku XX wieku,” 117-26. Among the locations where churches 
dedicated to Nevskii existed were: Sevastopol, Tampere (Finland), Reval (Estonia), Riga, 
Warsaw, Lodz (Poland), Sofia (Bulgaria), Copenhagen, Hankow (China), Paris, 
Jerusalem, and the island of Athos. For more on Russian politics and church construction 
see, Piotr Paszkiewicz, W shizbie Imperium Rosyjskiego, 1721-1917 (Warsaw: Instytut 
Sztuki-Polska Akademia Nauk, 1999).
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name in our national history,” religious leaders could point to the ways in which 
Alexander I, Alexander II, and Alexander HI continued the Nevskii legacy by protecting 
and defending Russia.124 The message would have been clear to Poles. Just as Alexander 
Nevskii defeated Russia’s enemies from the West many centuries before, so the modem 
Alexanders had kept a rebellious Poland in its place. The cathedral was a reminder that 
the Russian state had defeated the Poles twice, during the uprisings of 1831 and 1863, 
and that any future rebellions would meet with a similar fate.
Because of the symbolic importance of Nevskii’s name, this was not the first 
church in Warsaw to bear the name of the medieval Russian prince. The earliest Russian 
Orthodox church named thus was the military church consecrated in the Citadel on 26 
November 1835 (OS). It was a church that served the soldiers stationed there. Unlike the 
churches of the second half of the nineteenth century, it was built in a classical style 
designed by the Polish architect Andrzej Goloriski.125 Although it was in a military 
setting appropriate for such a warrior saint, its hidden location within the Citadel and its 
utilitarian function did not fulfill the symbolic importance of its namesake. When the 
Russian Orthodox eparchy of Warsaw was created in 1837, the Catholic church that was 
converted to serve as the cathedral was initially to bear Nevskii’s name, although it
124“ Zakladka novago pravoslavnago sobomago khrama v Varshave 30 avgusta 
1894 g.,” Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi vestnik, no. 17,1 (13) September 1894, 
277.
125A. N., “Kratkii ocherk istorii Varshavskoi eparkhii,” Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi 
listok, no. 14,1 August 1908, 115; Paszkiewicz, Pod berlem, 53-54.
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finally received the patronage of the Holy Trinity.126 The other church to bear Nevskii’s 
name was on the Lazienki Palace grounds. Its size and location, which was somewhat 
removed from the city center and in a park setting, reduced its potential for political 
symbolism. It served the imperial family when they visited Warsaw.
The building committee intended to make the new Nevskii cathedral one of the 
great projects of the turn of the century.127 They invited numerous prominent architects, 
including L. N. Benois, G. I. Kotov, M. P. Preobrazhenskii, A. V. Pomerantsev, A. F. 
Prakhov, and V. M. Chagin, to submit proposals for the competition. Committee member 
N. N. Medem presented the proposals to Grand Duke Vladimir Aleksandrovich, the 
President of the Academy Fine Arts, with the intention of gaining Imperial patronage. On 
18 January 1894, Governor-General Gurko received a rescript informing him that the 
emperor favored Leonti N. Benois’s sketches.128 Subsequently, the committee named 
Benois of the Imperial Academy of Fine Arts in St. Petersburg architect. Benois’s 
previous work included various other imperial projects, including the Russian Orthodox 
churches in the German cities of Hamburg and Dortmund, a hippodrome in Paris, and the
126Ustimovich, Varshavskii pravoslavnyi kafedral’nyi, 25.
127The committee’s membership was: Baron N. N. Medem, Iu. A. Andreev, K. V. 
Bozhovskii, A. P. Vorontsov-Vel’iaminov, A. P. Vemander, I. V. Bnevskii, N. V. 
Kleigel’s, N. V. Bibikov, K. M. Chekhovich, M. Ia. Zhakhanovich, and A. T. 
Timanovskii (the Committee’s project manager, cheln-deloproizvoditel’). See “Zakladka 
novago pravoslavnago sobomago khrama v Varshave, Kholmsko-Varshavskii 
eparkhial’nyi vestnik no. 17,1 (13) September 1894,280.
128Shingarev, “K osviashcheniiu,” 148.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
219
State Bank building in Warsaw. The Holy Synod granted its approval early in 1894.129
The Nevskii cathedral was marked by the traditional five cupolas and a separate 
bell tower that rose seventy meters into Warsaw’s skyline. It had a square footprint with 
a portico on three sides. Five large entrances decorated with mosaics invited up to 2,500 
worshipers. Sandstone created the smooth exteriors, and mosaic images filled the outer 
top arcades above the doors. The doors were made of copper-decorated oak after the 
style of the twelfth-century St. Sophia Cathedral of Novgorod. The bell tower was only 
“two sazhens shorter than the bell tower of Ivan the Great in Moscow.” Benois drew his 
inspiration for this building from various twelfth-century Russian churches in the 
Byzantine style such as St. Georgii’s Church in Iurev, the Dmitrovskii Cathedral, and the 
famous Dormition Cathedral in Vladimir, which became a model for Moscow’s 
Uspenskii cathedral in the fifteenth century.130 The surrounding three- to four-storey 
buildings consisted of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century baroque and neo-classical 
styles. Benois made no attempt to fit the building into Warsaw’s neo-classical 
architectural landscape. Saxon Square would become a fenced garden completely 
surrounding the cathedral, thus further setting it apart from the location.131 The jarring
129Paszkiewicz, Pod berlem, 120; Paszkiewicz, “The Russian Orthodox Church,” 
67. Paszkiewicz notes a Panslavic political message in this project. While there are 
certainly some such elements in the thinking of the project’s supporters, he is overstating 
its significance. Panslavic Russian nationalists could also be worrisome to government 
officials, many of whom still thought in dynastic terms rather than in nationalistic ones.
130V. Shingarev, “K osviashcheniiu,” 148-49; “Pravoslavnyi sobor v Varshave,” 
Varshavskii dnevnik no. 57,2 (14) March 1894,1-2. A sazhen is approximately 7 feet.
131Akaemov, Dostoprimechatel’nosti, 29.
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nature of the view created by the building broadcast the message that Russians were the 
permanent masters of Poland.
In 1900 a separate Artistic Commission formed to determine the interior’s 
iconographic program and decoration. Its members were Benois, N. V. Pokrovskii, the 
director of the Institute of Archaeology in St. Petersburg, and P. P. Chistakov, professor 
of the Imperial Academy of Fine Arts.132 One of its goals was to create “one of the 
exceptional monuments of Russian art” in Warsaw.133 While ostensibly guided by 
theological and artistic concerns, the commissioners formulated a distinct imperialist 
message with the choices that they made in designing the church. As in the case of the 
boys’ gymnasium, St. Nicholas the Miracle Worker and Saints Cyril and Methodius 
figured prominently. The commissioners dedicated one of the side chapels to St. 
Nicholas, who not only was the namesake of Emperor Nicholas EL, but also served as a 
link between the Orthodox Russians and the ancient church. For the other side chapel the 
designers chose the names of the apostles to the Slavs.134 The conversion of much of the 
Slavic world to Eastern Orthodoxy had marked that region’s incorporation into the 
Byzantine Commonwealth.135 The choices of St. Nicholas, as well as Cyril and 
Methodius, highlighted the Russians’ correct historical path and the Russian ruler’s
132Paszkiewicz, Pod berlem Romanowow, 125.
133“Novyi pravoslavnyi sobor v Varshave,” Varshavskii eparhial’nyi listok, no. 6, 
16 March 1910,90.
134 Paszkiewicz, Pod berlem Romanowow, 135.
135Dimitri Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe 500-1453 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1971).
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legitimacy in a region that was Slavic but Catholic and non-Byzantine. Because both the 
Staszic Palace and Nevskii Cathedral used the same images, the political message was 
only reinforced.
The selection of saints on the interior walls of the Nevskii Cathedral also sent the 
Poles a political message. Among the many saints’ images were the earliest Russian 
saints, Olga and Vladimir, rulers who introduced Christianity to Kievan Rus’. The 
images of the Late Roman Emperor Constantine and his mother, St. Helena, reinforced 
Russian Imperial rhetoric that imagined the tsars as inheritors of the first Christian 
emperor. St. Andrei Bogoliubskii and the popular Sts. Boris and Gleb, who were the first 
Russian martyrs, were examples of the Russian saintly prince. Important Russian 
religious figures also graced these walls. Antonii Pecherskii, the founder (in 1054) of 
Kiev’s Pecherskaia Lavra (Monastery), and Sergei of Radonezh (13197-92), founder of 
the Holy Trinity-Sergius Lavra in Sergiev Posad, were saints who helped to spread the 
influence of Russian Orthodoxy and monasticism. Sergei of Radonezh advocated 
resistance to the Mongols and blessed Prince Dmitrii Donskoi before the Battle at 
Kulikovo Pole in 1380. The Romanovs maintained a strong link with his monastery 
through frequent pilgrimages to the Holy Trinity Monastery, especially after their 
coronations.136 Thus, the building’s iconographic program helped to set the stage for the 
performance of imperial politics.
The construction of the Nevskii Cathedral offered a number of opportunities to
136Paszkiewicz, Pod berlem Romanowow, 132-36; Wortman, Scenarios o f Power, 
231,364. For Sergei of Radonezh, see David B. Miller, “The Cult of Saint Sergius of 
Radonezh and Its Political Uses,” Slavic Review 52, no. 4 (Winter 1993): 680-99.
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present official and religious ceremonies in Warsaw’s streets. The first such event was 
the ground-breaking on 2 June 1894. The Russian Orthodox Archbishop Flavian, with 
the assistance of numerous church officials, blessed the work site. Among the 
participants were various civil and military officials, the notable absence being an ill 
Governor-General Gurko. Despite the rain, a large crowd attended to see the archbishop 
symbolically begin the work on the foundation by putting spade to earth.137
On 30 August 1894, St. Alexander Nevskii’s Day, officials performed the rituals 
for laying the cornerstone. The events began with religious services in the Holy Trinity 
Cathedral a short distance away. At the end of the services, processions of the cross from 
all the city’s other Orthodox churches arrived.138 The priests who led the processions 
entered the Holy Trinity for further prayers, and upon their completion, all the individual 
processions formed one great religious procession from the Holy Trinity Cathedral to the 
building site. It began on ulica Miodowa, proceeded south along Krakowskie 
Przedmiescie, and finally turned west onto Saxon Square. Along the way the participants 
were greeted by rows of soldiers, a military band, and crowds of observers. At the work 
site, a wooden pavilion decorated with exotic plants and oak garlands with flowers had 
been set up for the chief dignitaries. Much of Warsaw’s civil and military elites attended,
137Shingarev, “K osviashcheniiu,” 149.
138“V vysokotorzhestvennyi den’ tezoimenitstva Evo Imperatorskago Velichestva 
Gosudaria Imperatora Aleksandra Aleksandrovicha, 30-go cego avgusta, budet 
covershena torzhestvennaia zakladka zdaniia novago prvavoslavnago sobora v g. 
Varshave, na Saksonskoi ploshchadi,” Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi vestnik no. 
16,15 (27) August 1894,258-59. This article also lists the clergymen who led each 
church’s procession to the cathedral.
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and a large crowd from the side of the Saxon Gardens filled the square. Orthodox school 
children also received a place of honor on the square near the pavilion. Cavalry, military 
bands, and choirs completed the list of participants.139 A memorial plaque with the names 
of the emperor, archbishop, governor-general and the committee members accompanied 
the cornerstone. Although the emperor, Alexander III, was not personally present, the 
celebrants at this dedication did mark the symbolic presence of the emperor: “Throughout 
the centuries, Alexander Nevskii appears as the celestial protector of the Russian tsar.
The celebrated name of Alexander is now borne by a third Russian emperor.” The 
festivities concluded with a dinner in the Royal Castle’s Hall of Columns for 240 guests. 
The orchestras of the Lithuanian guards and the Uhlan’s Regiments performed the works 
of Russian composers.140
The cathedral’s consecration on 20 May 1912 drew all of the highest officials in 
the Polish Kingdom, and numerous key figures from the capital of St. Petersburg and the 
holy city of Kiev. Among the dignitaries were the Ober-procurator of the Holy Synod V. 
K. Sabler, and Kiev’s Metropolitan Flavian.141 Commenting on the upcoming 
consecration, the diocesan newspaper declared that the building was “not an ordinary
139V. Shingarev, “K osviashcheniiu,” 149-50; “Torzhestvo v g. Varshave 30 
avgusta,” Beseda no. 18,15 September 1894 (OS), 206-07.
140“Zakladka novogo pravoslavnago sobomago khrama v Varshave 30 avgusta 
1894,” Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi vestnik no. 17, 1(13) September 1894,277. 
Alexander III had not yet died at this point. The composers listed were Chaikovskii, 
Dargomyshskii, Davydov, Glinka, and Rubenshtein.
141Paszkiewicz, Pod berlem Romanowow, 127. Flavian had been Warsaw’s 
Archbishop.
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temple of God.” Along with its immediate purpose, that of religious service to Orthodox 
Varsovians, it had another goal “in the thoughts of its creators: it should also serve as a 
monument to the greatness and might of the Russian nation.” A Russian journalist 
complimented Governor-General Gurko for “attend[ing] to the construction not of a 
theater, not an art museum, but an artistic Orthodox temple.”142 The ceremony began 
with a service in the Holy Trinity Cathedral that included the entire Russian Orthodox 
clergy in Warsaw, from bishops to deacons. At the end of the services a religious 
procession left the Holy Trinity Cathedral at five in the afternoon. Soldiers stood along 
the procession route, and largely Polish crowds observed an impressive but alien religious 
procession featuring elaborate Orthodox vestments, gold- and silver-encrusted icons, 
banners, and crosses.143
The most important ceremony performed in new Nevskii Cathedral followed 
shortly after its consecration to observe the tercentenary of the House of Romanov on the 
Russian throne. On 21 February 1913, this building was the scene for the magnificent 
and rich celebrations of this anniversary. The event was used to remind all observers and 
participants, yet again, of the historical perfidy of the Poles. Bishop Iosafon declared that 
the Orthodox faith saved Russia from foreigners (the Swedes and Poles during the Time 
of Troubles). “It was the only protector of Russia from these Poles. Had it not been for
142Shingarev, “K osviashcheniiu,” 145-46. One of the common complaints in 
Varsovian Russian papers was over the absence of a Russian Theater in Warsaw.
143“Torzhesvto osviashcheniia novago Kefedral’nago sobora v Varshave vo imia 
Sv. Blagovemago kniazia AleskandraNevskago,” VarshavsMi eparkhial’nyi listokno. 11 
1 June 1912 (OS), 162-63.
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the holy Orthodox Church. . .  we would not now be a great, independent nation. . .  We 
must carefully protect this building as a valuable treasure.”144 The celebrations began at 
the old cathedral and moved to Nevskii with a religious procession that moved along 
Warsaw’s streets: from Miodowa to Senatorska, through the Plac Teatralny, and down 
Wierzbowa street to reach Saxon Square (renamed Cathedral Square in honor of the new 
building). As an official state event, all of the civil and military officials attended the 
church services and viewed the parade on the square that followed.145
The above events served the purpose of removing the Nevskii site from Warsaw’s 
Polish space, and transforming that space into a solidly Russian one. The events that 
marked the building’s progress all made links to Russian Orthodoxy and the Russian 
state. Church authorities regularly mentioned the importance of the Russian state and 
greatness of the Russian nation, and civil-military officials spoke of Orthodoxy. The 
processions served to make the city’s streets appear more Russian through the sight of 
many Orthodox churchmen, who could never be mistaken for Catholic priests, and the 
sound of their prayers and songs. The use of religious processions, the sight of Russian 
soldiers, and the sounds of Russian military bands at the ceremonies celebrating this 
cathedral all helped to make parts of central Warsaw more like Moscow or St.
Petersburg. In doing this, Varsovian Russians were involved in an intensely political 
project.
144“Slovo v den’ prazdnovaniia 300-letiia tsarstvovaniia Doma Romanovykh,” 
Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi listok, no. 5, 1 March 1913, 72-72.
145“Tserkovnoe prazdnovanie v Varshave 300-letiia tsarstvovaniia Doma 
Romanovykh,” Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi listok no. 5,1 March 1913, 82.
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That imperial project, however, was shattered during the First World War. With 
the fall of the Romanov dynasty in February 1917, the birth of Polish independence in 
1919, and the Russo-Polish War, nearly all of the signs of a century of Russian rule were 
removed. Street signs named after Russians disappeared, to be replaced by names 
recalling the Polish past-Fedor Berg Street became Romuald Traugutt Street, and 
Aleksandriiskaia Street became Jagiellonska Street.146 The memorial in front of the 
Viceroy’s Palace to Ivan Paskevich, who defeated the Poles in 1831, lost its pedestal to 
the monument commemorating the Napoleonic general Jozef Poniatowski. More 
significantly, most of the onion-domed Orthodox churches faced Polish wrecking crews.
In such an anti-Russian atmosphere, the destruction of the Alexander Nevskii 
Cathedral and the Russian renovation of the Staszic Palace were pretty much a foregone 
conclusion. Polish architects also argued that the aesthetic damage the buildings inflicted 
on the surrounding area demanded their destruction. To many Poles, whatever the 
aesthetic values, the political message of these edifices was all too clear. One memoir 
recounted that “the thick cupolas of the church throw a bright light gleaming like 
polished Cossack boots.”147 These structures were too closely associated with the 
oppressive Russian Imperial state to survive in an independent Poland. The Staszic 
Palace again became the center of Polish scholarship in 1924, and its neo-Classical
146These two examples present an interesting parallel. Berg was the Viceroy who 
crushed the January Uprising, and Romuald Traugutt was the last leader of that uprising. 
Aleksadriiskaia and Jagiellonska are both royal references.
147“Ze wspomnien warszawskich,” Mucha, no. 48, (1917), as cited in Paszkiewicz, 
“The Russian Orthodox Cathedral,” 69.
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exterior returned by 1926.148 Begun in 1919, the destruction of the Nevskii Cathedral was 
completed in 1926.149
Fin-de-siecle Russo-Polish politics and contradictory interpretations of shared 
history had found their expression in the renovation of the Staszic Palace. Russians 
looked at the site and were reminded of the most painful moment of their history, when 
the Riurikid dynasty had become extinct and western invaders occupied Moscow. The 
nineteenth-century Russian response, however, did little to dampen Polish nationalist 
strivings. While the Russians interpreted the present as a fair judgement for past Polish 
sins -  be they the occupation of Moscow in the seventeenth century or the tradition of 
resistance to Russian rule in the nineteenth -  Poles interpreted current Russian policies as 
their great national tragedy.
Although the new facade was a statement of imperialist power, it rested upon a 
foundation of anxiety. There still was a sense of inferiority on the part of Russians vis-a- 
vis Western and Polish culture. Frequent appeals to construct purely Russian 
surroundings expressed the desire for spaces free of Polish influences. The Russians 
sensed that their ethnic boundaries were endangered, and overcompensated by 
emphasizing what they saw as truly Russian and committing themselves to Orthodoxy. 
Not surprisingly, the neo-Muscovite style, with its disdain for the post-Petrine era’s aping
148Biegariski, Palac Staszica, 81, 85. During the 1920s, many of the Russian 
Orthodox churches built across the former Polish Kingdom were razed. Financial 
difficulties were the primary reason that their destruction was often delayed until the 
second half of the decade.
149Paszkiewicz, “The Russian Orthodox Cathedral,” 70.
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of the West, became the means of accomplishing that goal.
The added benefit to the neo-Muscovite style was that it also drew a connection 
between the Muscovite tsar and contemporary Russians. Because it was a reinterpreted 
melange of architectural forms familiar to Shuiskii, it was best suited to serve as a visual 
technique of reminding passersby of the suffering of this tsar at Polish hands. By 
transforming the Staszic Palace into a Russian memory palace, Varsovian Russians 
commemorated the nadir of Russian history and also celebrated the contemporary reversal 
of situations: a seventeenth-century tsar’s suffering had been vindicated by modem 
Russian lordship in Warsaw. Thus, remembering Vasilii Shuiskii became a means of 
recognizing him as a paternal figure for Varsovian Russians. His presence, suffering, and 
death became a part of the community’s local Russian history, which was tied to the 
broader Russian historical narrative. Thus, just as Benedict Anderson argued that the 
Second World War begat the First World War, so nineteenth-centuiy Varsovian Russians 
begat Shuiskii and an Orthodox Poland.150
In similar ways, the Alexander Nevskii Cathedral helped to support the idea of a 
long-enduring Orthodox community. Commentators wrote of ancient Rus’ having risen 
again within the church’s walls. Along with the claims of serving the needs of present 
worshipers, the cathedral also claimed a genealogy of Orthodox believers that reached 
back to Greek refugees during the Commonwealth and even the earliest Polish Christians 
at the inception of Polish statehood. Furthermore, it made evident the assertion that long­
standing historical processes had been resolved; the Polish state was gone, and Russia
150Anderson, Imagined Communities, 205.
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would never retreat from its western borderlands.
It should not be surprising that St. Maxy Magdalene’s church survived the wave of 
Polish destruction during the 1920s and even earned the attention of post-Second-World- 
War restorers. Unlike the Russified Staszic Palace or the Nevskii Cathedral, it did not 
claim to be a judgement of Polish history, nor did it attempt to draw some kind of a 
genealogical narrative of a long-existing Orthodox or Russian presence. It was not even 
in a central location that threatened the construction of Polish national imagination.
Rather than functioning as a site of memory, it predominantly ministered to the spiritual 
needs of parishioners. Under these conditions, it was able to survive when churches with 
more political and imperialist impulses were razed to the ground.
In his description of the Cathedral of the Resurrection in St. Petersburg William 
Craft Brumfeld declared that “no other structure of the period reveals so clearly the link 
between architecture, Orthodoxy, and political purpose.”151 The political nature of the 
Nevskii cathedral and the Staszic Palace in Warsaw also bore such clear links. The 
officials who sponsored these projects spoke of them as reminders to the Poles of the 
course of Russo-Polish relations. They served as a judgement upon Poland for its 
previous hostility to Muscovy and Orthodoxy and as testimony to the enduring reign of 
the Russian tsar over Poland, the westernmost region of his vast empire.
These edifices also defined the central elements of Russianness. Russian 
nationality, Orthodoxy, and Russian statehood blended in the planning, decoration, 
ceremonies, and rhetoric that surrounded them. To be Russian was to be Orthodox and a
151Brumfeld, A History o f Russian Architecture, 419.
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subject of a great and powerful (centralized) state. According to the Russian national 
myth, the Slavs were most naturally suited to the Christian Eastern rite, and the might of 
the Slavic-Russian state depended upon being an Orthodox state. The proof of that 
greatness lay in Russia’s ability to vanquish an independent and Catholic Poland. The 
Nevskii Cathedral and the Russified Staszic Palace intended to confirm that greatness in 
Warsaw. The Russians failed to understand, however, that their imposed culture and 
buildings could not succeed in making a space truly Russian. The effects of that 
imposition proved to be as ephemeral as the nineteenth-century visitations of the tsar 
himself.
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CHAPTER 4
IMPERIAL VISITATIONS: TSAR AND NATION IN AN OCCUPIED LAND
The official visits of a sovereign produced great excitement, particularly if the 
monarch “ruled” as well as “reigned,” as in the nineteenth-century Russian case. They 
engendered both social excitement and political anxieties because the events functioned 
as part of the emperor’s tour of inspection of his empire. The Russian emperor’s arrival, 
whatever the political orientation of the local population and its administrators, attracted 
the intense interest of all who had any political inclinations or social position to consider. 
Imperial visitations disrupted the regular and often dull schedules of gentry and officials 
in the provinces by creating a series of grand social, ceremonial, and governmental 
events. Tours were the closest point of contact between the monarch and the local 
population. And as the ceremonies increasingly expanded beyond small aristocratic 
circles to include larger parts of the public, the ceremonies became more elaborate and 
more public. The result was that the imagery of the emperor became a part of local 
political contests between Poles and Russian officials and between the older aristocratic 
order and the rising industrial elites.
The increasingly public nature of the events created greater opportunities for local 
elites to invest the visits with a political symbolism that defined the social and political 
relationship between the ruler and his subjects. The imperial tours of Warsaw in the
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second half of the nineteenth century presented a visual drama of Polish subjugation.
They were moments when tsars rewarded loyal servitors, warned the obstreperous gentry 
about dreams of autonomy, and recognized the common folk for their love of the tsar. 
Russian officials in Poland used these visits to provide evidence of their successes in 
dominating a notoriously unreliable region and in tying it to the rest of the empire. The 
significance of the tsar’s personal appearance increased as the Varsovian Russian colony 
attempted to emphasize its Russian national identity amidst a hostile alien population. At 
the same time, Poles looked for any signs of a shift in policy through the prism of these 
events. Some Poles hoped to use the occasions to prove Polish loyalty to the emperor as 
a means of improving their lot in the future through behavior the Russian officials 
deemed appropriate.
The imperial visits of Alexander II, Alexander III, and Nicholas II all presented 
opportunities for both Poles and Russians to carve out the contours of their respective 
identities as well as the nature of Russo-Polish relations after 1863. Both Russian 
servitors and Polish aristocrats jockeyed for central roles in the staged dramas of the 
imperial tour as a means of defining political life in the Polish Kingdom. The Polish 
upper class presented itself as the ancient noble elite of the region who had a long 
tradition and deep understanding of Poland; they hoped that their contact and social 
closeness to the emperor could mitigate the harsh post-uprising conditions. By the time 
of Nicholas IPs visit in 1897, Poles hoped that the grand public events they orchestrated 
in his honor would convince the young tsar that they were different than their rebellious 
forefathers of 1863.
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While Polish aristocrats emphasized their noble relationship with the tsar, Russian 
servitors portrayed themselves as the truly loyal servants of the dynasty enacting its will 
in a region with an incorrigibly rebellious gentry and nobility. The January 1863 
Uprising created indignant responses among Russians, particularly among those of the 
small Varsovian community. Russian official and popular opinion called for the harshest 
measures in handling the Poles.1 The arrival of the Russian tsar allowed them to remind 
Poles and confirm for themselves that Warsaw was and would remain a part of Russia. 
Successive imperial visits made manifest the new terms of the Russians’ position in this 
conquered borderland. All those concerned with the Kingdom’s political and national 
environment invested much in the few days of the tsar’s presence.
Yet, the increasing investment placed in a successful imperial tour proved to be a 
losing one for all involved. As the audience and participants increased beyond the elites 
to include more of the region’s commoners, the imperial narrative shifted in a direction 
that only made the inclusion of a Polish population, even a potentially loyal peasant one, 
more difficult. Under Alexander II, the dominant narrative of imperial rule placed the 
dynasty above the various peoples and groups of the empire with the emperor as an 
arbiter who was above all particular interests. It was a scenario that made room for loyal 
non-Russian subjects in a multi-ethnic empire. That Western European myth of Russian 
power predominated until Alexander II’s assassination in 1881. The threat of revolution,
'For more on Russian responses to the uprising see Gl^bocki, Fatalna sprawa, 
261-301; Katkov, 1863 god, 427,474-85; and D. G. Anuchin, “Graf Fedor Fedorovich 
Berg, namestnik v Tsarstve Pol’skom, 1863-1874 g.,” Russkaia starina, February 1893: 
360-61.
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believed to have its origins in the westernizing reforms of Alexander II, encouraged the 
anti-Western bent of the succeeding emperors. Upon the accession of Alexander IE, a 
new myth came into being that emphasized the autocracy’s national (russkii) character. 
Nicholas II subsequently tried to present himself as a seventeenth-century Russian tsar 
who was supposedly in a mystical union with his Orthodox Russian people.2 After 1881, 
Polish subjects, even if they were perceived as a loyal peasantry grateful for 
emancipation, found themselves outside of a polity that denied the multi-national aspect 
of its empire, championing Russification instead. By the end of the nineteenth century, 
the royal visitation only succeeded in demonstrating the failure of the emperor and his 
Polish subjects in finding a modus vivendi because none of the participants fully 
comprehended (or cared to observe) the messages the others broadcast.
The last imperial tour in 1897 particularly exposed the cracks in the imperial 
script. The empire’s bureaucratic centralization and autocratic ideology led Russian 
officials to distrust innovation because of the fear of revolutionary or nationalist activities 
that it might encourage.3 Yet, Polish civil society actively participated in developing the 
narrative of the royal visitation by forming the Donations and the Decorations 
Committees. The work of the committees’ designers was ultimately subversive of 
imperial authority (whether or not it was intentional) because they adopted a supposedly 
unchanging imperial ritual to present their own story of the Polish nation. Furthermore,
2Wortman, Scenarios o f Power, vol. 2: 6.
3For one example of traditional ceremonies as opportunities of revolutionary 
protest, see Tom Trice, “Rites of Protest: Populist Funerals in Imperial St. Petersburg, 
1876-1878,” Slavic Review 60, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 50-74.
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this Polish script exposed the Polish aristocracy’s assumption that it represented the 
nation to be as anachronistic as imperial authority had become. As the tsarist regime tried 
to sustain the imperial myth, Polish organizers wrote a script that converted the event into 
a statement of Polish modernity and social vibrancy.
During the late nineteenth century, political rituals around the modernizing world 
underwent a considerable process of elaboration. Ceremonies and symbolic political 
events gained greater attention by the century’s end in democratic France and the United 
States, in monarchical but democratic Britain and Austria-Hungary, and in absolutist 
Germany, Russia, and Japan.4 David Cannadine pointed out that “politics and ceremonial 
are not separate subjects, the one serious, the other superficial. Ritual. . .  is itself a type 
of power.”5 These events instilled the sovereign with his or her power. Furthermore, 
events that once cemented or confirmed the relations among a small circle of elites by the 
end of the century became larger public urban spectacles. The modem mass occasions 
drew in workers and peasants with large parades along the streets, popular press accounts
4For more on the late nineteenth century as a generator of traditions, see Eric 
Hobsbawm, “Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914,” in Eric Hobsbawm and 
Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention o f Tradition (Cambridge, Eng. : Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), 263-307; Takahashi Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy: Power and 
Pageantry in Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Daniel L. 
Unowsky, The Pomp and Politics o f Patriotism: Imperial Celebrations in Habsburg 
Austria, 1848-1916 (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 2005); and Daniel L. 
Unowsky, “‘Our Gratitude Has No Limit”: Polish Nationalism, Dynastic Patriotism, and 
the 1880 Imperial Inspection Tour of Galicia,” Austrian History Yearbook 34 (2003): 
145-71.
5David Cannadine, “Introduction: Divine Rites of Kings,” in David Cannadine 
and Simon Price, eds., Rituals o f Royalty: Power and Ceremonial in Traditional Societies 
(Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 19.
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and pamphlets, and the mass-produced trinkets that became valuable souvenirs. A similar 
growth in the attention paid to royal visits occurred in Russian Warsaw: Alexander D’s 
tours were events geared more to bureaucrats and aristocrats, while Nicholas II’s tour 
embraced all of Polish civil society through massive stagings of loyalty designed to attract 
a modem city’s population.
One of the most important symbolic functions of an imperial visit is to tie the 
local area to the rest of the empire. According to Clifford Geertz, “When kings journey 
around the countryside, making appearances, attending fetes, conferring honors, 
exchanging gifts, or defying rivals, they mark it, like some wolf or tiger spreading his 
scent through his territory, as almost physically part of them.” The rituals of the official 
tour also make the leader numinous, akin to a local deity inhabiting his territory, and 
acknowledge the “sacredness of central authority” through the attention afforded the brief 
appearance of the ruler, who is the embodiment of that abstract authority. He becomes 
numinous through the deep involvement of all the participants in the master fictions of 
the existing order.6 As the actors repeat and reenact the imperial narrative, they lend it 
support. For this reason, the ruler’s periodic presence plays an important function; it 
facilitates the regime’s efforts to fix the people and the locale to the political order.
The necessity of establishing or re-establishing local links with the Russian 
emperor were particularly important for peripheral regions. His, or the heir’s, presence in 
remote regions could symbolically consolidate the dynasty’s hold on an area, replacing a
6Clifford Geertz, “Centers, Kings, and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics of 
Power,” in Sean Wilentz, ed., Rites o f Power: Symbolism, Ritual, and Politics since the 
Middle Ages (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 16,33.
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patchwork of various territories and peoples with one population under their sovereign 
lord. The Imperial “progress” through the country tied the various peoples to the paternal 
figure of the emperor, and his ceremonials at local sites established the sacred places of 
the official national landscape.7 After the visit of the tsarevich Alexander Nikolaevich 
(later Alexander II) in 1837, one Siberian resident commented that the region was 
“Siberia” until his arrival, but became “Russia” after his appearance there. Siberia’s first 
visit by a member of the imperial household, particularly the heir, made it into an integral 
part of the country.8
Regions that caused problems for rulers particularly merited the ministrations of 
an imperial presence. Francis Joseph’s imperial inspection tour of Galicia and other 
regions after the 1848 revolutions in 1851 was a reassertion of imperial authority over 
rebellious territories. The young emperor used his presence a means of bringing the 
various territories back into the fold of the Habsburg state by presenting the image of a 
sovereign who was “prepared to offer mercy and to ruthlessly quell all threats to the 
internal order.”9 Through image-making and ceremonial ritual, the emperor re­
established order and let the people know that their only acceptable place in that order 
was as loyal subjects. In the case of Russian Poland, similar purposes attended the tsars’
7Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy, 43-47.
8Richard Wortman, “Rule by Sentiment: Alexander II’s Journeys through the 
Russian Empire,” American Historical Review 95, no. 3 (June 1990): 751.
9Daniel Unowsky, “Reasserting Empire: Habsburg Imperial Celebrations after the 
Revolutions of 1848-1849,” in Maria Bucur and Nancy M. Wingfield, eds., Staging the 
Past: The Politics o f  Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present 
(West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 2001), 27.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
238
visitations. Unlike Russian regions in the empire’s interior, this was an occupied land 
with a population that had rebelled against the Romanovs. For the Poles, tours of 
inspection were consequently both threatening and exciting.
For the Russian colony in Warsaw, the appearances of the emperor carried the 
stamp of approval of their imperial mission at the empire’s borders. As with the Siberian 
resident who expressed the belief in the region’s transformation into a part of Russia, the 
emperor’s physical presence made Warsaw and the Privislinskii krai as a whole into 
Russian territories. Russian guides to Warsaw and pamphlets described the key sites of 
the city and included locations that previous emperors visited among the important sites, 
however brief or uneventful their stays had been. In describing the tours of the nineteenth 
century, a contemporary historian of the Russian colony in Poland, A. A. Sidorov, tied the 
country to the rest of the empire and the imperial project. He also extended the Russian 
history of Warsaw further into the past by mentioning the brief appearances of Peter I in 
Warsaw at a time when Poland was still an independent state. He even castigated local 
Russians for not having saved from the wrecking ball the palace in which Peter slept.
The building’s historical value had risen because of that imperial link. Even the locations 
symbolizing Russian weakness became an important part of the imperial narrative of 
Warsaw. The bell tower that imprisoned Patriach Filaret, the father of the first Romanov 
tsar Aleksei, and the burial site of tsar Vasilii Shuiskii also earned an important place in 
Varsovian Russian history by virtue of their links to imperial personages.10
10A. A. Sidorov, Russkie gosudari; Akaemov, PutevoditeV, 22-24, 72-73; 
Akaemov, Dostoprimechatel’nosti Varshavy, 41; and Ustimovich, Mitropolit Filaret.
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The tsar’s numinous qualities, which made royal visits important, were 
particularly powerful in the Russian context because the Russian Orthodox Church was 
an important force in Russian political culture. Although an emphasis on that Orthodox 
nature deleteriously affected the imperial mission in non-Orthodox regions of the empire 
such as Poland, the church maintained its traditional importance to the Orthodox majority 
and played a powerful role in matters of national identity and political discourse.11 The 
links between the emperor and the church had early roots that survived even through the 
more secular eighteenth century. With Peter I’s elimination of the Patriarchate, the tsar 
became the sole head of the church, whose hierarchy was subjected to a bureaucratized 
office.12 Rhetoric associating the tsar with the divine continued throughout the nineteenth 
century to an extent that startled foreign observers. Anna Tiutcheva described Russian 
power as bearing “a religious, and one might say, supernatural character.”13
The frequently used tropes of patriarchy also furthered the impression of the just 
emperor who inspired his people’s love in the Russian Varsovian press. A Beseda author 
began his article with, “What is the tsar for us? He is the father of a great family 
consisting of many millions.” From being the father of a family of millions, he was then
“Freeze, “Subversive Piety,” 309.
12Jan Sobczak, Cesarz Mikolaj //(Olsztyn: Wyzsza Skola Pedagogiczna, 1998), 2: 
8-12. Although Peter and successive emperors did much to secularize the court and elite 
Russian culture, bringing the Church hierarchy into the imperial administration did blur 
the distinctions between the secular and clerical spheres.
“Quoted in Richard S. Wortman, Scenarios o f Power: Myth and Ceremony in 
Russsian Monarchy, vol. 1, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 4; Boris A. 
Uspenskii and Viktor M. Zhivov, Car i Bog. Semiotyczne aspeky sakralizacji monarchy 
wRosji (Warsaw: Pahstwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1992), 12, 51-53.
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described as the “head of the nation {narod\” The hyperbolic rhetoric continued the 
tsar’s apotheosis by describing him as a “red sun [krasnoe solnyshko]” that illuminated 
and warmed his nation. The image of the just father figure who will correct the errors of 
society was one that justified the continued system of autocratic rule.14 It also made the 
personal contact between the tsar and people more important. The sovereign’s visits, 
thus, reinforced the ideological position that the tsar was the ultimate arbiter of justice 
because he was the “living bearer of truth and interpreter of law, receiving understanding 
directly from God Himself.”15 As the true Christian (Orthodox) father of his people, the 
emperor naturally ruled justly.
Furthermore, the Russian Varsovian press encouraged the notion of a paternal tsar 
who had direct contact with the peasantry. Articles laid out that hierarchy and made use • 
of anecdotes and tales concerning Nicholas II’s predecessors. In one tale, not only was 
Nicholas I a deeply religious man and commanding figure, but also a man who made 
appearances at peasant huts and provided the common folk with advice and assistance.16 
An account of Alexander Ill’s visits to his vacation palace in Spala in the Polish Kingdom 
described him frequently meeting with the simple and loyal Polish peasants, who were a 
contrast to the rebellious Polish gentry and intelligentsia. The peasants organized musical 
festivities and presented the welcome offering of bread and salt for their tsar batiushka. 
The empress in turn provided them with gifts of traditional Orthodox icons that reminded
14“Tsar i narod,” Beseda no. 12,15 June 1896,139.
15Ibid., 139.
16“Pravoslavnyi Russkii Tsar,” Beseda, no. 6, 15 March 1896, 62-64.
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them of the semi-religious nature of Russian autocratic rule.17 The official booklet 
commemorating Alexander Ill’s visit to Warsaw and the Polish Kingdom’s rural 
provinces in 1884, written in Polish, repeatedly made note of the great interest that event 
had stirred among the common people (lud). Although the chief event of this tour was 
his stay in Warsaw, nearly half of the pages described his travels in the Kingdom’s rural 
areas.18
After the 1863 Uprising, Russian officials enacted more generous emancipation 
laws in Poland than in the rest of the empire in the hope that the peasantry would become 
the basis for the regime’s support. Nikolai Miliutin, who was the architect of the Polish 
peasants’ emancipation, was among the strongest proponents of this idea.19 Russian 
officials generally believed that the Polish nationalist was a nobleman and that the 
peasant remained untainted by “Polonism.” The belief in the loyal peasant continued 
through the end of the nineteenth century when Vladimir Gurko naively wrote that Polish 
peasants trusted Russian officials more than they did Polish landowners. He believed that
17“Tsar i ego narod,” Beseda, no. 1,1 January 1898,4-5.
18M. Chudziak, Pobyt Ich Cesarskich Mosci w Kraju Nadwidanskim od dnia 27 
sierpnia do dnia 4 wrzesznia 1884 roku (Warsaw: Tip. Gubemialnyi, 1885).
19Stefan Kieniewicz, The Emancipation o f the Polish Peasantry (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1969), 170-74; Wereszycki, Historiapolityczna Polski, 53- 
54; W. Bruce Lincoln, Nikolai Miliutin, An Enlightened Russian Bureaucrat 
(Newtonville, Mass: Oriental Research Partners, 1977), 82-86; and Lincoln, “The Making 
of a New Polish Policy,” 54-66. Part of the inspiration for a generous settlement was at 
least to match, and thus to counteract, what the Uprising’s underground government 
offered peasants to join the rebellion. Miliutin’s hopes ended up falling short because of 
resistance from the viceroy, General Berg, who was more conservative (and thus more 
aligned with noble landowners), and also because of increasing Russification. For the 
conflict between Miliutin and Berg, see Groniowski, “Walka Miliutina,” 891-905.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
242
any peasant “indifference” towards Russian supremacy was really based upon their 
“backwardness” rather than frustration at Russificatory policies that complicated their 
lives by requiring the use of the Russian language in local affairs.20
The interplay between imperial ceremony, Polish subjects, and Russian officials 
began with the creation of the Polish Kingdom after the Congress of Vienna. Alexander I 
inaugurated imperial visitations in 1815, when he arrived in Warsaw on 31 October (12 
November, NS) to celebrate the creation of the Congress Kingdom as its king. Later 
during the nineteenth century, Poles would look to this early experience with Alexander I 
as the ideal model of their relationship to the rest of the Romanov empire: a separate 
autonomous entity with its own constitution. During Alexander’s stay, which lasted until 
18 (30) November, he approved and signed the constitution on 15 (27) November.
Finally, he appointed General Jozef Zajqczek as viceroy.21
Varsovians excitedly welcomed Alexander I to his new city. The celebrations 
began upon his arrival with a parade, which started from the city’s south and proceeded 
north to his official residence, the Royal Castle. Residents festively decorated the streets, 
and the city’s administration erected a large temporary triumphal arch on Three Crosses
20Gurko, Ocherki Privislian ’ia, 77-79. For information about how nationalist 
complaints became a part of Polish peasant protest see Blobaum, Rewolucja, 123-35.
21Sidorov, Russkie gosudari, 5-9; Kieniewicz, Warszawa w latach 1795-1914,26- 
27; and A. H. Zawadzki, A Man o f Honour: Adam Czartoryski as a Statesman o f Russia 
and Poland, 1795-1831 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 259-65. The choice of 
Zajqczek was a great surprise; many expected Czartoryski to be appointed. See Zawadzki 
for the organization of the new Kingdom during this early period. Alexander also visited 
the city in 1818 for the opening of the first Sejm, in 1820, and finally in 1825, shortly 
before his death, for the opening of the Third Sejm.
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Square (Plac Trzech Krzyzy ) for Alexander to pass through. Along this route, crowds 
lined the streets and filled the windows of buildings’ upper storeys to greet him. The 
following day, all the city’s churches held services for the king.22
During the evenings, additional court rituals cemented the ties between the new 
king and his Polish noble elites. Nightly street illumination, balls, and theater 
performances extended the festive atmosphere. The chair of the Provisional Government, 
V. S. Lanskoi, hosted the first of the balls. Warsaw’s president hosted a masquerade ball 
that attracted much of the Polish elite. Princess Maria Wiirttemberg, the sister of Prince 
Adam Czartoryski who was one of the emperor’s close confidants, also hosted a ball for 
Alexander I. These courtly “entertainments” or social drama established personal bonds 
between Alexander and his new Polish elites as well as defined the political and social 
order of the revived Polish Kingdom.23
Because Alexander I established a new political order in Poland, official memory 
of his reign left a considerable stamp upon Warsaw. The site of his triumphal arch 
celebrating his arrival in 1815 became the location of St. Alexander’s Roman Catholic 
Church in 1825. The square itself was subsequently renamed St. Alexander’s Square. 
During the reign of Nicholas I, the city became still more of a memorial to Alexander I. 
Nicholas ordered the Alexandrine Citadel to be built during the 1830s, with an 
accompanying obelisk in the citadel’s grounds as another memorial to Alexander I.
22Sidorov, Russkie gosudari, 5-9; Sidorov, Russkie i russkaia zhizn ’, 11-20; and 
Paszkiewicz, Pod beriem Romanowow, 141-44.
23Aleksandra z Tanskich Tarczewska, Historia mego zycia. Wspomnienia 
warszawianki (Wroclaw: Ossolineum, 1967), 204-208; Sidorov, Russlde gosudari, 8.
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These numerous reminders of Alexander’s importance to nineteenth-century Warsaw 
helped to make it Alexander’s city and bound it to the rest of the Romanov state.24
Alexander I’s visit represented the high point of relations between the Russian 
emperors and their Polish nobles. Polish elites had a revived, albeit a considerably 
reduced, kingdom. In honor of Alexander and his recreation of a Polish Kingdom, the 
neo-Classical author Aloj2y Felinski wrote the hymn “Boze, cos Polsk?” (God Save 
Poland).25 The emperor acquired new territories and subjects who were pleased with the 
promise of stability and autonomy after the difficult partition and Napoleonic eras. The 
ceremonies staged by imperial authorities and Polish elites in 1815 lifted Alexander I 
“into various realms of the sublime” that were beyond the divisions and quarrels of 
competing interests.26 Alexander’s decisions concerning the administration of the 
kingdom demonstrated his role as the impartial benefactor. Although many Poles 
enthusiastically joined Napoleon’s forces, Alexander established an administration 
primarily managed by Poles. The most notable example of this largesse was in the person 
of his new viceroy, Zajqczek, who had served Napoleon as a general. Previous service to
24Sidorov, Russkie gosudari, 5; Piotr Paszkiewicz, Pod berfem Romanowow, 144; 
and K. G. Sokol, Russkaia Varshava (Moscow: MID “Sinergiia,” 2002), 47.
Interestingly, no statue of Alexander I, or subsequent emperors, had been erected in 
Warsaw.
25The official title was “Hymn na rocznic^ ogloszenia Krolestwa Polskiego.” 
During the mid-nineteenth century, the song’s pro-Russian elements were removed and it 
became a religious-patriotic hymn during the protests of the 1860s. Anti-communist 
Solidarity protesters also made it a regular part of their demonstrations. See Alicja 
Kulecka, “Boze cos Polsk§,” Encyklopedia historii Polski, vol. 1 (Warsaw: Morex,
1994): 75.
26Wortman, Scenarios o f Power, vol. 2,4.
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a Russian opponent did not necessarily disqualify one from future service to the Romanov 
emperor. As the Russian King of Poland, Alexander also maintained the prevailing 
tradition of using the French rather than Russian language at official engagements.27 
Although the respect the emperor and the Polish elites held for each other did not last 
long, the subsequent reign of Nicholas I marked a sharp contrast. Nicholas reacted to the 
Polish Uprising of 1830-31 by abolishing the constitutional system and began the process 
of Russifying the Polish Kingdom’s administration.28
Upon the death of Nicholas I in 1855, Polish hopes for improved conditions in the 
Congress Kingdom revived. Viceroy Paskevich’s death the following year further 
elevated Polish hopes that the era of repression had passed. Alexander II’s early moves in 
the direction of reforms within the empire as a whole added to Polish expectations for 
some kind of political autonomy. Poles were again able to work in the civil service in the 
western provinces. By 1862, a Polish-administered civilian government, under the 
leadership of Marquis Aleksander Wielopolski, had been reestablished. Under these 
hopeful, but tentative conditions, Alexander made a tour of the western reaches of his
27D. K. Tarasov, “Vospominaniia moei zhizni. Zapiski pochetnago leib-khirurga 
D. K. Tarasova 1792-1866,” Russkaia starina vol. 5 (March 1872): 385. This account 
recorded Alexander’s last visit to Warsaw in 1825 when he spoke at the closing 
ceremonies of the Sejm.
28The support Poles had for Alexander waned considerably over the years as 
Alexander interfered with the constitutional arrangements of the kingdom. Of particular 
concern was the Grand Duke Constantine’s frequent interference in Polish affairs as the 
chief of the Polish army. Alexander also became less satisfied with the existing situation 
because of the criticism and resistance he faced in subsequent years, particularly in the 
Sejm.
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empire.29
Unlike his successors, Alexander II found his way to Warsaw for official purposes 
on multiple occasions. Certain features were standard parts of Alexander’s royal 
visitations. The news of the arrival became public when the oberpolitsmaistr issued the 
regular orders concerning the illumination and decoration of homes along the route the 
imperial retinue would use.30 These regulations encompassed the evening routes 
Alexander took during his stays, which included all the buildings from the Belvedere 
Palace to the train station, including the Teatr Wielki and the Royal Castle.31 Upon 
arriving in Warsaw, the Imperial guests were greeted with the traditional salt and bread 
offering, singing, and flowers for the empress.32
Soon after his accession to the throne, Alexander II visited Warsaw on two 
occasions, in 1856 and 1858. During these visits, he played the traditional role of an 
emperor bestowing his grace upon loyal subjects and issuing warnings to the potentially
29Wandycz, The Lands o f Partitioned Poland, 155-65; Kieniewicz, Historia 
Polski, 224-237. For a description of the similar expectations and ultimate 
disappointment among Poles in the Lithuanian and Belorussian provinces see Dawid 
Fajnhauz, 1863: Litwa i Bialorus (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo NERITON—Instytut Historii, 
Polska Akademia Nauk, 1999), 10-16.
30 AG AD, Zarz^d Palacow Cesarskich (1839-1918). Sygn. 1321, no. 411. “Po 
prebyvaniiu v Varshave Ikh Imp. Velichestv v 1867 g.;” ibid., Sygn. 1321, no. 54611, 
17/29 May 1867. Letter from the Oberpolitsmaistr.
31AGAD, Intendent Zamku. Sygn. 3, no. 269,30 May/ll June 1870. Letter from 
the Oberpolitsmaister.
32Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 124,9/21 June 1867,501; Agata Tuszynska, “Trzy 
pomniki,” Zeszyty historyczne (Paris), no. 94 (1990), 68.
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unruly ones.33 In 1856, he traveled to Warsaw for six days, after which he moved on to 
Berlin. The Polish aristocracy of the entire Congress Kingdom gathered in Warsaw for 
the occasion; many hoped that Alexander II would be another Alexander I, bestowing 
upon them constitutional privileges. On the day of his arrival, 10 (22) May, he addressed 
the leaders of the Polish aristocracy and informed them that “our relations between each 
other should be clarified as much as possible”34 and then reminded them of their place in 
the imperial order. As was customary within aristocratic circles, particularly of mixed 
nationality, French was the language of communication. He declared, “I have you in my 
heart, just like the Finns and like my other Russian subjects; but I desire to preserve the 
order that was established by my father.” He then cautioned them to abandon their 
“dreams” of independence. During the aristocratic ball at Lazienki Palace he reiterated 
his admonition. In spite of his stem words, Alexander occupied a space of impartiality; 
he made it clear that Poles (and Finns) were his subjects as much as Russians were. At a 
subsequent ball hosted by Warsaw’s social elites, Alexander played the part of the 
magnanimous lord forgiving prodigal sons. He granted Polish emigres permission to 
return to Poland without reprisal. His pronouncements were not those of a Russian 
national tsar, but that of a dynastic ruler who cared for and considered the interests of the 
various peoples of his empire. All of Alexander’s activities were limited to occasions
33Alexander was also in Warsaw in 1860 to meet with the Austrian emperor and 
Prussian king. Naturally, international, rather than local, affairs dominated that 
appearance. Furthermore, the Polish national movement had begun to strain relations 
between Alexander II and Polish elites.
34N. V. Berg, Zapiski N. V. Berga o polskikh zagovorakh i vozstaniiakh (Moscow: 
Tip. Gracheva, 1873), 145.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
248
with the Polish nobility. Literate Poles of other classes had to be content with reading 
about the events in the censored press.35
Soon after the 1863 Uprising, Alexander II visited Warsaw from 7 (19) June to 10 
(22) June 1867 as part of a return trip from Germany and France. The tour followed his 
previous pattern but did provide evidence of a changing relationship between the emperor 
and this borderland. As previously, this primarily elite event provided opportunities for 
the emperor to maintain contacts with the leading figures, both Polish and Russian, in 
society and government in the Polish Kingdom.36 The Empress arrived with a retinue of 
Grand Dukes from St. Petersburg on 7 (19) June; the Emperor appeared the following day 
from the west. Along the route between Lazienki Park and the Royal Castle on Aleje 
Jerozolimskie, the city erected a triumphal arch decorated with Russian flags to 
commemorate Alexander’s arrival. The Varshavskii dnevnik declared that “Warsaw has 
not seen such a celebratory sight” in its description of the decorations and large crowds 
that assembled to greet the Imperial family. The article noted that the peasants, “knowing 
of the arrival of their Tsar-Liberator,” made up a considerable portion of the estimated 
five thousand people on that day.37 That evening, the Imperial entourage attended a
35S. S. Tatishchev, Imperator Aleksandr II. Ego zhizn ’ i tsarstvovaniie, 2nd ed., 
(St. Petersburg: A. S. Suvorin, 1911), 1: 195-97; Sidorov, Russkie gosudari, 20; Berg, 
Zapiski o polskikh zagovorakh, 145-46; and Szymon Azkenazy, Sto latzarzqdu w 
Krolestwie Polskiem 1800-1900,2 nd. ed., (Lwow: Ksi^gamia H. Altenberga, 1903), 57.
36AGAD, Zarz^d Palacow Cesarskich (1839-1918). Sygn. 1321, no. 411. “Po 
prebyvaniiu v Varshave Ikh Imp. Velichestv v 1867 g.
37 Varshavskii dnevnik no. 123, 8/20 June 1867,497-98.
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performance at the Teatr Wielki where they saw the first act of the ballet The Milliner 
The audience there shouted to the operatic company that it sing the Russian national 
hymn, and it finally did consent by singing “God Save the Tsar” three times in a row.39
Official engagements dominated Alexander IPs next day. He began the morning 
observing a military parade at Mokotow Fields (Pole Mokotowskie). Before noon, the 
imperial entourage inspected the Aleksandriisko-Mariiskii Institute, a school for noble 
girls. Their tour included conversation with the girls in both Russian and French and 
ended with a stop at the institute’s three chapels (Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant). 
Later in the evening, Alexander II hosted approximately 200 guests for dinner at Lazienki 
Palace. The event provided an occasion for the Kingdom’s chief administrative servitors 
to be with the emperor. The evening’s entertainment began with a performance of the 
ballet Countess Egmont at the Teatr Wielki (a ballet), followed by a grand ball sponsored 
by the Russian Club.40 The ball occurred in the Zamoyski Palace (across the street from 
the Staszic Palace), which was the property of the Russian military administration. Not 
surprisingly, the location and sponsorship of the event discouraged many Polish nobles
38I have been unable to determine who the composer or the choreographer were of 
this work (Modistka). The few hints that I found indicate that it may have been of 
western European origin.
39Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 124, 9/21 June 1867, 501; Varshavskii dnevnik, no.
125,10/22 June 1867, 505-06. Although the press account does not state the makeup of 
the audience, it would seem rather unlikely that the Polish audience would have requested 
the Russian anthem.
40I am not sure of the composer or choreographer of this work, but it appears to be 
of German origin (possibly Beethoven?).
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from attending.41
Alexander ended his visit on 10 (22) June after a few more specifically Russian 
engagements. As on the previous day, he began with a military inspection, this time of 
the artillery. He finished on a charitable note by stopping at the Nikolaevskii Orphanage 
for Russian military children and a Russian gymnasium. In the early evening, the 
imperial entourage broke up and left for various points out of Warsaw 42
This visitation was notable for the increased Russian character of the events. 
Although Polish nobles were present, their place in the drama of a visit had declined. The 
January Uprising was still a fresh memory for the imperial administration, and the 
Varsovian Russian colony had grown dramatically. Russian officials now looked upon 
the Poles as traitors and were thus less inclined to consider the sensibilities of the Polish 
elites who wished to see the tsar. It was also now possible for the Russian elites to 
separate themselves from the Polish noble population and limit the Poles’ access to the 
emperor. The Russian Club’s ball was a Russian affair for the military and civil servants 
governing a defeated territory. It signaled to Polish aristocrats that they no longer could 
count upon their titles, or past loyalty, to gain full access to the sovereign.
On the following visit of 1870, the theme of Russian power over the Poles became
41 Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 125, 10/22 June 1867, 505-06; Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 
126,11/23 June 1867, 510', Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 127, 13/25 June 1867, 514; Sidorov, 
Russkie i russkaia zhizn ’, 148; and Sidorov, Russkie gosurari, 21. The Russian Club was 
formed in 1864. The Zamoyski Palace (Palac Zamoyskiego) became the property of the 
Russian military during the January Uprising after a gunman attempted to assassinate 
Viceroy Berg from one of its windows.
42 Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 127, 13/25 June 1867, 514.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
251
more explicit through the commemoration of a new, specifically Russian space in 
Warsaw. During the afternoon of 21 June (3 July) Alexander II participated in the visit’s 
culminating event in front of the Viceroy’s palace, which housed the offices of the 
Governor-General and the governor.43 On that day, the Russian community unveiled a 
memorial to Ivan Paskevich, the Russian general who defeated the Polish uprising of 
1830. The initial idea for the monument came from the emperor as early as his first visit 
in 1856; he involved himself in the project throughout its development and chose the 
memorial’s site himself.44 Originally, in 1826, this site was the intended location of a 
memorial to Jozef Poniatowski, who had been a general in the Kosciuszko Uprising of 
1794 and the Napoleonic campaigns. After 1831, the public display of such a monument 
became impossible and the location held no monument until the erection of Paskevich’s 
memorial.45 Nikolai Stepanovich Pimenov (1812-1864) of the Academy of Fine Arts in 
St. Petersburg sculpted it at a ratio of two and one-half times the height of the field 
marshal who crushed the Poles in 1831. Aleksandr R. fon Bok (von Bock, 1829-1895)
43AGAD, Intendent Zamku. Sygn. 1325,30 April/12 April 1870. Letter from 
governor-general to the Palace Administration. Agata Tuszynska, “Trzy pomniki,” 68.
44H. Szynkman, Pomnik Paskiewicza w Warszawie (Warsaw, 1918), 7 as cited in 
Paszkiewicz, Pod beriem Romanowow, 169; Bania and Jaroszewski, Palac Rady 
Ministrow, 108.
45Sokol, Russkaia Varshava, 36-37. Nicholas I ordered Poniatowski’s monument 
to be destroyed, but Paskevich himself saved and moved it to his estate. In 1921 it 
returned to Poland and stood on Saxon Square. A copy of it now stands on the site (now 
the President’s Palace); the original was melted down by the Nazi regime.
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finished the project by sculpting the bas-reliefs on the pedestal.46 The 12-meter tall 
bronze statue portrayed the general standing in his uniform, wrapped in a cloak with the 
insignia of his office (a field marshal’s baton).47 The dark grey Finnish granite base bore 
his title: ’’The Prince of Warsaw, Count Paskevich Erevanskii,” which reminded 
passersby of his two most notable military victories: the conquests of Warsaw and of 
Erevan.48
The monument’s unveiling was primarily a Russian affair. The Austrian 
Archduke Albert was one of the few non-Russians present. Russian soldiers lined the 
streets from Krakowskie Przedmiescie to the Plac Ujazdowski. Along with the emperor 
and the local Varsovian Russian dignitaries, Paskevich’s son Fedor, and the military 
figures who had served under the field marshal were in attendance. Interestingly, Fedor 
Paskevich opposed the erection of the memorial in Warsaw and wore his regular (non­
ceremonial) uniform for the occasion. The Russian Orthodox archbishop Ioanniki recited 
a prayer for the emperor and Paskevich’s soul, and sprinkled holy water on the 
monument. Ceremonial cannon fired from the Alexandrine Citadel and the assembled 
soldiers (37 companies, over 8 squadrons, over 2 divisions, and 9 batteries) marched past
46Bania and Jaroszewski, Palac Rady Ministrow, 108; Sidorov, Russkie gosudari, 
22; and Jelena Karpowa, “Dziewi^tnastowieczne pomniki na polnocno-zachodnich 
rubiezach Imperium Rosyjskiego: idee, losy, artysci,” in Dariusz Konstantynow and Piotr 
Paszkiewicz, eds. Kultura i polityka. Wpfyw polityki rusyfikacyjnej na kulturp 
zachodnich rubiezy Imperium Rosyjskiego (1772-1915) (Warsaw: Instytut Sztuki Polskiej 
Akademii Nauk, 1994), 178-80.
47Archiwum Panstwowe m. st. Warszawy, Zbior W. Przyborowskiego, vol. 3: 116.
48Sokol, Russkaia Varshava, 38.
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the statue to conclude the event.49
During the evening, the emperor hosted a dinner at Lazienki palace. Among the 
guests were the Austrian Archduke Albert and nearly 200 local Russian officers and civil 
servants. The evening concluded with a theatrical performance in the Orangery on the 
Lazienki grounds. The entire imperial tour bore a heavily official and Russian character 
that minimized the Polish presence.50
The staged events of Alexander IPs 1870 visit crystalized the new state of affairs 
in the Polish Kingdom. The Russian community, whose numbers had begun to grow 
dramatically, became the central focus of attention in the imperial drama. Paskevich’s 
memorial made concrete the position of Russians in this Polish city. The importance of 
the choice of subject and location was not lost on Warsaw’s Polish population. Paskevich 
defeated the Poles in 1831 and instituted repressive policies that meant the end of the 
Polish autonomy created in 1815. The monument’s location on Krakowskie 
Przedmiescie put it in the very heart of the city. The emperor’s involvement in the 
project, and his participation at the dedication, clarified the post-uprising relationship 
between Poles and their sovereign. The Russian emperor increasingly appeared not as the 
paternal figure standing impartially over all his peoples, but as a conqueror who placed 
alien (non-Polish) officials over a defeated territory. To the Varsovian Russians, this
49Paszkiewicz, Pod berlem Romanowow, 171; Agata Tuszynska, “Trzy pomniki,” 
67-68. Tuszynska has the full text of a report of the event by the French consul in 
Warsaw, Baron Finot. Apparently, Fedor Paskevich had fallen from favor at the court 
and requested dismissal a few years before. I have not found the grounds for his 
opposition to the memorial.
50Tuszyhska, “Trzy pomniki,” 68.
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imperial tour confirmed their own privileged position in Poland and with the emperor.51
Upon the assassination of Alexander II in 1881, the direction of policy vis-a-vis 
the Poles took a distinctly harder line. Richard Wortman found that the conception of the 
empire “shifted from a multinational elite serving the Westernized European emperor to 
an Orthodox, ethnically Russian elite serving the Russian tsar. The Government no 
longer tried to appear as German in Riga and Tatar in Kazan, but as Russian masters 
subjecting lesser peoples of the empire.”52 Few Poles bore any illusions that the new 
emperor would ease their conditions. Furthermore, the last two Romanovs emphasized 
their distinctly Russian heritage. The cosmopolitan Polish aristocracy would find itself in 
an increasingly weakened position when confronting these tsars who viewed their non- 
Russian and non-Orthodox subjects, especially Polish Catholics, with suspicion.
Alexander III only made one official visit to Warsaw in 1884. He did come to the 
Polish Kingdom on a number of occasions for military maneuvers or annual hunting 
holidays at Spala or Bialowieza (Belovezh); however, other than that one trip in 1884, he 
only passed through the city on the way to other destinations.53 The 1884 visitation was 
part of a routine diplomatic and military tour and not an excursion intended to redefine 
Polish relations. At the end of the Varsovian trip, he participated in the military 
maneuvers in Novo-Georgievsk (currently Modlin); after this military inspection, he
5'Alexander also made one more imperial visit to Warsaw in the fall of 1879. See 
AGAD, Zarz^d Palacow Cesarskieh. Sygn. 1365, p. 1; Sidorov, Russkie gosudari, 22.
52Wortman, Scenarios o f Power, vol. 2:233.
53Sidorov, Russkiie gosudari, 22; Sidorov, Russkaia zhizn ’, 178; and Wortman, 
Scenarios o f Power, vol. 2: 282.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
255
traveled to Skiemiewice on 4 (16) September for the meeting of the Three Emperors 
(with Wilhelm I of Germany, and Francis Joseph of Austria-Hungary) to renew the 
existing treaty between them.54 He returned to the Russian Empire through the Polish 
Kingdom and took holiday in the area of the Spala’s Forests. In all, Alexander HI was in 
the Polish Kingdom a total of nineteen days, from 27 August (8 September) to 14 (26) 
September. Only three of these, 27 August (8 September) to 29 August (10 September), 
were spent in Warsaw.53
After repeated delays, the administration finally decided upon these dates, and 
Warsaw’s citizenry received the news on 16 (28) August 1884 in Gazeta Warszawska. 
Only a short time before the occasion, oberpolitsmaistr General-major Sergei Tolstoi 
called upon residents to prepare for the occasion by decorating their homes with “flags, 
tapestries, flowers, busts, portraits, [and] the Imperial Monogram on their balconies and 
in their windows. During the evenings, candles and lamps were to light the interiors, 
while the exteriors were to be illuminated by gas and oil lamps.” The best-known 
orchestras were to perform during the evening illuminations in locations chosen by the 
police. A few days later, Tolstoi announced the conditions under which some people 
could have access to the Court and observe the military parade. The Oberpolitsmaistr’s 
Chancelleiy issued the tickets and credentials to the individuals who would be thus
54Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 189, 5 September 1884,1. All dates for the 
Varshavskii dnevnik are according to the Julian calendar.
55 Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 183,29 August 1884, 1; Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 185, 
31 August 1884, 1; Sidorov, Russkiie gosudari, 22-24; and Chudziak, Pobytlch 
Cesarskich Mosci, 5,13.
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privileged.56
Security concerns for Alexander Hi’s visit to Warsaw played a greater role than 
had been the case in previous imperial tours. Along with Alexander’s well-known dislike 
of Poles and of public events, the apprehension caused by the threat of terrorism 
shortened the excursion and limited its ceremonial occasions.57 Alexander II’s 
assassination was still a recent memory. Nationalist and revolutionary Poles were known 
to have links with the Russian revolutionaries — including Narodnaia Volia -  the group 
responsible for the assassination. Wild rumors of attacks upon the life of Alexander III in 
Warsaw circulated among some dignitaries and Polish aristocrats.58 News of the tsar’s 
visit was viewed apprehensively by some for this reason. Helena z Morsztynow 
Ostrowska noted the impending arrival of the emperor in her diary in August 1884. “It is 
unwelcome news that the tsar is coming . . .  Considering the recently uncovered 
preparations upon the life [of the emperor], there was, until now, hope that they [the
56Gazeta Warsawska, no. 196, 16/28 August 1884; Gazeta Polska, no. 19,16/28 
August 1884; Warsawska gazeta policyjna no. 179,1884 as cited in Agnieszka 
Moczulska, “Wizyta Aleksandra III w Warszawie w 1884 r.,” Rocznik Warszawski 24 
(1991), 256.
57See Wortman, Scenarios o f Power vol. 2: 166,170 for more on Alexander’s 
dislike of such events.
58Zanna Kormanowa, “Zamach na Aleksandra III w Warszawie. Ze studiow nad 
dziejami Proletariatu,” Z Pola Walki 6 , no. 3 (1963), 7-8,17-21. The last pages are 
reproductions of the Dutch embassy’s report to The Hague relating the supposed attack. 
Kormanowa accepted the reports as evidence that the intended terrorist attack was real, 
but Leon Baumgarten effectively rejected the plan’s reality. Although the attempt was 
not real, the concerns, particularly in Poland, were. See Leon Baumgarten, “Czy partia 
Proletariat organizowala zamach na cara Aleksandra HI?” Z Pola Walki 6, no. 4 (1963): 
110- 122.
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imperial family] had abandoned this holiday [to Poland], which placed fear in the whole 
country.” She believed that it was the Poles’ “misfortune” to have to bear “the 
undeserved responsibility” of protecting him.59 The fear was that such plans might just be 
successful; Ostrowska expressed the concerns of Russian reprisals for the death of a tsar 
on Polish territory. Furthermore, paranoia pervaded the entire regime, and it 
overestimated the power of revolutionaries for a number of years. Russian officials came 
to believe that “nihilists were everywhere and terrorism unavoidable.”60 As a result, 
security was tight; officials limited public transport a half hour before the imperial train’s 
expected arrival, and travel by horse was restricted. Many of the forces based in Warsaw 
appeared on the streets in preparation for the emperor’s arrival. Officials also closed 
Lazienki Park to city residents.61 Under these conditions, Poles were unlikely to petition 
the tsar for improved conditions, and the administration was even less likely to accede to 
them.
The first day’s introductions portrayed the existing hierarchy within the Polish 
kingdom. Russian officials played the central roles, followed by the Russian religious
59Helena Ostrowska, “Dzieje Maluszyna i jego dziedzicow z opowiadania i 
pami^ci zebrane,” Biblioteka Uniwersyteta Warszawy, manuscript no. 581, 130. Her 
husband was Aleksander Ostrowski, the chairman of the nobles’ Land Credit Society 
(Towarzystwo Kredytowe Ziemskiego).
60Norman M. Naimark, Terrorists and Social Democrats: The Russian 
Revolutionary Movement under Alexander III (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1983), 20. For more on the pervasive sense of paranoia among high officials, see 
pp. 15-21.
61 Warszawska gazetapolicyjna, no. 183,25 August/6 September 1884,1-2; 
Moczulska, “Wizyta Aleksandra III,” 260-61; and Kormanowa, “Zamach na Aleksandra 
in,” 14-15.
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hierarchy. The Polish nobility was also present, but they became silent participants rather 
than fellow performers in the drama of imperial power. Because participation, however 
small, offered political access, Polish elites in the Kingdom nevertheless understood the 
need to attend the ceremonies. Governor-General Iosif V. Gurko hoped to impress 
Alexander m  with the predominance and size of the Russian colony. He accordingly 
reminded the major-generals, lieutenant-generals, generals, and corporals of the Guards 
regiment that their wives could be presented to the Imperial Couple.62
The imperial train arrived at the Warsaw-St. Petersburg station in Praga on 27 
August (8 September) at 10 a.m. A military band began the festivities as the train 
approached the platform. As was the case with many such events, the imperial family’s 
(the heir also accompanied his parents) entourage included various grand dukes, courtiers, 
and ministers (of the Imperial Court, Interior, War, and Communication). The Russian 
Varsovian leadership made the official greetings. The inscription on the platter for the 
bread-salt offering was in Russian: “A faithful offering from the citizens of Warsaw.” 
Alexander III responded that he was “very happy to be here.” He walked past the honor 
guard of the First Company of the Lithuanian Life Guards Regiment, which sang in 
unison and displayed its banners. With the final greeting to these soldiers, the first act of 
the tour’s drama concluded. The Russian press made a brief note of the Polish 
representatives, but the impression left was of a predominantly Russian welcome. 
Russians such as Mme. Gurko and President Starynkevich became the representatives of
62Moczulska, “Wizyta Aleksandra HI,” 256; Zaleski, Towarzystwo warszawskie,
116.
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“society,” while the Poles were left as little more than onlookers as far as the Russian 
leadership was concerned.63
Yet, Poles did greet Alexander III. Despite Gurko’s intentions, the Russian 
contingent did not outnumber the Polish attendees. The Polish patriotic stance of 
avoiding all contacts with the Russian occupiers had already relaxed among Polish elites, 
particularly among the conservative aristocracy who hoped to reestablish contacts and 
cooperation with the Russians 64 Among their representatives were individuals from the 
aristocracy, industrialists, Jewish leaders, and others including Count Tomasz Zamoyski, 
Count Seweryn Uruski, Count Stanislaw Kossakowski, Count August Potocki, Marquis 
Zygmunt Wielopolski, Chair of the Railroad Stanislaw Kronenberg, banker Jozef Rawicz, 
and Chair of the Jewish Community Dr. Ludwik Natanson, and industrialist Wilhelm 
Rau.65 The brief words Alexander III spoke to this group of Poles were in Russian. The 
Poles present responded likewise in Russian, and the emigre Polish press chided them for 
it. Ultimately, this moment was more about proving loyalty than about requesting a
63Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 183,28 August 1884, 1; Kholmsko-Varshavskii 
eparkhiaVnyi vestnik, no. 17,1/13 September 1884,249; and Chudziak, Pobytlch 
Cesarskich Mosci, 5.
^Andrzej Szwarc, Od Wielopolskiego do stronnictwa polityki realnej: zwolennicy 
ugody z Rosjq, ich poglqdy i proby dziahlnosei politycznej (1864-1905) (Warsaw: Gryf, 
1996), 106; Jerzy W. Borejsza, Pipkny wiekXIX  (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1984), 347.
65“Mestnaia khronika,”Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 183,28 August 1884,1; 
Moczulska, “Wizyta Aleksandra HI,” 262; and Kormanowa, “Zamach na Aleksandra ID,” 
15. Among the titled aristocrats were men known for a loyalist, conservative approach to 
Russo-Polish relations. Zygmunt Wielopolski was the son of Aleksander Wielopolski, 
the civilian head of administration in Poland before the January Uprising.
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change in conditions for Poles.66
Although the Polish representatives hoped to find some kind of modus vivendi 
with the imperial government, the pressure to remain “discrete” persisted. The emigre 
Polish newspaper, the Kurier Polski of Paris, criticized the Polish delegation for speaking 
to Alexander III in Russian, rather than French. It also labeled them targowicze -  an 
accusation of treason -  for not seeking to improve the political situation of the Polish 
Kingdom.67 Aleksander Swi^tochowski wrote in his memoirs of the constraints that 
Poles living in the Kingdoms felt. Unlike the emigre press, local Poles “covered more 
truthful thoughts and feelings between the lines of poetry. . .  in an invisible art of writing, 
which readers conjured through shrewdness, like disappearing ink.”68 The Poles who 
participated in this drama did not believe they could do more when confronting the 
nationalistically inclined Allexander HI.
Upon the conclusion of the welcome at the train station, the imperial entourage 
proceeded west across the Vistula into the city’s center to greet the religious hierarchy at 
the Russian Orthodox Holy Trinity Cathedral. Amidst the ringing of bells and people’s 
applause, Alexander III and Gurko entered the cathedral for a service of welcome. Inside 
the church, Archbishop Leontii, Lublin Bishop Modest, Archimandrite Gerontii, and
66Szwarc, Od Wielopolskiego, 173.
67S2warc, Od Wielopolskiego, 173. Targowicze refers to the Polish noblemen who 
formed the Confederation of Targowice in 1792 and requested Russian assistance to 
defeat the Polish 3 May 1791 constitution. The result of that Russian assistance was the 
Second Partition of Poland.
68Aleksander Swi^tochowski, Wspomnienia (Wroclaw: Ossolineum 1966), 101.
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other clergy greeted the emperor with a cross and holy water. Leontii’s speech reminded
the sovereign of the increasingly Russian national character of his empire:
If in your vast empire, to our deepest regret, can be found people unworthy of the 
appellation sons of the fatherland [and] who disgrace themselves with their 
actions in defiance of [their] oaths, what significance do they have among the 
mass of the enormous national population?69
The archbishop’s words noted the relative weakness and isolation of any resistance to
imperial rule in the face of the much larger Russian population that supported Alexander
III. While those who could be called “unworthy” included Russian revolutionaries, in
Warsaw, these words included the bulk of Polish educated society.
After the Orthodox service, Alexander made a brief nod to the Catholic Church.
The Catholic Archbishop, Wicenty Chosciak-Popiel, was conducting services in honor of
Alexander III in St. John’s Cathedral in the Old City to the north.70 However, the tour’s
bureaucratic managers chose another Catholic church that sidestepped the Polish Catholic
hierarchy. As the royal entourage moved south towards Lazienki Park, it stopped at St.
Alexander’s church, where the church’s priest blessed the emperor with a crucifix and
holy water at the entrance.71 The Catholic church the imperial suite visited further
indicated the declining status of the Catholic Polish population. This church
commemorated Alexander I’s visit in 1815 and was not one of the city’s most important
Catholic churches. Rather than proceeding to St. John’s, which was also much closer to
69Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 183,28 August 1884, 1; Kholmsko-Varshavskii 
eparkhial’nyi vestnik, no. 17,1/13 September 1884,249.
70Moczulska,“Wizyta Aleksandra HI,” 263.
11 Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 183,28 August 1884,1; Sidorov, Russkie gosudari, 22.
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the Orthodox cathedral, as well as the seat of the archbishopric, the emperor’s handlers 
chose the one that commemorated the Romanov’s presence in the city.72
The next event, after a brief rest at Lazienki, was an inspection of the military in 
Warsaw at the Mokotow Fields. Alexander III viewed 90 battalions, 66 squadrons, and 
132 guns.73 As he passed by the units on horseback, military bands performed music and 
the men shouted “ura.” He then joined the empress to view the soldiers march past the 
imperial entourage. The imperial couple continued with the military theme by visiting the 
veterans of the Alexandro-Mariinskii Invalids’ Home.
The remainder of the day was taken up with social diversions. In the afternoon, 
the emperor hosted the kingdom’s chief officials and invited guests at Lazienki Palace for 
lunch and musical entertainment provided by two Russian military bands. Later, 
Alexander and his guests enjoyed the palace grounds. In the evening, the imperial 
entourage attended the Teatr Wielki to see portions of the Polish opera Jawnuta 
(Stanislaw Moniuszko, 1819-1872, composer) and the Italian ballet Love and Art 
(Antonio Pallerini, 1819-1882, choreographer).74 Despite the heightened Russian 
nationalism of Alexander ID and the Varsovian Russian community, their cultural 
entertainments remained pan-European. Performing Moniuszko’s work also showed that
72St. John’s was also the church that Nicholas I attended for his coronation as 
King of Poland, and it had a long history as the primary church for the city. It houses the 
crypts of the last Dukes of Mazovia and of King Stanislaw August Poniatowski.
73For the specific makeup of the infantry, cavalry, and artillery units, see 
“Mestnaia khronika,” Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 183,28 August 1884,1-2.
74 Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 183,28 August 1884,1.
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the Russians were not completely antagonistic to Polish culture. Poles honored 
Moniuszko as the father of a truly national operatic form; yet, his work entertained the 
imperial party.
Beginning in the late morning on the second day of the visit, 28 August (9 
September), Alexander III met with more local dignitaries. The Kingdom’s ten provincial 
governors, the residing consuls (English, German, Austro-Hungarian, and French), 
religious leaders (Russian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Lutheran), heads of 
governmental institutions, the rector of Warsaw University, and the President of the city 
each had a turn meeting the sovereign in the White Hall of Lazienki Palace. The leading 
Polish aristocrats also met with Alexander at this time. The empress met separately with 
Mme. Gurko and Polish aristocratic women.75 According to Antoni Zaleski, Mme. Gurko 
created a near scandal by attempting to present the wives of local Russian officers and 
officials ahead of the Polish ladies, “disregarding birth and [aristocratic] title.” Helena 
Ostrowska’s diary also mentions some kind of tension between Mme. Gurko and the 
Polish ladies. To the satisfaction of the aristocratic ladies, however, court protocol 
diffused the situation.76
75 Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 184,29 August 1884, 1. The names of each of the 
individuals are listed in the article. Some of the same Polish nobles who attended the 
train station welcome were present again.
76Zaleski, Towarzystwo warszawskie, 116; Ostrowska, “Dzieje Maluszyna,” 130. 
Zaleski’s comments need to be read carefully since they were published outside the 
Russian empire and tend toward the hyperbolic with regard to Russians, particularly, it 
seems, with Maria Andreevna Gurko. Zaleski declared that “the Court had many 
problems with her at the time.” Yet there clearly was friction between Polish society and 
Mme. Gurko.
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During the afternoon, the focus of the imperial visitation shifted to charity and 
education. Alexander III and Maria Fedorovna inspected the Ujazdowski military 
hospital and spent an hour and a half speaking with various soldiers, including those 
injured by the previous day’s maneuvers. The next destination was the Aleksandriisko- 
Mariinskii Girls’ Institute near the hospital. They met the headmistress, instructors, and 
students, and Maria Fedorovna presented medals and awards to young women who 
finished their courses. Students then sang the national hymn, “God Save the Tsar.” The 
tour concluded with a tour of the library, the girls’ dormitory, and more student singing.77
The most important event of the second day, and of the entire visit, was the ball in 
the Royal Castle that evening. Its guest list included the Polish aristocracy, as well as the 
chief Russian military and civil officials. Yet, it remained a predominantly Russian 
event. Although nearly 700 guests attended, only a small number were Poles, primarily 
from the leading aristocratic families.78 Since the castle was the residence of the 
Governor-General, he played the part of the host, and the occasion’s organization 
involved some controversy well before it finally took place. The initial instructions Mme. 
Gurko gave were that the invitations and menus were to be only in Russian and to be 
dated according to the Julian calendar. Such a violation of court protocols caused an 
uproar among the Polish aristocracy. The final versions of both were in French with both 
styles of dafing, and the evening’s cuisine was still French. Despite the heightened
77Chudziak, Pobytlch Cesarskich Mosci, 7-8; Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 186,1 
September 1884, 1.
n Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 184,29 August 1884: 1; Agnieszka Moczulska, 
“Aleksander III na balu w Zamku Krolewskim,” Kronika zamkowa 6 (1987): 12.
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Russian nationalism of the era, there was no attempt to Russify the occasion completely.79
The Governor-general ordered that the Castle and its environs be appropriately 
decorated for such an auspicious guest as the emperor. The official Varsovian 
newspaper, Varshavskii dnevnik, even described the ball as being “in some respects a 
national holiday.” Illuminations lit up the Castle’s facade, its square, the nearby bridge to 
Praga, both shores of the Vistula, and even ships in the river. The illuminations across 
the river even included the novelty of electrical lighting. Large images of the crown and 
imperial monograms and numerous military bands fiirther heightened the festive 
environment. Large crowds assembled along the streets and the Castle Square to see the 
illustrious guests.80
The last day of the visit began when the imperial couple met with a delegation of 
approximately 200 local peasants on the small square in front of Lazienki Palace. They 
greeted Alexander and Maria Fedorovna with the bread-and-salt presentation and a copy 
of the icon of the Black Madonna of Czestochowa. The peasant elder thanked Alexander 
HI, in Russian, for his generosity in aiding them through the recent flooding of the
79 AG AD, Zarzqd Palacow Cesarskich. Sygn. 1375. Zaleski, Towarzystwo 
warszawskie, 115-16. Zaleski described the attempts to write French cuisine in Russian 
(creme d’asperges into azperznyi krem, for example). However, I have not found any 
printed invitations or menus in Russian in AGAD.
mVarshavskii dnevnik, no. 184,29 August 1884,1; Chudziak, Pobytlch 
Cesarskich Mosci, 8-10; and AGAD, Intendent Zamku. Sygn. 24, no. 219. Letter from 
the Warsaw division of the Ministry of the Imperial Court, 17/29 August 1884. Chudziak 
described the occasion as a “people’s holiday” [swipto ludowe\ as a way of emphasizing 
Alexander’s popularity among the common folk.
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Vistula.81 This event helped to maintain the belief that the peasants were essentially pro- 
tsarist in nature, even in Poland. In the imagination of Russian leaders, the common 
Polish peasant, who was free of Polonism, remained grateful for the emancipation and the 
tsar’s care.
The day then proceeded to address the remaining obligations the emperor had to 
the Varsovian Russian colony. These obligations primarily dealt with the concerns of 
children and their schooling. The Imperial Couple saw the Mariinskii Orphanage, which 
was managed by the Russian Charitable Society, and the First Girls’ Gymnasium (for 
Russian children). At the Gymnasium, Alexander asked the school’s director about the 
school’s needs, and she replied that the building was in a poor state of repair and needed 
considerable renovations. Yet, the entourage left with a positive impression of the 
“Russian children, bom and living among a population of another faith, with other 
customs, and with hostile relations toward them and all Russians” because of their 
feelings toward their “native tsar and native [sic] tsarina.”82 Despite their small numbers 
and isolation from Russia’s interior, the schools succeeded in teaching their pupils in a 
Russian spirit.
The final series of events focused on both Russian and Polish charitable 
institutions. Alexander in  presided at the laying of the cornerstone of a new school and 
Orthodox church for the Warsaw chapter of the Russian Red Cross near the comer of
81Chudziak, Pobyt Ich Cesarskich Mosci, 10-11.
S2Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 186,1 September 1884, 1; “Poseshchenie ikh 
velichestbami 1-i zhenskoi gimnazii,”Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 187,3 September 1884, 3; 
and Stefanovich, Zapiska o 1-ykh muzhskoi i zhenskoi gimnaziiakh, 24-25.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
267
Aleje Jerozolimskie and Smolna Street; the event included much of the local Russian 
administration. Institutions that were not exclusively in Russian hands also appeared on 
the agenda. Alexander III toured the Hospital of the Infant Jesus, where he met with a 
Catholic priest and noted with approval the generally high standards of the complex. The 
imperial visit concluded with a stop at the Institute for the Blind, Deaf and Mute.83
The inspection of Warsaw that Alexander III made highlighted the changed social 
order in the defeated Polish Kingdom. The Russian civil service, military, and Russian 
Orthodox Church held the preeminent positions throughout the events concerned. Even 
when touring charitable institutions, those organized by and for Russians gained greater 
attention by the Russian press and officials, despite the fact that they only affected a small 
part of the greater population. Polish interests and institutions were relegated to a 
secondary rank. Even the aristocracy, the traditional participants of such imperial 
scenarios, found themselves with reduced roles. Under this tsar and his local 
administrators, the Russian national nature of his empire denied Poles, however loyal 
they may have been, an active part in the drama of imperial power.
During the reign of Nicholas II, imperial ideology adopted nationalist and 
religious elements even more ardently. Conservatives and monarchists such as the 
theologian P. I. Melnikov-Pecherskii wrote that “only Russians call their tsar an earthly
83 Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 185,31 August 1884, 1; Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 186,
1 September 1884:1. As a postscript to the tour, the leading Russian officials received 
various awards and orders (such as the Orders of the White Eagle, St. Ann, and St. 
Stanislaw) for its smooth conduct. A modem adaptation to conclude such tours included 
the exchange of telegrams of thanks between the emperor and Archbishop Leontii, which 
were also published in the press.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
268
God [italics in original],” while Sergei Bulgakov noted upon seeing the emperor that “the 
tsar bears his authority like Christ’s Cross.”84 During the early twentieth century, 
Orthodoxy became still more important to the regime as a pillar of political legitimacy 
because the secular supports had suffered considerable erosion. The late imperial period 
was marked by disasters -  the famine of 1891, economic depression in 1901-03, the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, and Nicholas II’s own weak imperial persona -  that 
only weakened autocracy’s legitimacy. The result was an attempt to “resacralize the 
autocracy and emphasize the religious foundations of the autocracy.”85 Links with 
Orthodox Christianity were intended to provide the tsar with an aura of the sacred. Thus, 
a visit was an important local event because the leader’s link with the divine reaffirmed 
the correct order of the world.
The Russian Varsovian press propagated the image of the Christian Emperor and 
the established order with increasing frequency during Nicholas II’s reign. The accounts 
made use of anecdotes relating to previous monarchs, as well as to Nicholas II. The 
emperor’s special relationship with Orthodoxy was evident because he was a 
“magnanimous and deeply faithful son of the holy Orthodox Church.” As the Orthodox
84P. I. Mel’nikov-Percherskii [Andrei Pecherskii], Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, v. 
12 (St. Petersburg: Izdanie Tovarichestva M. O. Vol’f, 1898), 367; Sergii Bulgakov, 
Avtobiograficheskie zametki, 2nd ed. (Paris: YMCA Press, 1991), 82.
85Freeze, “Subversive Piety,” 309-10. Freeze’s article examine’s the regime’s 
inept attempts to tie the autocracy more closely with Orthodoxy, while both institutional 
and popular religious actors performed the opposite in subverting that dominant political 
culture.
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tsar, he was deeply religious and prayerful, and was the exemplar of Orthodoxy.86 One 
article asked readers: “Who among us has not sinned before God and is not to blame 
before the tsar?”87 Another suggested that at least in the eyes of pious pilgrims, the 
deceased Alexander II had intercessory powers before God. Vladimir Gurko reported in 
his book on the region that peasant pilgrims to Czestochowa spread legends that the 
statue to Alexander II erected on the stairs to the shrine held “miraculous strength.”88 
While the author did not accept the validity of such tales, he did approve of such devotion 
among Polish peasants to their benefactor. The tsar had a special relationship with the 
divine, and his authority over the people replicated that of God over the faithful.
Varsovian press accounts also echoed a modified form of the Official Nationality 
that had characterized Nicholas I’s reign. The links between Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and 
Nationality were self-evident and natural to Russia’s greatness.89 A modem Russian 
nationalism that was indifferent towards the Orthodox faith and also denied the tsar’s 
autocratic power was not only “the greatest state heresy,” according to the diocesan 
newspaper, “but also the full denial of the third part -  Russian nationality.” By choosing 
religious terminology, heresy, to describe a different nationalism the author placed a high
86“Pravoslavnyi Russkii Tsar,” Beseda, no. 6,15 March 1896, 62.
87“Tsar i narod,” Beseda, no. 12,15 April 1896,139.
88Gurko, Ocherki Privislian ’ia, 79. Czestochowa is the Catholic shrine that 
houses the famous Black Madonna.
89For more on Official Nationality see Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, Nicholas land  
Official Nationality in Russia, 1825-1855 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1959).
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value upon faith and upon an Orthodox tsar in delimiting Russianness. The heresy of 
more modem or secular Russian nationalists was so great that it amounted to the end of 
the nation itself. Not surprisingly, Polish history became the best evidence of the danger 
that such a modem Russian nationalism posed. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 
was a “half-republic” with weak royal power, and bore the burden of considerable 
religious diversity with its large populations of Catholic, Jewish, Lutheran, and Orthodox 
believers. The lesson contemporary Russian nationalists learned from the Polish case was 
that autocracy and Orthodoxy preserved the Russian state from a similar collapse.90 
Another article pointed out similarly that the Orthodox faith and the autocracy were the 
sources of Russian greatness in the world and protected the people from disaster.91
Even after the Revolution of 1905, articles continued to claim a special bond 
between the tsar and his Russian people. One author asserted that “there has always been 
unity between the tsar and the people” and further added that that unity was the 
foundation of the Russian national idea. “An historical enthusiasm for Orthodoxy and 
monarchism” inspired Russians and their “first impulse” directed them “towards God and 
tsar.”92 By implication, those who did not express similar “impulses” were not truly 
Russian. Another article claimed that “without the Russian faith, without the Russian
90“Natsionalizm bez very i tsaria,” Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi listok, 16 April 
1908,61-63.
91“Tsar i narod,” Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi vestnik, no. 19,12 May 
1902,231-232.
92A. Bumakin, “Volia tsaria i naroda,” Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi listok, no. 18,16 
September 1914,285.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
271
tsar, there will not be a Russian nation.”93 The nation itself ultimately depended upon the 
other elements of the official trinity. The various enemies Varsovian Russians imagined 
in Poland -  the Polish szlachta, Catholic priests, Jews, liberal modernizers -  became alien 
threats that had to be controlled. Among a population which primarily served the 
emperor in an official capacity, a tsar-dependent construction of Russian identity was an 
attractive idea. The construction of a Russian nationalism around the tsar, however, 
would leave the population of Poland less satisfied with its place in the empire.
The unexpected death of Alexander Eli created considerable hope and interest in 
the new emperor among many Poles. Many pinned their hope for improved conditions 
upon Nicholas II and grasped at any signs that his reign might prove friendlier to them. 
Maria z Lubienskich Gorska wrote in her diary that Polish aristocrats believed Nicholas 
was “completely different from his father; his nature [was] good and desires [were] 
noble.”94 The first few years of the reign marked the high point of Polish conciliationists 
(ugodowcy), who strove for some kind of rapprochement in Russo-Polish relations.95 
Among the chief indicators of improved relations Poles perceived was the dismissal of 
the hated Governor-General Gurko at the beginning of Nicholas IPs reign in December
93“Natsionalizm bez very i tsaria:” 63.
94Maria z Lubienskich Gorska, Gdybym mniej kochala; dziennik lat 1896-1906 
(Warsaw: Twoj Styl, 1997), 38. Gorska wrote what others stated of Nicholas, but she 
was less convinced. In that same day’s entry (8 September 1897) she noted serious 
doubts in Nicholas II’s ability to reverse the anti-Polish course of the large Russian 
administration in Warsaw, even if he were positively inclined towards Poles.
95For more on the Ugoda and other loyalist movements see Andrzej Szwarc, Od 
Wielopolskiego.
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1894. The appointment of Pavel Shuvalov and then Prince Aleksandr K. Imeretynskii as 
the new Govemors-General furthered the hope for better conditions. Both men looked to 
improving relations with Polish society and left positive impressions upon it. After 
Imeretynskii’s sudden death in 1900, Maria Gorska, who tended to look skeptically at 
most Russian officials, noted that people in Warsaw liked him: “He was neither 
malicious, nor hateful like others . . .  He may have sympathized with the Poles [because 
of] the fate of his [Georgian] fatherland.”96 The government also removed another hated 
figure, Warsaw School District curator Aleksandr L. Apukhtin, in early 1897, who 
became infamous for the Russification of the schools.97
The Polish desire for change was so strong that they read portents of positive 
change in the smallest of notes, much like later Cold War-era kremlinologists. Among 
the many hints they found were the use of the phrase “Kingdom of Poland,” rather than 
Privislimkii krai, in imperial rescripts; Imeretynskii’s acceptance of the use of the Polish 
language by local priests and elites when he toured the Polish provinces; the admission of 
the Polish writer Henryk Sienkiewicz to the Imperial Academy of Sciences; and the 
imperial approval of appointments for seven long-vacant Roman Catholic bishoprics in 
Poland and the western gubernia in 1897. When the imperial government terminated the
%Gorska, Gdybym mniej kochaia; dzienniklat 1896-1906,102. (Entry dated 15 
December 1900). Shuvalov (Governor-General 1894-1896) had to leave due to serious 
illness, and Imeretynskii (Governor-general 1897-1900) died in 1900. Their departures 
were both mourned in Poland.
97Jan Sobczak, “Proba Polsko-Rosyjskiego pojednania u schylku XIX stulecia,” in 
Slawomir Kalemka and Norbert Kasparek, eds., Mipdzy irredentq a kolaboracjq.
Postawy spoleczenstwa polskiego wobec zaborcow (Olsztyn: Wydawnictwo Warminsko- 
Mazurskie, 1999), 151-52.
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special taxes imposed after the 1863 uprising on Polish landowners in the western 
gubernia, Poles sensed yet another sign of better relations. A possible indicator of the 
level of Polish self-deception could be seen in a street tune’s words: “Poland has not yet 
perished / Because Nicholas lives. . . ” Such positive signs, however, only raised Polish 
expectations of greater change.98
Nicholas II’s decision to visit Warsaw further encouraged Polish hopes of some 
improvement. His father came to the city in 1884 as part of a larger tour whose pinnacle 
was the meeting with his fellow emperors in Skiemiewice. Alexander III never again 
officially appeared in Warsaw, despite repeated requests by the Governor-General. He 
even kept away from the cornerstone-laying ceremonies of the Alexander Nevskii 
Cathedral. In 1897, Nicholas IPs reign had not yet suffered any setbacks, and still 
seemed to offer promise. Nicholas’s decision to come to Warsaw also followed a 
successful trip to western Europe in 1896 (French reception was particularly positive). 
The Polish conciliationists argued that the visitation presented them with the best 
opportunity to incline the new tsar towards improving Polish conditions. To accomplish 
their goal, they seized upon the idea of impressing the emperor with a grand display of 
welcome.99
"For more on the Polish hopes placed in the new reign of Nicholas II, see Jan 
Sobczak, “Polskie fascynacje mlodym cesarzem Mikolajem II. Geneza jego wizyty 
Warszawskiej we wrzesniu 1897 roku i proba polsko-rosyjskiej ‘Ugody,’” Mazowieckie 
studia humanistyczne 2, no. 1 (1996): 5-39. The street tune (on page 11) is a parody of 
the national hymn, “Jeszcze Polska nie zginela.”
"Jan Sobczak, Cesarsz Mikohj II, 2 vols. (Olsztyn: Wyzsza Skola Pedagogiczna, 
1998), 2:123-25. Not all of Polish society was enamored of Nicholas. The leaders of the 
socialist and nationalist parties such as Jozef Pilsudski had no interest in such a greeting.
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Many Polish leaders devoted themselves to the project, and the makeup of that 
leadership indicated changes in Polish society. When Nicholas announced his desire that 
donations be collected for local charitable and other institutions before his tour, 
prominent Polish citizens formed a committee in May 1897. Governor-General 
Imeretynskii appointed Marquis Zygmunt Wielopolski the chair of the Committee for 
Collecting Charitable Donations for the Creation of Charitable Institutions on the 
Occasion of Their Majesties’ Visit in Warsaw (shortened to the Contributions 
Committee, Komitet Skladek). Financier-industrialist Leopold Kronenberg became the 
treasurer. In all, the 46-person committee membership included 21 aristocrats, 18 
industrialists and financiers, and 7 members of the intelligentsia. Although the 
aristocracy maintained its privileged position, the representatives of a modem urban and 
industrial Poland gained a significant voice in the royal drama that followed. The 
organization grew to include over 800 members throughout the Kingdom.100
The results of the Contributions Committee were impressive: it collected over one 
million mbles from approximately 100,000 people of all classes. Although the 
aristocracy certainly provided many of the donations, the industrialists and financiers, 
many of whom were Polonized Germans and Jews, donated more heavily. Leopold 
Kronenberg offered 100,000 mbles. Jan Bloch and Hipolit Wawelberg each donated
100Ibid., 127-28; Album maigtkowy z pobytu Ich Cesarskich Mosci Najjniejszych 
Panstwa w Krolestwie Polskiem (St. Petersburg: ‘Kraj,’ 1897), 18-20. The list included 
the likes of old aristocratic families such as the Lubomirskis, Potockis, and Radziwills, 
but also industrialists such as Maurycy Poznahski of Lodz and Wladyslaw Kislanski, 
chair of the Warsaw Society of Industry and Trade (who was the one engineer). The 
membership of the novelist and journalist Boleslaw Prus was particularly notable for 
garnering public support.
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25,000, and other industrialists followed suit with multi-thousand ruble figures. No other 
call for donations had ever resulted in such large sums in Poland before.101 And through 
these donations, Poland’s developing middle class earned the right to have access to the 
tsar on his visit. An event that once established or confirmed a relationship between 
emperor and nobles now had many more participants striving to prove their own place in 
the social and political order.102
The weak position of Polish society vis-a-vis the Russian authorities, however, 
became clear after the committee’s chair presented the results to the Governor-general.
On 14 (26) August 1897, Marquis Wielopolski appeared before Imeretinskii at the Royal 
Castle and gave his report in Russian. He declared that “the majority of the Polish nation, 
without renouncing its nationality or its faith, honestly wishes to live and develop in 
union with the powerful Russian State.” However, Interior Minister Ivan Goremykin 
arrived in Warsaw before the visit to ensure that the proceedings did not become an 
opportunity for Polish patriotic demonstrations. He insisted that the imperial monograms 
be in Cyrillic rather than Latin characters. The million-ruble offering could be given 
publicly, but the platter on which it rested had to be in Russian, not Polish, script, and it 
also had to describe the gift as coming from Warsaw rather than the Kingdom of Poland. 
Finally, delegates could only speak to Nicholas in Russian.103 The protocols which
101Sobczak, Cesarz Mikola.], 2: 128.
102Many of the Polish industrialists were also favorably inclined to better relations 
with Russia because that was their primary export market.
103Sobczak, Cesarz Mikotaj, 2: 129. With regard to the imperial monogram, the 
insistence was upon “ H - A” (Nikolai- Aleksandra), rather than “M - A” (Mikolaj -
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dictated the use of the French language in an ethnically mixed aristocratic setting had 
fallen by the wayside long ago. Russian officials provided no room for Polish leaders to 
depart from a Russian script, particularly when they were in close proximity to the 
emperor. Polish leaders for their part hoped to avoid any offense in the name of better 
relations.
The completion of the donation drive did not mark the end of the Polish 
Contributions Committee members’ activity. Many of them formed what is sometimes 
referred to as the Citizens’ Committee under the leadership of Lucjan Wrotnowski to 
beautify Warsaw and collect separate funds for this purpose. Among the tasks entrusted 
to this group were the organizational, technical, and even some matters of public order for 
the official greeting on the first day. Different committee men managed each of the four 
portions of the parade route Nicholas II was to take on that day. Individual factories, 
offices, schools, and institutions had their own assigned locations for greeting the tsar.
The committee placed electric lights on the streets leading to the tsar’s palace. It also 
supervised the extensive renovations of both the Belvedere and Lazienki Palaces, which 
included electric lighting and connections to the water system.104 Varshavskii dnevnik 
estimated that the decorations cost 87,000 rubles and wrote that “despite its irregular 
construction, Krakowskie Przedmiescie looks extremely striking” as a result of this
Aleksandra).
104“K priezdyu ikh imperatorskikh velichestv,” Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 220,
19/31 August 1897, 2; Sobczak, “Polskie fascynacje,” 35-36. The route’s first section 
was from the train station to the Alexander Bridge (currently the Sl^sko-D^browski), the 
second continued to the Hotel Europejski, the third extended to Smolna Street, and the 
final segment reached Lazienki Park.
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effort.105 The monies for the palace renovations, however, came from the Ministry of the 
Imperial Court.106
The committee’s work on decorating the city streets for the first day garnered the 
greatest attention. Jan Bogumil Rosen, a well-known contemporary painter, directed the 
artistic program. Other artists involved in the project included the architects Bronislaw 
Rogojski (Rogojski-Brochwicz) and Bronislaw Gawrychowski, the artist-sculptor 
Jeziorahski, and the painter-conservator Jan Strzalecki, who renovated all the frescoes in 
Lazienki Palace. Banners, portraits, flags, and an impressive twenty-four thousand 
flowers festooned the route between the St. Petersburg Rail station and Lazienki Park.
The designers also erected a series of gates and triumphal arches along the way for 
Nicholas 11’s party to pass through.107
These structures not only incorporated imperial imagery, but also represented 
various segments of modem Polish society. The first arch, dedicated to Polish industry, 
was at the intersection of Aleksandrovskaia and Mikhailovskaia Streets (currently Aleje 
Solidamosci and Lukasiriskiego St.) near St. Florian’s Roman Catholic church. The arch 
replicated two massive Greek pillars connected with garlands and topped by an oak 
wreath with the imperial crown. Varshavskii dnevnik’s correspondent described them as
105“Ubranstvo goroda,” Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 221, 20 August/1 September
1897.2. The author also pointed out particular buildings for their extravagant 
presentations.
106AGAD, Zarz^d Palacow Cesarskich, Sygn. 1389, str. 9-10, 84,91.
107Sobczak, “Polskie fascynacje,” 36; Russkiia vedomosti, no. 229,20 August
1897.2.
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similar to the Zygmunt column on Castle Square. Artists decorated the arch with the 
symbols of local industry: copper pipes, machine wheels, and agricultural steel 
instruments. Factory owners dressed in black coattails and white ties assembled along 
the arch and workers in their Sunday best assembled further down toward the bridge to 
greet Nicholas. A workers’ orchestra also performed at this section of the route. The 
bridge itself was heavily decorated with flags, garlands, and a massive image of the city’s 
coat of arms.108
The second arch stood at the end of the bridge on Krakowskie Przedmiescie near 
the Royal Castle. Its symbolism centered upon Warsaw’s merchants and craftsmen. Its 
“elegant tent of bright red material” was capped with another imperial crown and the state 
seal with the city’s underneath it decorated the comers. Large busts of the imperial 
couple rested on brackets next to the columns supporting the tent. At this location, the 
local merchants assembled on one side of the street, while craftsmen manned the other 
side.109
The intended high point of this parade route was the third arch, which was 
dedicated to the Polish nobility. It consisted of massive Greek columns decorated with 
oak garlands, flags, flowers, busts of the imperial couple, and the seals of the empire and 
the city. Beyond the arch, near Count Berg (currently Traugutt) Street, planners erected a
108Russkiia vedomosti, no. 230,21 August 1897,2; V. Prokof ef, “Varshavskiia 
torzhestva,” Novoe vremia, no. 7718, 28 August (4 September) 1897, 2; and “Ubranstvo 
goroda,” Varshavskii dnevnik, 2. It should also be noted that Russia was the primary 
market for Polish industry.
l09Russkiia vedomosti, no. 230:2; “Ubranstvo goroda,” Varshavskii dnevnik. 2.
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large red tent with golden brocade-covered cornices. The tent was covered with the state 
seal and also with the seals of the ten Polish provinces. This arch was surrounded by the 
representatives of the noble landowners of the Polish Kingdom. Those who had Court 
titles wore their medals and appropriate uniforms.110
The fourth arch belonged to the Polish peasantry and used an appropriately 
different iconography. Its location was along Nowy Swiat near Swi^tokrzyska Street and 
attracted more press attention than the other structures. Rather than using Greek 
columns, the artist responsible for this arch, Jan Bogumil Rosen, chose to imitate a 
peasant hut covered with thatch (the Varshavskii dnevnik article incorrectly named 
Rogojski as the designer). Along with the ubiquitous flags and monograms, this arch 
included various agricultural plants and peasants’ farm implements, such as plows, 
scythes, and rakes. Rosen supposedly took pride in this arch for skillfully covering the 
blue part of the Russian flags so that the visible red and white bars appeared from a 
distance to be Polish colors. A peasant orchestra performed at this site and Polish 
peasants in various regional costumes assembled around it.111
The fifth arch, like the previous one, presented an interesting innovation. This 
arch represented sporting clubs. The arch’s upper portion was made of a crimson-and- 
gold-colored cloth. At its pinnacle designers placed an oak wreath with a bust of 
Nicholas with his imperial crown. The rest of the decoration included bicycles, oars,
noRusskiia vedomosti, no. 230: 2. This arch was near C2ysta Street, which no 
longer exists.
mRusskiia vedomosti, no. 230:2;“Ubranstvo goroda,” Varshavskii dnevnik: 2; 
and Sobczak, Cesarz Mikohj, 2 :130.
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racing flags, horses, and the seals of the city’s various athletic clubs and societies. 
Bicyclists, skaters, and oarsmen, each with their respective gear, assembled at this 
location.112
Finally, on St. Alexander’s Square, one more structure completed the emperor’s 
triumphal passage through the city’s center. These gates bore the images and symbols 
that covered the entire parade route: garlands; imperial monograms; national flags; and 
state, provincial, and city seals. Children from various orphanages and schools 
surrounded this location south to Lazienki Park. Near the end of the route, Russian 
soldiers from the Lithuanian Life Guard Regiment stood as the final welcoming group.113
The designers wanted these arches and the groups that assembled around them to 
inform Nicholas II of the existence of a new and diverse Polish society that was 
comprised of more than nobles. Factories, social organizations, Jewish groups, sporting 
clubs, and many other elements of modem Polish society participated. Even the Catholic 
clergy, frequently assumed to be the source of Polish nationalist agitation, played a part; 
they stood at the entrances of their churches with groups of “young girls in white skirts, as 
if dressed for a procession.”114 Although the nobles’ arch was intended as the 
“culmination” of the procession, it was not the first of this series of structures; the
n2Russkiia vedomosti, no. 230: 2. This arch was on Nowy Swiat, before the 
intersection with Aleje Jerozolimskie, between the Branicki and Kossakowski Palaces.
mRusskiia vedomosti, no. 230: 2; “Ubranstvo goroda,” Varshavskii dnevnik: 2; 
and Sobczak, Cesarz Mikolaj, 2: 143-44. The number of “arches” mentioned by various 
sources wavers between 5 and 6. It seems to me that the distinction between an “arch” 
and a “gate” is one source of the confusion.
lHBeseda no. 17,1 September 1897,194.
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industrialists had that honor. The most unusual and creative structures belonged to the 
peasants’ and athletes’ delegations. The peasants’ arch acknowledged what was still the 
largest part of the Polish people. The sportsmen’s arch indicated a different means of 
organizing society; a growing middle class presented itself according to self-selected 
interests rather than according to occupation or estate. The organizers showed a diverse 
and modernizing population that was loyal to the emperor.
The day before Nicholas’s arrival, the oberpolitsmaistr announced the security 
restrictions relating to transportation and nightly illumination. Horse-drawn trolleys 
along the primary streets between the palace and the castle ceased running at 7:15 in the 
evening. The detailed regulations even included rules on the use of bicycles, which only 
recently appeared in Warsaw, along these streets. The movement along the main streets 
between the tsar’s palace and the Royal Castle were to be carefully regulated, even on the 
sidewalks.115
The enthusiastic response Nicholas II received surprised participants and 
correspondents in Poland, and even in Russia. Along the entire 7-kilometer route, the 
Imperial couple was met by a few hundred thousand Varsovians who generally were 
excited to welcome them. Some of the more patriotically inclined Poles opted to be out 
of the city, but the city’s streets had not seen anywhere near this number of people since 
the January uprisings.116 Maria Gorska wrote in her diary entry (8 September 1897) that
n5Warszawska gazeta policyjna, no. 169, 18/30 August 1897, 1; Warszawska 
gazeta policyjna, no. 170,19/31 August 1897,1-2.
116Jan Sobczak, “Proba Polsko-Rosyjskiego pojednania,” 157.
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“Warsaw was so impressionable, so tired of its heavy imprisonment and persecution 
under Alexander II [sic]” that it completely came out “to greet the new government with 
new hope.”117 Novoe vremia's Warsaw correspondent wrote that it was “hard to imagine 
what is happening now.” He compared the city to a miniature Paris and declared that 
Poles had arrived from every comer of Poland for the occasion.118
The proceedings at the St. Petersburg train station followed the expected course. 
The imperial family (with daughters Olga and Tatiana), members of the court, and certain 
ministers arrived at approximately five o’clock to the welcoming sounds of a military 
band and church bells. The military and administrative officials and their wives 
dominated the membership of the greeting party.119 Among the official representatives of 
the city were the former president, Sokrates Starynkevich, and numerous Poles, many of 
whom had been on the committees organizing the arrival. The Polish representatives, 
although their membership remained heavily aristocratic, included industrialists and 
prominent members of the intelligentsia.120 After a few brief words, the imperial party
117Gorska, Gdybym mniej kochala, 38.
118V. Prokof ev, “Varshava,” Novoe vremia, no 7716,21 August (2 September)
1897. Nicholas II had been enthusiastically welcomed in Paris the previous year.
119“Prevyvanie ikh imperatorskikh velichestv v Varshave,” Varshavskii dnevnik, 
no. 221, 20 August (1 September) 1897, 1; Beseda, no. 17: 193; and Russkiia vedomosti, 
no. 230: 2. Bibikov was president from 1892 to 1906.
120“Deputatsiia ot goroda Varshavy,” Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 221,20 August (1 
September) 1897,2. Among the Polish delegates were Dr. Ignacy Baranowski, Prince 
Michal Radziwill, Count Jozef Wielopolski, Count Adam Krasinski, Count Maurycy 
Zamoyski, Jan Bloch, Leopold Kronenberg, Edward Natanson, Adolf Suligowski, 
Aleksander Glowacki (better known as the author Boleslaw Prus).
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began its way along the parade route.
The festivities continued into the evening with entertainment for the imperial 
entourage at Lazienki Park and public celebrations on the city streets. The Warsaw 
Choral Society, Lutnia, performed arrangements that included the Polish composers 
Chopin, Moniuszko, Kotarbinski, and Maszynski. By choosing these composers, the 
Choral Society reminded the park’s guests that they were in a Polish setting. Frederick 
Chopin and Stanislaw Moniuszko had the stature of national composers, and Piotr 
Maszynski (1855-1934) was known for choral pieces that adapted Polish folklore; they 
also had strong connections with Warsaw.121 The assembled guests also took advantage 
of the park’s lake for other entertainments as well.122 On Warsaw’s streets, the wider 
public enjoyed festivities enhanced by extensive gas and electric lighting. This evening 
marked the largest electric lighting project that Warsaw had yet seen and included 
hundreds of lights, which were particularly pronounced at the Royal Castle. Its lighting 
was organized by Colonel Radivanovskii, who planned the 1883 electric lighting of the 
Ivan the Great Bell Tower in Moscow.123
121Maszyhski was very popular among amateur choral groups at the end of the 
century. Moniuszko was the director of the opera at the Teatr Wielki since 1858. I have 
not been able to determine who Kotarbinski was. See Jozef M. Chomihski and Krystyna 
Wilkowska-Chimiriska, Historia muzyki polskiej, vol. 2 (Warsaw: Polskie Wydawnictwo 
Muzyczne, 1996), 59.
122“Vecher v Lazenkakh,” Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 221,20 August (1 September)
1897,2.
123“Elektricheskaia illiuminatsiia zamka,” Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 221, 20 
August (1 September) 1897, 2; “Gazovaia illiuminatsiia g. Varshavy,” Varshavskii 
dnevnik, no. 221,20 August (1 September) 1897,2; and “Illiuminatsiia 
goroda ''Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 221,20 August (1 September) 1897,3.
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The imperial couple began their second day at the Holy Trinity Russian Orthodox 
Cathedral to meet Archbishop Flavian and the Orthodox religious hierarchy. As sounds 
of church bells greeted them, Flavian welcomed Nicholas to “our outlying region 
[okrainnaia oblast’].”124 After a brief prayer, they moved on to Saxon Square to observe 
the Alexander Nevskii cathedral building site. After some more prayers, Nicholas viewed 
the designs and a model of the building and met with the building committee. At eleven 
o’clock, Nicholas’s entourage observed a military parade on Mokotow Fields. In the 
afternoon, the chief Russian Orthodox and Catholic religious figures, officers, civil 
officials, and consular representatives met the emperor at Lazienki Palace. The Polish 
Collections Committee also made an appearance, during which Marquis Wielopolski 
made a speech and presented the million-ruble donation for local charities. Nicholas II 
thanked the committee for the collection and the previous day’s welcome in Russian.
That evening, the imperial couple attended a reception at the Royal Castle with 
approximately 1,500 to 2,000 guests. The illuminations surrounding the Castle and its 
grounds brought particular press attention.125
For the third day, the emperor and empress adopted separate itineraries. Nicholas 
II left Warsaw for an inspection of Novogeorgievsk and Zergzh forts, while Alexandra 
toured charitable institutions. She visited a widows’ home (and its Orthodox church) in
124Beseda, no. 17: 194.
l25Kkolmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi vestnik, no. 17,1/13 September 1897, 309- 
10; Beseda, no. 17: 194-5; “Prebyvaniie ikh imperatoskikh vleichestv v Varshave,” 
Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 222,21 August (2 September) 1897,1; and V. Prokof ev, 
“Varshavskiia torzhestva,” Novoe vremia, no. 7719,24 August (5 September) 1897: 2. 
Prokof ev describes in some detail the electric lighting for that evening.
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Praga, a workhouse, the Institute for the Deaf, and the Infant Jesus Children’s Hospital. 
She also stopped at an orphanage run by the (Polish) Warsaw Charitable Society. Later 
that evening, the imperial couple hosted the chief officials of the Kingdom at their 
palace.126
The final day of Nicholas’s visit continued with the obligatory tours. In the 
morning, Nicholas inspected Warsaw forts, and concluded that part of the tour by meeting 
a delegation of peasants from Warsaw province. At noon, the imperial couple toured the 
Ujazdowski military hospital and its Orthodox church, where they were blessed with a 
cross and holy water. In the afternoon, they stopped at St. Alexander’s Catholic church, 
where they met the Catholic Archbishop Popiel and other Catholic church hierarchs.127
Charitable and educational institutions dominated the agenda for the remainder of 
the afternoon. Nicholas paid a visit to the Aleksandrinsko-Mariinskii (Noble) Girls’ 
Institute (which educated Polish nobles), the Red Cross Society, and the First and Third 
Boys’ Gymnasia. At the Girls’ Institute, the empress handed out awards to students who 
completed their course of study. Alexandra also accepted two gifts from the girls. One 
was a hand-sewn silk screen that won an award at a recent Nizhegorod exhibit. The 
other gift was for the Princess Olga, a small gilded table with two chairs and two dolls. 
One doll was in a boyar woman’s dress, and the other was in a Krakovian costume.
126Beseda, no. 17: 196; Russkiia vedomosti, no. 231,22 August 1897, 1; and V. 
Prokof ev, “Varshavskiia torzhestva,” Novoe vremia, no 7720,25 August (6 September) 
1897: 1.
127Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 224, 23 August (4 September) 1897, 1, 3; Beseda, no. 
17: 196-97; and Russkiia vedomosti, no. 232:1.
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Pairing a Russian doll with a Polish one and providing a table and chairs on which they 
could sit, expressed the hope that relations would improve between Russians and Poles.
At the First Boys Gymnasium (the Staszic Palace) they also met with students from the 
First Girls’ Gymnasium.128 Along with the usual tours of classes, this visit included 
examinations of the building’s neo-Muscovite renovations. The imperial couple saw the 
work on the school’s church, particularly the iconostasis and two large paintings by the 
Russian artist Svedomskii.129
The last day concluded with another dinner at Lazienki Palace and a performance 
at the Teatr Wielki. The dinner’s guests were predominantly military and administrative 
officials, although Polish aristocrats with court titles also attended. The Lithuanian Life 
Guards band performed the evening’s music. Later in the evening, the imperial entourage 
attended a performance of Lohengrin and the last act of a ballet, Dama Kerova, at the 
Teatr Wielki.130 Nicholas left Warsaw on the morning of 23 August/4 September. Their 
sendoff also included the typical music and flowers, and both Russian officials and Polish 
aristocrats attended.131
mBeseda no. 17: 196-97; Kholmsko-Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi vestnik, no. 17:
310.
129 Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 224: 1.
130Russkiia vedomosti, no. 232: 1; “Prebyvanie v Varshave ikh imperatorskikh 
vleichestv,” Russkiia vedomosti, no. 236,27 August 1897,2. This newspaper goes into 
some detail describing the dinner and its guests. Lohengrin was composed by Richard 
Wagner, but I do not have any information on the ballet (and have simply transliterated 
the title).
131 Varshavskii dnevnik, no. 225,24 August (5 September) 1897, 1.
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Nicholas II’s lone visit to Warsaw marked the high point of an attempted 
conciliation between tsar and a loyal Polish society. This last imperial visit was the 
greatest attempt by Poles to exhibit their loyalty. Previous visits had oberpolitsmaistrs’ 
announcements on decorations; in 1897, Poles took on this expensive task themselves. 
The rewards the conciliationists managed to squeeze from imperial officials for their 
obsequious posture were minimal. One was the approval for a monument in Warsaw to 
the Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz, which was erected on the centenary of his birth in
1898. Nicholas 13 even looked at the plans on the last day of his visit.132 The other 
achievement concerned the million-ruble donation; it went to found the Nicholas II 
Polytechnical Institute of Warsaw, where Russian was the language of instruction.133
Not long after the visit, the hopes of a rapprochement collapsed. During the 
course of the tour, Nicholas himself did nothing in the form of gestures to the Poles that 
indicated any real change in policy. The Polish advocates of conciliation looked to the 
Finnish model as a means of preserving (or regaining) some autonomy while being 
properly loyal to the empire. Yet, by the end of the century, that very model faced 
concerted attacks on the part of Russian leaders in St. Petersburg and in the Finnish 
administration.134 The obsequious nature of the conciliationists also rankled the younger
132Sobczak, “Proba Polsko-Rosyjskiego pojednania,” 161-62.
133APW, Warszawski Instytut Politechniczny im. Mikolaja II, sgyn. 32.
134For more on the Russificatory policies toward Finland at the end of the century 
see Polvinen, Imperial Borderland; and C. Leonard Lundin, “The Storm Breaks and 
Rages,” in Edward C. Thaden, ed. Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 
1855-1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 419-47.
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generations of Poles, particularly Jozef Pilsudski’s Polish Socialist Party and Roman 
Dmowski’s National Democrats. By the end of the century Pilsudski’s party stole and 
published secret documents Governor-General Imeretinskii wrote to St. Petersburg that 
belied his amiable fa?ade. The papers proved that the Russians had no intention of 
improving relations. Rather than revive some level of autonomy for the Poles, 
Imeretinskii had suggested instead that the Polish Kingdom be fully incorporated into the 
Russian empire.135 The Russian leadership had no interest in or saw any need of a 
partnership with the Poles.
Imperial visits to Warsaw were vital in determining the nature of Romanov rule in 
the Polish Kingdom. All those involved — Russian officials, Polish aristocrats, educated 
society, and the emperors -  looked to these events to inform their understanding of 
political realities. Although the presence of occupying regiments defined that authority 
rather bluntly, that “political authority still require[d] a cultural frame in which to define 
itself and advance its claims.”136 The repetition or innovation of established 
performances identified people’s relation to power and defined their expectations. In 
1897 Polish participants had engaged themselves in the drama, hoping to mitigate post­
uprising conditions; the Russian officials saw these events as a means of confirming their 
place as the enforcers of the imperial will on a borderland.
The Polish leaders who participated in such events faced considerable challenges
n5Tajne dokumenty Rzqdu Rosyjskiego w sprawach Polskich. Memorialks. 
Imeretynskiego. Protokofy Komitetu Ministrdw. Nota Kancelaryi Komitetu Ministrow, 
2-nd ed. (London: J. Kaniowski, 1899).
136Geertz, “Centers, Kings, and Charisma,” 30.
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in achieving their goals of improved relations. Through all the visits, they did attempt to 
dissuade Russian leaders, particularly the emperor, of Russian assumptions about 
treasonous Poles. The problem they faced, however, was that the traditional Polish elites 
-  the aristocracy -  were no longer necessary to administer these lands. Russian officials 
had come in greater numbers and occupied the chief posts. The theme of a multinational 
state with a dynasty standing above all interests and local nobilities on the borderlands 
became less workable, especially as the last emperors’ scenarios turned towards 
emphasizing the distinctly Russian nature of their authority.
The relationship dramatized in the tours, however, cannot simply be characterized 
in terms of Russian or Polish nationalisms. Large numbers of Poles did come to Warsaw 
and line the streets to catch sight of the imperial personages visiting the city. By 1897, 
the development of a mass press helped to foster excitement and boost Polish crowds to a 
degree that surprised all the correspondents. Although the scripts that Russian officials 
adopted were increasingly Russian in tone, no attempts were made to create purely 
Russian events. The consistent performance of Polish composers at the Teatr Wielki and 
Lazienki Park attests to the willingness of Russians to consume Polish culture during 
such official occasions.
The problem the Polish aristocracy confronted during the Tsars’ tours became 
particularly acute by the end of the century when imperial authorities rejected their claims 
to local leadership at the same time they faced challenges from other elements of the 
modernizing and industrializing Polish society. By 1897, an imperial visit was no longer 
the province of the nobility and state officials; it had become a mass event, and it was the
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Polish business classes who played the more important role. Although Polish nobles may 
have retained ceremonial primacy, men like Kronenberg, Bloch, and others (who included 
Polonized Jews and non-Catholics) were vital participants. The great press attention to 
Nicholas’s visit and to the parade route stands in sharp contrast to the previous visits 
when press notices were less plentiful and the pinnacle of the tours were the balls. While 
Polish nobles hoped to affirm Polish loyalty in such events, the rest of Polish society 
wanted to present its modernity through industry, production, and even sporting clubs.
Russian officials had a different agenda for these events that placed them at the 
center of local power. As the loyal servitors in a rebellious borderland, they were at cross 
purposes with the Polish aristocrats. They modified these tours so that the events became 
increasingly dedicated to firming relations between the emperor and his officials. Since 
the Varsovian Russian colony predominantly consisted of officials from other parts of the 
empire, that tie to the emperor and their service to him played an important role in 
separating them from the Poles and producing a positive definition of themselves. Thus, 
they increasingly filled the imperial tour’s agenda with visits to sites of exclusively 
Russian nature: the First Boys’ Gymnasium, the Red Cross, and Russian charitable 
institutions. Polish aristocrats found their roles to be more as spectators than participants 
in the drama of power. Officials also abandoned the old protocols, such as the use of 
French; in this manner, Russian officialdom clarified Polish subjugation. Those attending 
the balls and other events that had once been the domain of the titled began to wear the 
garb of military and civil service with greater frequency. Even the loyalist Polish nobles 
found such events more difficult to attend because of the inferior status accorded to them.
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Yet, one can argue that Russian Varsovian officials were not fully successful at 
redefining the meaning of the tours because the scenarios of power they assumed to be in 
play were changing. Alexander III and Nicholas II both visited Warsaw only once. They 
were in Poland numerous times, and officials had hoped that Alexander would be present 
for the initial commemorations of the Nevskii cathedral project. Given the military and 
economic importance of this borderland to the empire, it does seem unusual that both 
emperors stayed away from Warsaw. Furthermore, the large non-Russian contingent of 
official Warsaw found itself on weaker ground as these last two tsars moved away from 
expressing their authority as a transnational dynasty to a purely Russian one. Baltic 
Germans who governed a Polish borderland become problematic when Russian 
nationalism developed in a direction that excluded them.
The ideological tensions the visits produced only worsened during Nicholas II’s 
reign as he focused on there being a mystical link between the Russian Orthodox tsar and 
his Russian people. The result was the exclusion of “Others” who were neither Russian 
nor Orthodox. Gregory Freeze has written that “the attempt to resacralize the autocracy 
not only offended the sensibilities of the non-Orthodox minorities and secularized elites 
but also proved a desperate and risky form of mass politic, which demonstrated the want, 
not the presence, of divine favor.”137 The Polish organization of the welcome was another 
form of mass political action, but it imagined a social environment at variance with 
Nicholas’s vision. Poles looked to a modem industrial future (a “Western” image) while 
Nicholas was moving backward in time. The Poles and the imperial court ultimately
137Freeze, “Subversive Piety,” 350.
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were rehearsing different scripts for the Varsovian stage. In the Polish Kingdom, the only 
“people” with whom the emperor could argue a link, thus, were his Russian officials in 
the Polish territories (and not all of them, either). Yet, that same link with officialdom 
was undermined by the ideology Nicholas propagated in Russia’s interior as he drove 
toward the fantasy of a union with his common non-bureaucratic Russian nation. Visits 
to Warsaw ultimately failed to reaffirm the political and social order because the chief 
protagonists, Poles, officials, and emperor, had goals that could not be integrated.
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CONCLUSION
RUSSIANNESS AND RUSSIA’S EUROPEAN BORDERLANDS
When the First World War began in August 1914, the three partitioning powers -  
Russia, Prussia/Germany, and Austria-Hungary -  attempted to secure Polish support.
Each warring party claimed that it had the Poles’ best interests in mind and offered the 
prospect of unified and free Polish institutions under the auspices of the victor. Much of 
the fighting that took place on the Eastern Front that first year occurred in Russian Poland 
and Galicia. The regimes hoped to ensure Polish loyalty in their respective states and 
possibly entice the enemy’s Polish subjects to their own side. Although nationalist Poles 
had amassed a litany of complaints against all three states, there was no serious Polish 
national uprising until the end of the war. The war, not national uprisings, spelled the end 
of Russian (as well as German and Austrian) control of Polish lands.1
Russian Poland ceased to exist when the Russian administration and military 
evacuated Warsaw in 1915. Preparations for evacuation began in November 1914 but 
accelerated during the summer of 1915. Officials intended to relocate the entire Russian
‘For Russian wartime policies concerning Polish lands see Aleksander 
Achmatowicz, Polityka Rosji w kwestii polskiej w pierwszym roku Wielkiej Wojny, 1914- 
1915 (Warsaw: Neriton-Instytut Historii Polska Akademia Nauk, 2003); and A. Iu. 
Bakhturina, Okrainy Rossiiskoi Imperii: gosudarstvennoe upravlenie i natsional ’naia 
politika v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny (1914-1917 gg.) (Moscow: Rosspen, 2004), 15-77.
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community together with strategically important industries and workers. The University 
of Warsaw offered train tickets to the Russian interior to its faculty and staff in June. The 
Russian Orthodox Archbishop performed the last service in a chapel near his residence on 
5 July. During the night of 4-5 August, the last Russian divisions crossed the Vistula 
River heading east and blew up the bridge behind them; Praga would be abandoned a few 
days later. German forces arrived 5 August to an open city.2
The evidence of a century of Russian presence in Warsaw soon was expunged 
under the watchful gaze of the German occupation. The recently completed Alexander 
Nevskii Cathedral became a German military church, St. Heinrich’s, where the first 
Roman Catholic mass was held on 25 February 1916, with a Protestant service following 
a week later. The City Council, now composed of Polish members, officially changed 
street names that offended Polish national sentiments on 26 October 1916; Berg St. 
became Traugutt St, and Konstantynovskii Square became Mickiewicz Square, among 
others. It was not until 19 October 1917, however, that the German occupiers permitted 
Poles to remove the Paskevich memorial.3 During the early 1920s, most of the remaining 
Russian-identified buildings would be tom down or transformed to suit the needs of the 
Second Polish Republic.
The collapse of Russian Poland was not evident to either Russian leaders or Polish
2APW, Cesarski Uniwersytet Warsawski, sygn. 324; Paszkiewicz, Pod berlem 
Romanowow, 68; and Drozdowski and Zahorski, Historia Warszawy, 315-54.
3Sokol, Russkaia Varshava, 38,43; Krszysztof Dunin-Wqsowicz, Warsawa, 
1914-1918 (Warsaw: Polskie Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1989), 81. Berg St. honored the 
governor-general who crushed the 1863 uprising, and Traugutt St. honored the last leader 
of that uprising.
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nationalists at the beginning of the century. The number of Russians living in the Polish 
Kingdom had been growing since the end of the 1863 January Uprising, and the region 
was more closely tied to the rest of the empire than ever before. The harsh reprisals for 
rebellion had inspired a Polish movement away from nationalist rebellion towards 
political rapprochement, social causes that were often termed “organic work,” or the 
expanding industrial firms of Russian Poland.4 Although the Vistulaland (Privislinskii 
krai) remained a potentially troublesome region, it also became another borderland where 
migrating Russians defined themselves as an imperial nation.
Because many Russians remained ambivalent about their place in Europe, Russian 
officials migrating to Warsaw confronted a different cultural environment than the one 
they experienced in the empire’s non-European regions. This imperial periphery was one 
of the most Western and most economically developed parts of the empire. During the 
second half of the nineteenth century, Russian administrators witnessed the problems of 
industrialization, urbanization, and the development of national consciousness among 
subject Poles, The people these officials came to administer thus had no doubt of their 
place within European civilization and believed that Polish culture was more civilized. 
Furthermore, the expectations of Polish nationalists and elites often contradicted the 
imperial mission Varsovian Russians believed they had in Russian Poland. Thus Russian 
rule and Polish responses fed upon one another in a manner that sharpened their 
animosities and the distinctions between them. As more Russians migrated to Poland,
Proponents of organic work often looked to improving the education, health, and 
working conditions of the Polish lower classes as their primary national mission.
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that ambivalence grew to fears among Varsovian Russian leaders that some parts of their 
colony could succumb to nativization.
Local Russian administrators looked with concern at their lower ranks in Warsaw 
for various reasons. Although the number of Russians was considerable, it still 
constituted a small portion of the residents in a city with a burgeoning population. 
Varsovian Russians recognized that Warsaw was far from the Russian interior, and that 
the Poles, although Slavs, were unassimilable “aliens” (inorodnye) within the Russian 
empire. Additionally, the demographic imbalance within their group came to official 
attention as the perceived threat of the Polish woman appeared to endanger the 
Russianness of the family and home in the traditional garb of the wife and mother. Not 
only would she bring with her the features of a Catholic Polish culture, but she also 
threatened the next generation of Russians with Polonization.
Attempting to counter these Polish challenges, Russian officials defined the 
features of Russianness that they considered important An author for the Kholmsko- 
Varshavskii eparkhial ’nyi vestnik opined that “It seems that precisely on the borderlands 
of Russia, the soul of the Russian person is more lively than anywhere else.”5 That 
liveliness could be attributed to a greater awareness of the differences between Russians 
and other peoples. Defining Russianness would be less important in Moscow since most 
residents there were assumed to be Russian. Just what constituted the nature of that 
“Russian soul” depended upon the borderland in which the migrating Russians found
5“Molitva za tsaria v Varshave,” Kholmsko- Varshavskii eparkhial’nyi vestnik, no. 
20,15/27 October 1894, 327.
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themselves. On the Polish frontier, Russian Orthodoxy and the Russian language became 
crucial markers to distinguish the Russian from the Pole.
The ethnic boundaries between these two groups depended upon religion, in part 
because religious difference was easily identifiable. The contrast between Catholicism 
and Orthodoxy immediately became apparent when one saw a church, the priest’s 
vestments, or the services. That difference even made itself apparent every day when one 
simply read the newspaper, since the Gregorian (Catholic) and Julian (Orthodox) 
calendars were approximately two weeks apart. Another important feature behind 
religion’s importance concerned the crucial role of Polish Catholicism in sustaining 
Polish national identity. It tied Poland to the Latin West, rather than the Orthodox East. 
Catholic priests were active participants in the uprisings, and convents served as safe 
houses for rebels. Polish women used memorial masses as nationalist propaganda events. 
The reputed religious zeal of these women only contributed to their supposedly dangerous 
nature.
The Russian language, the language of the state, also gained increasing 
prominence in defining Russianness. As the administration increasingly centralized the 
bureaucracy and more closely integrated the Polish Kingdom into the rest of the empire, 
the Russian language played an ever more important function in official life in Poland. 
Not only administration, but also education, which opened the doors to civil service posts, 
became Russian in Poland. The old tradition which dictated that aristocratic Russians 
and Poles speak to each other in French during official engagements fell victim to Russo- 
Polish political realities after 1881, and the Russian language came to dominate such
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occasions. The importance of the language as a means of conveying cultural values 
further heightened the importance of Russian to the Varsovian colony, as they 
complained of Russian children who could no longer say their Orthodox prayers in 
Russian. Language and religion were both important ethnic boundary markers.
The tsar also became an important part of defining Russian identity for this 
community. The overwhelming majority of Varsovian Russians came to Poland in a civil 
or military capacity. Because local Polish elites were deemed “unreliable,” officials 
sought to replace Poles with Russians in this troublesome region. Varsovian Russians 
thus interpreted service to the tsar as a part of their national identity. When the emperor 
came to Warsaw, they attempted to minimize the role Polish aristocrats played in the 
royal drama by highlighting their importance in governing the region. The bureaucrats 
and officers continued to apply a modified form of Official Nationalism that valued the 
tsar and their place in the autocracy.
The Russian community defined its Russianness defensively in Warsaw, 
reflecting that Russian Varsovian leaders perceived a threat to marginalized Russians in 
Poland. The lower civil and military ranks, widows, and Russian children (especially 
from mixed marriages) loomed large in the imagination of the Russian elites, who feared 
that their colony was fraying at the edges. Polish culture and relations with Poles 
threatened these weakest members of the community, and Russian officials determined 
that the surest means of preserving their Russianness was through erecting barriers that 
protected them from the Polish people that engulfed them. Charitable institutions of 
various stripes filled in the vacuum by providing care for the sick and orphaned and
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training for the able. Efforts particularly focused upon children since they were 
recognized as the weakest part of the Russian community, as well as representatives of its 
future. Orphanages, day care, and scholarships all intended to ensure that the next 
generation still knew what it meant to be Russian.
Varsovian Russian leaders also attempted to erect physical signs that defined 
Russianness in Warsaw. The Russian colony built numerous churches and chapels that 
modified Warsaw’s skyline, providing it with public spaces they believed to be more 
appropriate for a city along a Russian borderland. In their search for truly Russian 
architectural forms, they adopted the neo-Muscovite style, which harked toward a pre- 
Petrine vision of Russia. This historicist style, which blended various architectural 
features from Early Modem Russia, gained popularity during the late nineteenth century 
and earned the support of Alexander III and Nicholas EL.
The built environment of Warsaw also became a means of creating a Russian 
collective memory in Poland. At the end of the nineteenth century, officials used the 
imprisonment and death of tsar Vasilii Shuiskii to remodel the Staszic Palace. Articles 
describing the erection of the Alexander Nevskii Cathedral claimed that the church 
marked the culmination of an Orthodox heritage dating well into the eighteenth century. 
Any site that linked Warsaw to Russian history became part of a Russian map that lay 
over the modem city: the bell tower of St. Anna’s commemorated Patriarch Filaret’s 
imprisonment during the Time of Troubles, Shuiskii’s captivity and burial were in 
Gostynin and the Staszic Palace site during the seventeenth century, and authors 
bemoaned the destruction of Peter the Great’s residence.
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The Russian community also exhibited great initiative in its architectural, 
charitable, and official activities. They were not simply bureaucrats following the 
commands issued from the capital. The two largest architectural projects, the renovation 
of the Staszic Palace and the Nevskii Cathedral, were the result of local activity.
Proposals and fund raising for the projects were in their hands. The importance of 
Orthodoxy for these officials became clear in their reports and press accounts; the 
Orthodox faith was competing against Catholicism and they rejected the possibility that it 
could be compared poorly.
However, the assertion of Russian power and identity along this borderland were 
not unproblematic. The assertion of Russianness reflected the community’s fears of 
Polonization, but that community also faced the crisis the rest of the empire underwent 
during the late imperial era. The bureaucracy and imperial system were unprepared or 
unwilling to adjust to the modernization that Russian society was experiencing. While 
Varsovian Russians strove to define their own Russianness, the “scenario of power” that 
Nicholas II adopted shifted away from them. Nicholas’s vision of a sacred Russian tsar in 
communion with his common Russian folk had no applicability in Russian Poland. The 
folk of the region were not Russian, and the Russians who were there were predominantly 
in the bureaucracy. The increasing nationalism at the end of the era also excluded a 
sizeable part of the Varsovian Russian community’s leadership. Russian nationalists 
came to look askance at figures such as Governor-General Skalon because they were not 
ethnically Russian and they governed a strategically important boundary.
As the Russian community in Warsaw attempted to shore up its sense of Russian
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identity along this western frontier, conditions in the empire and in Europe as a whole 
forced their wholesale evacuation in 1915. The Russian leadership could look to their 
successes in Russifying the administration of Poland. They created institutions to care for 
their own who were in need. And their buildings created the illusion of Warsaw as a 
Russian city. At the beginning of 1914, Warsaw and the Vistulaland did possess some of 
the hallmarks of Russianness. However, like the plaster exteriors of many Varsovian 
buildings, the imposed Russianness of Warsaw fell away at the end of the war.
Additional work on the Russian community in Poland still needs to be done to fill 
in some gaps. A closer examination of the Russian imperial project as a gendered 
endeavor is one example. How did Russians (and also Poles and Jews) imagine the roles 
of the Russian woman and Russian man in this borderland? What were Russian 
perceptions of such lower-class Polish women as prostitutes, domestic servants, and 
industrial workers? The Russian image of the Jewish woman, particularly if she were 
Polonized, would deepen our understanding of Russian conceptions of the Polish 
Kingdom. A comparison of Russians living in Polish areas outside Warsaw with those in 
Warsaw might or might not illuminate distinctions in these Russians’ perceptions of their 
identity and the imperial mission. A study of Russian cultural projects, especially the 
building of Orthodox churches, throughout the Polish Kingdom could flesh out the 
imprint of Russian dynastic nationalism. Finally, research into the iconographic 
programs of these churches could be fruitful if enough photographic images and interior 
building plans have survived in the archives.
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